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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
THE YEAR 2012
Martin J. McMahon, Jr.*
Ira B. Shepard*
Daniel L. Simmons***
This recent developments outline discusses, and provides context to understand
the significance of the most important judicial decisions and administrative
rulings and regulations promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service and
Treasury Department during the most recent twelve months - and sometimes a
little farther back in time if we find the item particularly humorous or
outrageous. Most Treasury Regulations, however, are so complex that they
cannot be discussed in detail and, anyway, only a devout masochist would read
them all the way through, just the basic topic and fundamental principles are
highlighted - unless one of us decides to go nuts and spend several pages
writing one up. This is the reason that the outline is getting to be as long as it is.
Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code generally are not discussed except to
the extent that (1) they are of major significance, (2) they have led to
administrative rulings and regulations, (3) they have affected previously issued
rulings and regulations otherwise covered by the outline, or (4) they provide
Dan and Marty the opportunity to mock our elected representatives; again,
sometimes at least one of us goes nuts and writes up the most trivial of
legislative changes. The outline focuses primarily on topics of broad general
interest (to the three of us, at least) - income tax accounting rules,
determination of gross income, allowable deductions, treatment of capital gains
and losses, corporate and partnership taxation, exempt organizations, and
procedure and penalties. It deals summarily with qualified pension and profit
sharing plans, and generally does not deal with international taxation or
specialized industries, such as banking, insurance, and financial services.
Please read this outline at your own risk; we take no responsibility for any
misinformation in it, whether occasioned by our advancing ages or our
increasing indifference as to whether we get any particular item right. Any
mistakes in this outline are Marty's responsibility; any political bias or offensive
language is Ira's; and Dan is just irresponsible.
Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric
G. Levin College of Law.Professor Emeritus, University of Houston Law Center.
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of California Davis School of
Law.
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I. ACCOUNTING
A. Accounting Methods
1. Rev. Proc. 2012-39, 2012-41 I.R.B. 470 (9/4/12).
The IRS announced a change in its policy on automatic accounting method
changes in corporate reorganizations. Taxpayers that engage in a tax-free
reorganization or liquidation under § 381(a) after 8/31/11 will be allowed to
make automatic accounting method changes in the tax year they engage in
the transaction. This revenue procedure clarifies and modifies (i) Rev. Proc.
2011-14, 201 1-1 C.B. 330; and (ii) Rev. Proc. 97-27, 1997-1 C.B. 680, as
amplified and modified by Rev. Proc. 2002-19, 2002-1 C.B. 696, as
amplified and clarified by Rev. Proc. 2002-54, 2002-2 C.B. 432, as modified
by Rev. Proc. 2007-67, 2007-2 C.B. 1072, as clarified and modified by Rev.
Proc. 2009-39, 2009-2 C.B. 371, and as clarified and modified by Rev. Proc.
2011-14.
B. Inventories
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
C. Installment Method
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
D. Year of Inclusion or Deduction
1. "One potato, two potato, three potato, four .... "
To have spudded or not to have spudded, that is the question. Caltex Oil
Venture v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 18 (1/12/12). The taxpayer, which was
on the accrual method, entered into a turnkey contract under which it paid
$5,172,666 by cash and note in December 1999 for the drilling of two oil and
gas wells. Some site preparation required under the contract occurred in
1999, but drilling was not commenced within ninety days after the end of
1999. The taxpayer deducted the full amount as intangible drilling and
development costs (IDC) under § 263(c) in 1999 and the IRS disallowed the
deduction on the ground that the economic performance requirement of
§ 461(h) was not satisfied. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that for
purposes of the special rules in § 461(i)(2)(A), which provide ninety days
leeway after the close of the year for economic performance to occur with
respect to drilling oil and gas wells, "drilling of the well commences" when
there is "actual penetration" of the ground surface in the act of drilling for
[Vol 13:10
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purposes of spudding a well. Mere site preparation is insufficient. He
emphasized that the title of the provision refers to "spudding," which
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2212 (2002) defines as "to
begin to drill (an oil well) by alternately raising and releasing a spudding bit
with the drilling rig." Thus, the taxpayer did not qualify under the special
rule. Furthermore, the 3-1/2-month rule of Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(6)(ii), which
allows a taxpayer to treat a liability as having been economically performed
at the time of payment if that taxpayer "reasonably expect[ed] the . . .
[provider of services] to provide the services ... within 3 months after the
date of payment," did not apply "because, in the case of an undifferentiated,
non-severable contract, the 3-1/2-month rule contemplates that all of the
services called for must be provided within 3-1/2 months of payment."
Moreover, even if the 3-1/2-month rule applied to treat some of the services
due under the contract as having been economically performed in 1999, the
deductions allowed under the 3-1/2-month rule were limited to payments of
cash or cash equivalents and did not include payments made by notes.
Finally, Judge Gustafson held that a trial was warranted on how much of the
IDC was actually incurred in 1999 and could be deducted under the general
economic performance rule of § 461(h).
2. You'll learn more about insurance company
taxation than income tax accounting reading this case. Massachusetts
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 111 (Fed. Cl.
1/30/12). The Court of Federal Claims (Judge Horn) held that the taxpayer,
an accrual method mutual life insurance company could deduct guaranteed
minimum policyholder dividends in the year that the board of directors
passed a resolution to pay the dividends during the following year. All events
fixing liability had occurred and the obligation to pay out at least a minimum
amount established both the fact of liability and that the liability could be
determined with reasonable accuracy. Pursuant to § 461(h)(3) and Reg.
§ 1.461-5 because policyholder dividends were in the nature of return of
premium, and they qualified under Reg. § 1.461-4(g)(3) as "rebates or
refunds," and thereby satisfied both the matching requirement and the
recurring item exceptions to the economic performance rule. Further, the
court rejected the government's argument that the economic substance
doctrine applied to prevent the taxpayer from accounting for dividends in
guarantee years; the taxpayer "did not engage in a typical transaction with an
investment followed by a deduction. Instead, as plaintiff notes, plaintiff's
payment of policyholder dividends was not designed to generate a tax
benefit, rather 'the payment of policyholder dividends is central to Plaintiff's
business and that of the mutual life insurance industry as a whole,' and to the
benefit of the policyholder."
2013]
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II. BUSINESS INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Income
1. The dentist's income is taxable to the dentist, just
like his lawyer's income is taxable to the lawyer. Walker v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-5 (1/9/12). The taxpayer dentist practiced
through an LLC, owned 1 percent by the taxpayer and 99 percent by a
partnership that included the dentist's children. The arrangement was
patterned on entities created by Scott and Darren Cole to avoid income and
employment on their law practice and rejected in Cole v. Commissioner, 637
F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2011). The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the
arrangement represented an anticipatory assignment of income that was
taxable to the taxpayer. The only distinction between the taxpayer and the
taxpayers in Cole was the practice of dentistry versus law, a distinction that
did not make a difference.
2. Assignment of income principles are alive and
well, sort of. Owen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-21 (1/19/12). The
taxpayers, John and Laura Owen incorporated a personal services company,
J&L Owen, Inc., in which they were the sole shareholders. In 1997, John
Owen and two others formed two companies, Family First Insurance
Services companies (FFIS) and FFEAP, which sold insurance related and
financial products. John was both an officer/employee and an independent
contractor salesman. Laura was employed by FFIS as an executive. In 2002,
John sold his 50 percent interest in the two companies for $7.5 million, $3.8
million of which was paid in the form of a cashier's check. The taxpayer
reported $1.9 million on the sale of FIS as capital gain-and attempted to roll
over $1.9 million of gain on the sale of FFEAP into a jewelry business under
§ 1045 (rollover of an investment of one small business corporation into
another small business corporation). In each of January and December 2003
the purchaser paid an additional $1.5 million into the Owen family trust. The
taxpayers' accountant mistakenly omitted the second payment from the
taxpayers' 2003 return. An employment agreement retained John as
President of FFIS and vice-president of FFEAP. Various compensation and
incentive payments pursuant to the agreement and amendments signed by
John in his role as president of FFIS were made to J&L Owen, Inc. In 2002
J&L Owen, Inc. reported $910,454 of wages to John and $225,000 to Laura
on Forms W-2, which wages were deducted by the corporation. The Tax
Court (Judge Wherry) held that payments to John for his sales activity in his
capacity as an independent contractor for the insurance companies were
under the control of J&L Owen, Inc., and were thus income of the
corporation. The court indicated that, as an independent contractor, an
[Vol. 13:10
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individual has control over earned income, which includes the right to
choose to do business as a corporation. After a factual inquiry into the nature
of other payments, the court held that payments to John for consulting and
sales promotion activities were made in his capacity as an officer of the
insurance companies and therefore not subject to assignment to the personal
service corporation. The court rejected the taxpayers' assertion that they
over-reported their income for 2002 in the amount reported as compensation
from the personal services corporation, stating that the taxpayers failed to
meet their burden of showing that they did not receive the amounts reported
on W-2s from the personal services corporation. (The IRS also conceded that
amounts includable in the taxpayers' income for 2002 under assignment of
income principles had been included in the W-2s from the personal services
corporation.) The court also noted that while a taxpayer may conduct
business in whatever form the taxpayer chooses, the taxpayer must also
accept the result.
* With respect to the capital gain the
taxpayer attempted to roll over under § 1045, the court held that the jewelry
business into which the taxpayer invested proceeds from the sale of FFEAP was
not an active trade or business and thus not a qualified small business for §
1045 purposes.
* The court imposed § 6662 accuracy
related penalties, holding that the taxpayer did not reasonably rely on the tax
advice of the accounting firm that structured the various transactions.
3. F. Lee Bailey defends himself in the Tax Court,
as they say about the client of the (disbarred) lawyer who represents
himself ... . Bailey v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-96 (4/2/12). To
facilitate an incarcerated marijuana dealer's forfeiture plan, F. Lee Bailey
entered into an unwritten agreement with the Justice Department to deposit
$5.9 million of Biochem Pharma stock in his investment account at Credit
Suisse Bank that was provided by the client. The purpose of the arrangement
was to facilitate repatriation and forfeiture of the client's assets to the U.S.
Government as part of a deal to reduce the client's sentence. Mr. Bailey sold
some of the stock and borrowed $3 million from Credit Suisse posting the
stock as security. Mr. Bailey used the proceeds to make payments on behalf
of his client and deposited a portion of the proceeds in personal accounts.
When the drug dealer client replaced Mr. Bailey with a different lawyer, the
U.S. District Court ordered Mr. Bailey to return the stock to the court.
Unfortunately, he was unable to do so because the bank refused to release the
collateral until the loan was paid. As a consequence, Mr. Bailey was held in
contempt by the District Court and incarcerated for a period of 44 days. After
Mr. Bailey was able to raise capital to repay the Credit Suisse loan and
transfer the stock, he was released. Mr. Bailey was reimbursed for out-of-
pocket expenses that he paid on behalf of the client but was not paid any fee
20131
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for his services. In a deficiency notice the IRS asserted that Mr. Bailey had
unfettered dominion and control over the stock and therefore recognized as
income the full value of the stock at the time it was deposited in his Credit
Suisse account. Alternatively, the IRS asserted that if the full value of the
stock was not includable in Mr. Bailey's income, at least the value of the
stock that he used as collateral for the $3 million loan represented gross
income. In a 143-page opinion addressing multiple issues, the Tax Court
(Judge Gustafson) held that, based on findings in Mr. Bailey's litigation over
the right to retain the stock (Bailey v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 459 (2002)),
to which collateral estoppel applied, Mr. Bailey held the Biochem Pharma
stock in trust for the U.S. Government. Mr. Bailey was not therefore taxable
on the stock's value. However, the court also held that Bailey realized
income of approximately $425,000 when he transferred proceeds from sale
of some Biochem Pharma stock to his personal accounts in a departure from
his fiduciary role. The court also rejected the IRS's assertion that Bailey
realized income on the use of $12 million of the appreciated Biochem
Pharma stock as collateral for the $3 million loan from Credit Suisse. The
IRS argued that Bailey had misappropriated the value of the stock used as
collateral for the loan. The court found that Bailey was personally liable for
repayment of the Credit Suisse loan and that the loan was a bona fide
indebtedness for which there was a consensual recognition of Mr. Bailey's
obligation to repay. Thus, the receipt of the loan proceeds was not includible
in income.
* The court rejected Bailey's argument that
due process barred the government from including in his income $1.6 million in
fees that were attached by the government and used to satisfy a portion of the
indebtedness to Credit Suisse in order to release the Biochem Pharma stock
from the Credit Suisse security, holding that payments made to a third party on
behalf of the taxpayer are nonetheless included in income.
* The court rejected Bailey's argument that
the burden of proof with regard to substantiation of expenses shifted to the
government after he had notified the government that he was disposing of
records stored in an aircraft hangar and provided access to those records to
auditing agents prior to their destruction. The court observed that taxpayers are
required to maintain records, there is no provision that imposes a recordkeeping
requirement on the IRS, and the fact that he offered to let the IRS review and
copy records before discarding them does not absolve Bailey of the
recordkeeping requirement nor shift the burden of proof.
0 The court held that Bailey's yacht
renovation and rental activity was not an activity engaged in for profit, but that
an aircraft renovation activity was a profit seeking activity.
0 Finally, Bailey was found liable for
negligence penalties.
[Vol. 13:10
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4. The IRS cuts an illegal drug dealer a break not
warranted on the face of the statute. Olive v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No.
2 (8/2/12). The taxpayer operated a medical marijuana business that sold
medical marijuana at retail under the California Compassionate Use Act of
1996. The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) upheld the IRS's determination that the
taxpayer underreported his gross receipts and that § 280E precluded his
deduction of business related expenses. The IRS conceded that § 280E did
not bar a deduction from gross receipts for costs of goods sold but argued
that the taxpayer's ledger entries were inadequate substantiation and that as a
factual matter cost of goods sold should be zero. Judge Kroupa sustained the
IRS's position that the journal entries were unreliable, but applied Cohan v.
Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930) to find, based on expert witness
testimony, that the cost of goods sold was approximately 75 percent of the
gross receipts and adjusted that amount to account for marijuana that was
given away to customers and staff. Judge Kroupa rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the expenses should be deductible based on Californians
Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 173
(2007), in which the Tax Court held that the corporation's care-giving
activities for terminally ill patients were a separate trade or business from its
medical marijuana delivery and that expenses allocable to the care-giving
activity were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. In the
instant case, unlike in Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems,
based on the facts and circumstances there were not two separate and distinct
activities. In this case the taxpayer operated a single business of dispensing
medical marijuana, with all other services being provided as part of that
business.
* Judge Kroupa upheld accuracy-related
penalties on the deficiency resulting from unsubstantiated expenses, but not
with respect to expenses that were substantiated but disallowed under § 280E,
reasoning that the application of § 280E to the medical marijuana industry was
decided after the years at issue.
* A straightforward reading of § 280E and
the last sentence of § 263A(a)(2) in concert clearly denies the recovery of cost
of goods sold for the marijuana in this case. Prior to the enactment of the last
sentence of § 263A(a)(2), however, § 280E alone did not deny drug dealers tax-
free recovery of the cost of goods sold. See, e.g., Franklin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 93-184. In Californians Helping to Alleviate Medical Problems,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 173 (2007), the IRS, based on that outdated
case law conceded - erroneously in our opinion - that § 280E did not operate
to deny as matter of law the cost of goods sold to a taxpayer that purchased and
resold marijuana. That mistake was repeated in this case.
5. Abracadabra: A creditor's bad debt does not
necessarily create debtor's COD income. Abarca v. Commissioner, T.C.
Florida Tax Review
Memo. 2012-245 (8/27/12). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that no
cancellation of debt income was realized by a taxpayer where the only
evidence that the debt was discharged was a letter stating that the loan had
been "charged off," but also stated that the taxpayer "still remain[ed]
obligated for the repayment of the debt," and no Form 1099-C was
introduced into evidence.
6. The fabled Plotkin diamond always comes with a
curse - Mr. Plotkin. Plotkin v. Commissioner, 110 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-6752
(lth Cir. 11/27/12). Taxpayer received an economics degree from the
University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School, class of 1963, and a law
degree from St. Louis University, class of 1972, before he purchased a
controlling interest in a nursing home empire from the father of his ex-wife
in 1980. As the result of a complex series of financial machinations and fund
diversions through his girlfriend(s) during the years 1991, 1992, and 1993,
he was convicted on three counts of willfully making and subscribing false
income tax returns under § 7206(1) in 1999 and sentenced to five years of
probation. The Commissioner determined that he failed to report in excess of
$1.5 million of Schedule C self-employment income during the years 1991
through 1995. In this unpublished per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed a Tax Court decision upholding the Commissioner's determination,
finding taxpayer's argument that he received non-taxable partnership
distributions not supported by the facts because taxpayer deliberately chose
not to be a partner in the entity from which he received financial benefits.
B. Deductible Expenses versus Capitalization
1. Temporary and proposed regulations provide
extensive rules for the acquisition, production, or improvement of
tangible personal property. T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060
(12/27/11), and REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11). The Treasury Department has promulgated temporary
regulations, generally effective for tax years beginning on or after 1/1/12,
addressing capitalization requirements for expenditures to acquire and
improve tangible property. The temporary regulations adopt provisions of
regulations proposed in 2008 (REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property,
73 F.R. 12838 (3/10/08)), which were in turn based on a 2006 proposal that
was substantially modified by the 2008 proposed regulations (REG-168745-
03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures
Related to Tangible Property, 71 F.R. 48590 (8/21/06)). The temporary
[Vol 13:10
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regulations provide detailed capitalization rules and several bright-line
standards under §§ 162(a) and 263(a) regarding the acquisition,
improvement, or repair of tangible real and personal property. The temporary
regulations also revise rules under § 168 regarding disposition and
maintenance of general asset accounts for MACRS property. In general, the
regulations adopt the provisions of the 2008 proposed regulations, but with
multiple modifications. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2T provides rules for amounts
paid for the acquisition or production of tangible property, and § 1.263(a)-3T
provides rules for amounts paid for the improvement of tangible property.
However, these new proposed regulations provide many additional rules. The
temporary regulations define material and supplies to treat as deductible
(1) the cost of any property with a useful life that does not exceed one year
and (2) any item that cost not more than $100. They add a book-conformity
de minimis rule, a safe-harbor for routine maintenance, and an optional
simplified method for regulated taxpayers. The temporary regulations
contain provisions defining a unit of property as a key concept and address
capitalization of expenditures that improve or restore a unit of property. The
regulations do not provide for a detailed repair allowance rule, but do
provide for future I.R.B. guidance regarding industry-specific repair
allowance methods.
* Acquisition and Production Costs. Temp.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-2 provides that a taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to
acquire or produce a unit of real or personal property (as determined under
Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(d)(2)), including leasehold improvement property,
land and land improvements, buildings, machinery and equipment, and
furniture and fixtures. Amounts paid to create intangible interests in land are
treated as capital expenditures. Amounts paid for work performed on a unit of
property prior to the date the property is placed in service must also be
capitalized. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2T(d)(1). Transaction costs to facilitate the
acquisition of property are expressly required to be capitalized, Temp. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-2T(f), but facilitative expenditures do not include employee
compensation or overhead unless the taxpayer elects to capitalize such
expenditures. Expenditures to defend or protect title must be capitalized. Temp.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-2T(e).
* Selling Expenses. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-
1T(d) provides for the capitalization of selling expenses as an offset against
sales proceeds (except in the case of dealers).
* Materials and Supplies. As under the
prior rules, Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T allows a deduction for incidental material
and supplies in the year an expenditure is made. Materials and supplies are
incidental when they are carried on hand and for which no record of
consumption is maintained or when not carried in inventory. A deduction for
non-incidental materials and supplies is allowed in the year the property is
consumed. Materials and supplies include tangible property that is (1) a
2013]
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component acquired to repair or improve a unit of tangible property that is not
acquired as part of a unit of property, (2) fuel, lubricants, water and similar
items that are reasonably expected to be consumed within 12 months, and (3)
tangible property that is a unit of property with (a) an economic useful life to
the taxpayer of not more than 12-months, or (b) that costs not more than $100
(an embedded de minimis rule). Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T(c). Taxpayers may
elect to capitalize the cost of each item of material or supply. Items used in the
production of other property remain subject to the uniform capitalization rules
of § 263A. Temp. Reg. § 1.263A-IT(b). On sale or disposition, materials and
supplies are not treated as capital assets. Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T(g).
0 Rotable Spare Parts. Rotable spare parts
are components treated as materials and supplies that are installed in a unit of
property, are removable from the unit of property, and are generally repaired
and improved for installation in a unit of property or stored for later use. The
cost of rotable spare parts is deductible in the year of the disposition of the part.
Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T(a)(3). Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T(e) provides an elective
optional method of accounting for the treatment of rotable and temporary spare
parts under which (1) the taxpayer deducts the amount paid for the part in the
year the part is first installed on a unit of property, (2) in each year the part is
removed from a unit of property the taxpayer includes the fair market value of
the part in gross income, (3) includes in the basis of the part the value taken into
income plus amounts paid to remove the part, (4) includes in the basis of the
part any amounts expended to maintain the part, (5) then deducts the basis and
any cost incurred to reinstall the part in a unit of property, and finally
(6) deducts the basis of the part on final disposition.
* Financial Accounting De Minimis Rules.
Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(g) allows a taxpayer to deduct expenditures to acquire
or produce property (other than property produced for resale) if the taxpayer
expenses the cost on a certified audited financial statement (including audited
financial statements prepared by an independent CPA and used for non-tax
purposes and certain financial statements filed with regulatory agencies)
pursuant to a written accounting procedure adopted by the taxpayer that treats
as expenses amounts paid for property costing less than a specified dollar
amount, as long as the amounts deducted under the de minims rule do not
exceed the lesser of 0.1 percent of the taxpayer's gross receipts or 2 percent of
the taxpayer's total depreciation and amortization expense reflected in its
financial statement. (The temporary regulations remove a provision in the 2008
proposed regulations that the aggregate amount deducted do not materially
distort the taxpayer's income for purposes of § 446.) Property subject to the de
minimis rule cannot be treated on sale or other disposition as a capital or § 1231
asset. A taxpayer may elect to apply the de minimis rule of Temp. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-2T(g) to materials and supplies, including rotable spare parts, which
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are then not treated as materials or supplies under Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T.
Temp. Reg. § 1.162-3T(f).
* Unit of Property. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-
3T(e). The unit of property concept is central to the proposed regulations'
requirement that improvements to a unit of property must be capitalized.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(e)(2) provides
that a building and its structural components (as defined in Reg. § 1.48-1 (e)(2))
are treated as a unit of property.' However, the improvement rules must be
separately applied to components of a building including heating, ventilation
and air conditioning systems, plumbing systems, electrical systems, elevators
and escalators, fire protection and security systems, gas distributions systems,
and other systems identified in published guidance. Condominium units and
cooperative units are each treated for the owner as a unit of property. Similarly,
a leasehold interest in a portion of a building is treated as a unit of property.
* Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(e)(2) defines a
unit of property for property other than buildings as including all the
components that are functionally interdependent. Components of property are
functionally interdependent if the placing in service of one component is
dependent on the placing in service of the other component. However, a
component that is recorded on the taxpayer's books as having a different
economic useful life or which is in a different class of property for MACRS
depreciation would be treated as separate unit of property. Thus, for example,
all of the component parts of a railroad locomotive constitute a single unit of
property, as does a truck trailer and its tires (unless the taxpayer's financial
statements treat them as separate property). A special rule applies to "plant
property," which is a functionally integrated collection of equipment and
machinery used to perform an industrial process; each component (or group of
components) that performs a discrete and major function or operation within the
functionally interdependent machinery or equipment constitutes a separate unit
of property. Determinations of a unit of property with respect to network assets
are based on the taxpayer's facts and circumstances unless otherwise provided
in published guidance. Network assets include property such as railroad tracks,
oil, gas, water and sewage pipelines, power transmission lines, and cable and
telephone lines that are owned or leased by taxpayers in those industries.
1. Under Reg. § 1.48-1(e)(2), structural components of a building include
such parts of a building as walls, partitions, floors, and ceilings, as well as any
permanent coverings therefor such as paneling or tiling; windows and doors; all
components (whether in, on, or adjacent to the building) of a central air conditioning
or heating system, including motors, compressors, pipes and ducts; plumbing and
plumbing fixtures, such as sinks and bathtubs; electric wiring and lighting fixtures;
chimneys; stairs, escalators, and elevators, including all components thereof;
sprinkler systems; fire escapes; and other components relating to the operation or
maintenance of a building.
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0 Capitalization of Improvements.
Expenditures to improve a unit of property must be capitalized. Temp. Reg.
§ 1.263(a)-3T(d). Amounts expended for repairs and maintenance of tangible
property are deductible if they are not required to be capitalized under Temp.
Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T. Temp. Reg. § 1.162-4T. Expenditures that improve
tangible property and that are required to be capitalized include expenditures
that:
'Result in a "betterment" to a unit of
property (replacing the term "material increase in value" used in the original
proposal);
*Restore a unit of property; or
'Adapt the unit of property to a new or
different use.
Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(f) provides special rules requiring a lessee to
capitalize expenditures for improvements to a unit of leased property. A
lessor is required to capitalize the cost of improvements to leased property
paid directly or through a construction allowance to the lessee. (The
preamble to the regulations states that the recovery period for an
improvement or addition to the "underlying property" begins on the placed-
in-service date of the improvement or addition. See § 168(i)(6); Temp. Reg.
§ 1.168(i)-8T(c)(4)(ii)(E).)
* Betterment. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(h).
An expenditure results in a betterment of a unit of property if it (1) ameliorates
a material condition or defect that existed prior to acquisition of the property or
arose during production of the property, (2) results in a material addition to a
unit of property, or (3) results in a material increase in capacity. Determination
of whether an expenditure results in a betterment is factual and requires a
comparison of the condition of the property immediately prior to the
circumstance necessitating the expenditure (or the condition of property the last
time the taxpayer corrected for normal wear and tear) with the condition of the
property after the expenditure. An expenditure that results in a betterment of a
component of a building is treated as a betterment to the unit of property
consisting of the building and its structural components.
0 Restoration. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(i).
An expenditure is capitalized as a restoration if it (1) replaces a component for
which the taxpayer has deducted a loss, (2) replaces a component the adjusted
basis of which has been accounted for in realizing gain or loss on a sale or
exchange of the component, (3) repairs damage for which the taxpayer has
deducted a casualty loss under § 165, (4) returns the property to its ordinary
operating condition after the property has fallen into a state of disrepair and is
no longer functional, (5) results in rebuilding the property to a like-new
condition at the end of its class life under the § 168(g) alternative depreciation
system, or (6) is for the replacement of a major component or structural part of
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the unit of property. Whether there is a replacement of a major component or
structural part is determined under the facts and circumstances and includes
replacement of a major component or structural part that comprises a large
portion of the physical structure of the unit of property or that performs a
discrete and critical function in the operation of the unit of property. (The 50
percent of replacement cost test of the proposed regulations was eliminated.)
Again, the restoration of a component of a building is treated as a restoration of
the unit of property consisting of the building and its structural components.
0 New Use. Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(j). A
unit of property is treated as adapted to a new or different use if the adaptation
is not consistent with the taxpayer's "intended ordinary use of the unit of
property at the time originally placed in service by the taxpayer." An
expenditure to adapt a component of a building to a new use must be capitalized
as an expenditure to adapt the unit of property consisting of the building and its
structural components to a new use.
* Rehabilitation doctrine is no more.
Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(f)(3) eliminates the judicially created rehabilitation
doctrine by providing that, "[I]ndirect costs that do not directly benefit and are
not incurred by reason of an improvement are not required to be capitalized
under section 263(a), regardless of whether they are made at the same time as
an improvement." But the regulations provide that if otherwise deductible
repairs benefit or are incurred by reason of an improvement, the cost of the
repairs must be capitalized under § 263A.
* Routine Maintenance Safe Harbor.
Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(g) provides a safe harbor from the capitalization
requirement for "the recurring activities that a taxpayer expects to perform as a
result of the taxpayer's use of the unit of property to keep the unit of property in
its ordinarily efficient operating condition." The safe harbor applies to activities
that the taxpayer reasonably expects to perform more than once during the class
life of the property, as determined under the MACRS alternative depreciation
schedule of § 168(g). Routine maintenance includes maintenance with respect
to and the use of rotable spare parts. Routine maintenance excludes activities
that follow a basis recovery event similar to the items that are described as
restorations.
* Repairs. Temp. Reg. § 1.162-4T allows
as a deductible repair expense any costs that are not required to be capitalized
under Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T.
0 Repair Allowance. The regulations do
not provide for a repair allowance, but Temp. Reg. § 1.263(a)-3T(l) permits
taxpayers to use a repair allowance method that is authorized by published
guidance in the Federal Register or the Internal Revenue Bulletin, suggesting
that such rules will be forthcoming.
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* Examples. The regulations are full of
examples that seem to cover most of the litigated cases and rulings addressing
capitalization versus repair. The examples are necessary to understand the
substantive provisions, which, although intended to provide clarity, are not so
clearly applied.
a. IRS specifies the procedures for adopting
new accounting methods under the Temporary Regulations. Rev. Proc.
2012-19, 2012-14 I.R.B. 689 (3/7/12), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1
C.B. 330. The IRS has provided lengthy and detailed rules regarding
automatic changes in methods of accounting under Temp. Reg. §§ 1.162-3T
and 4T (materials and supplies), 1.263(a)-iT (capital expenditures in
general), 1.263(a)-2T (transaction costs), and 1.263(a)-3T (improvements),
all added by T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of
Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). These
changes are for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2012.
b. LB&I provides guidance under Rev.
Proc. 2012-19. LB&I-4-0312-004 (3/15/12). This directive to the field
applies to taxpayers who adopted a method of accounting relating to the
conversion of capitalized assets to repair expense under § 263(a).
c. Have your clients been wasting time
trying to comply with the Temporary Regulations in 2012? Yes, they
have. Further guidance announcing that pending final regulations will
apply only in years beginning in 2014 and thereafter. Notice 2012-73,
2012-51 I.R.B. 713 (11/20/12). The IRS announced that pending final
regulations will apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14, but that
taxpayers will be permitted to apply the final regulations to taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/12. The notice also indicates that the temporary
regulations may be revised with respect to the de minimis rule of § 1.263(a)-
2T(g); dispositions under §§ 1.168(i)-IT and 1.168(i)-8T; and the Safe
Harbor for Routine Maintenance under § 1.263(a)-3T(g).
d. Technical amendments so revise the
Temporary Regulations. More important, the effective date of the
12/27/11 temporary regulations is delayed to years beginning on or after
1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability. T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12). These include the following explanation:
... [T]he IRS and the Treasury are concerned that taxpayers
are expending resources to comply with temporary
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regulations that may not be consistent with forthcoming final
regulations.
e. This announcement amends - really!!??
Announcement 2013-7, 2013-3 I.R.B. 308 (1/14/13). An announcement
amending regulations - the temporary regulations (T.D. 9564), regarding
the deduction and capitalization of expenditures under §§ 162(a) and 263(a)
relating to tangible property to apply to taxable years beginning on or after
1/1/14, while permitting taxpayers to apply the temporary regulations for
taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/12, and before the applicability date
of the final regulations.
2. Just because state law requires you to make the
payment doesn't mean it's an ordinary and necessary business expense.
Zweifel v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-93 (3/28/12). Citing Sebring v.
Commissioner, 93 T.C. 220, 227 (1989); Firetag v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 1999-355, aff'd without published opinion, 232 F.3d. 887 (4th Cir.
2000); and Rankin v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1996-350, aff'd, 138 F.3d
1286 (9th Cir. 1998), the Tax Court (Judge Paris) held that payments to a
"build up fund account" into which a bail bondsman is required under state
law to make deposits to reimburse insurers for losses on bail bonds
underwritten by the bail bondsman are not deductible in the year of the
contribution to the account, because the expense for which the account was
created has not yet arisen.
0 As a condition of doing business,
taxpayer bail bond agent was required by state law to maintain a "build-up
fund" of 1 percent of bonds executed as an agent of National Surety Services
(the underwriter) for the purpose of establishing an indemnity to protect the
insuring company from loss through the posting of bonds by the agent. The
taxpayer had legal title to the funds, was taxable on interest, and was entitled to
return of the funds on termination of the contract with the insurer and discharge
of remaining open bonds. Judge Paris rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
payments were in the nature of insurance premiums paid to financially protect
the taxpayer. The court indicated that the payments are specific payments tied
to an individual bond and are not a general contract to protect against
unforeseen losses. The court held that the payments are deductible when
amounts are paid out of the build-up fund to the insurer.
* The court sustained penalties for failure
to timely file and indicated with respect to negligence penalties that, although
the taxpayer presented "well-thought-out arguments" to distinguish prior case
law with respect to the claimed deductions, the taxpayer's failure to timely file
indicates that the taxpayer did not act in good faith or with reasonable cause.
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3. Avoided interest attributable to associated
property taken out of service requires capitalization under Chevron-
tested regulations that barely survive. Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United
States, 97 Fed. Cl. 239 (2/25/11). The taxpayer, an electric utility, removed
boilers from service to replace burners. Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B)
requires that the capitalized cost of improvements under § 263A include both
direct expenditures and the capitalized cost of interest (under the avoided
cost rules) attributable to the basis of property temporarily removed from
service in order to complete the improvements. The court (Judge Lettow)
rejected the taxpayer's arguments that (1) the associated property rule of
Reg. § 1.263A-1 1(e)(1)(ii)(B) is invalid as inconsistent with § 263A, and
(2) it was adopted in contravention of the requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act. Under the test of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the taxpayer argued that the regulation
was inconsistent with § 263A(f)(2)(A)(ii), which provides that for purposes
of determining production period interest "with respect to any property...
interest on any . .. indebtedness [not directly attributable to production
expenditures] shall be assigned to such property to the extent that the
taxpayer's interest costs could have been reduced if production expenditures
• ..had not been incurred." The taxpayer asserted that "property" for this
purpose under the statutory language can include only the improvement
itself, which is separately depreciable, and cannot, therefore be expanded to
include associated property as provided in the regulation. The taxpayer also
argued that the production costs were incurred with respect to the
replacement burners, and not with respect to the boilers themselves. While
the court was not completely happy with the IRS's argument that the
property can be separated for depreciation purposes while considered as a
unit for purposes of the interest allocation, the court concluded that the
statute was sufficiently ambiguous under the first prong of the Chevron test
that the regulation could be tested under the second prong of Chevron, which
asks whether the regulation is a permissible construction of the statute. Here
the court indicated that, "It is stretching the statute quite far to say that the
associated-property rule 'is a reasonable interpretation of the enacted text'
[of section 263A]." The court added that the IRS's rationales "are not very
satisfying." The court then concluded, however, that "it is not this court's
province to be making such policy choices. In this very close case, the court
cannot say that Treasury overstepped the latitude granted by the statute to
adopt regulations prescribing the calculation of interest to be capitalized in
connection with an improvement to existing property used by the taxpayer to
produce income" and held that the regulation therefore survived the
taxpayer's challenge. With respect to the taxpayer's challenge under the
Administrative Procedure Act, the court again found that "it is a stretch to
conclude that Treasury 'cogently explain[ed] why it has exercised its
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discretion in a given manner,"' but added that "[t]he 'path' that Treasury was
taking in the rulemaking proceedings can be 'discerned,' albeit somewhat
murkily" and upheld the regulation. Finally, the court rejected retroactive
application of a de minimis rule of Reg. § 1.263A-1 l(e)(2) to the taxpayer,
and denied the IRS's counterclaim for capitalization of additional interest.
0 No pretzel in existence has as many
twists and bends as does this opinion.
a. But the regulation does not survive
Chevron analysis on appeal. Dominion Resources, Inc. v. United States,
681 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. 5/31/12). The Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (in an opinion by Judge Rader) reversed the Court of Federal Claims
decision upholding Reg. § 1.263A-11(e)(1)(ii)(B), which requires that the
capitalized cost of improvements under § 263A include both direct
expenditures and the capitalized cost of interest (under the avoided cost
rules) attributable to the basis of property temporarily removed from service
in order to complete the improvements, by invalidating the regulation under
step two of the Chevron analysis. The majority of the Federal Circuit panel
held that "the regulation is unreasonable in defining 'production
expenditures' to include the adjusted basis of the entire unit," because "[t]he
regulation directly contradicts the avoided-cost rule that Congress intended
the statute to implement." The opinion illustrated the problem with the
following example.
For example, let's say an owner purchased real property for
$100,000 by a loan with a 3% interest rate. A few years
later, she made an improvement that cost $5,000. If she had
used that $5,000 toward the debt instead of the
improvement, she would have avoided accruing $150 in
interest ($5,000 multiplied by 3%). The avoided-cost rule
requires her to capitalize that $150 in interest. The Treasury
regulation, however, requires her to capitalize $3,150 in
interest ($100,000 + $5,000 then multiplied by 3%). That
result makes no sense, because there is no way that she
could have avoided accruing $3,150 in interest by not
making the improvement, as she did not expend or incur an
amount equal to $105,000 when making the improvement.
. The court went on to point out that "[t]he
only way that an amount equal to the adjusted basis could potentially satisfy the
avoided-cost method is by assuming that the property owner would have sold
the unit and used the sale proceeds to pay down the debt." Based on this
analysis the Court of Appeals concluded that the Court of Federal Claims erred
by concluding that the regulation reflected a "policy choice" by the agency and
was thus permissible.
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0 The majority also invalidated the
regulation, as did the concurring opinion of Judge Clevenger, on the basis that it
violated the requirement imposed by the Supreme Court in Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass 'n of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983), that the agency must provide a reasoned explanation for adopting a
regulation. "State Farm requires that the Treasury 'articulate a satisfactory
explanation for its action, including a rational connection between the facts
found and the choice made."' Neither the preamble to the proposed regulations
nor the preamble to the final regulations (nor Notice 88-99, 1988-2 C.B. 422)
provided any rationale for adopting the rule in the regulations; there was "no
explanation for the way that use of an adjusted basis implements the avoided-
cost rule."
4. Proposed regulations restrict negative numbers
in allocating indirect costs under the complicated "simplified methods
rules." REG-126770-06, Allocation of Costs Under the Simplified Methods,
77 F.R. 54482 (9/5/12). Section 263A requires capitalization of all direct and
indirect costs into goods produced during the year and inventory, so-called§ 471 costs that must be included in inventory. Section 263A costs may be
allocated on a facts and circumstances basis, or the taxpayer may use the
simplified resale or simplified production methods provided in Reg.§§ 1.263A-2(b) and 1.263A-3(d) to allocate costs to eligible property
produced or held for resale in lieu of a facts-and-circumstances allocation
method. Under the simplified method a pool of additional capitalized § 263A
costs (indirect costs not otherwise includible in inventory under the
taxpayer's method of accounting) may be allocated among ending inventory
and costs of goods sold based on an "absorption ratio" of such costs to the
taxpayer's total § 471 inventory costs. In some circumstances the simplified
method will produce negative amounts that cause distortions in inventory
accounting, generally when a taxpayer capitalized a cost as an inventory cost
that is greater than the amount required to be capitalized for tax purposes.
Proposed Reg. § 1.263A-2(b) would, with certain exceptions, prevent
taxpayers from using negative amounts in determining additional § 263A
costs. Producers with average annual gross receipts of less than $10,000,000
would be allowed to continue to include negative amounts in additional§ 263A costs. Retailers who use the simplified resale method would be
permitted to remove inventory costs that are not required to be capitalized for
tax purposes from ending inventory by treating them as negative additional
§ 263A costs.
0 The proposed regulations include a
modified simplified production method that would allow producers to
separately determine the allocation of preproduction related additional § 263A
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costs using a preproduction cost absorption ratio applied to capitalized
inventory costs for raw materials.
• As a sop for simplification, the proposed
regulations would redefine a taxpayer's "additional § 263A costs" for purposes
of the simplified methods as costs, other than interest, that a taxpayer
capitalized to its inventory in its financial statements. The definition would
provide, however, that a taxpayer must include all direct costs in its § 471 costs
regardless of the taxpayer's treatment of the costs in its financial statements.
5. Tax expenditures for movies and television. The
Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 744, extends the election under Code
§ 181 to expense up to $15 million of qualified film and television
production costs if 75 percent of total compensation is for services performed
in the U.S. The limit is $20 million for production costs incurred in low-
income or distressed communities through 2011.
a. Final regulations come out just in time
for the expiration date of the statute. T.D. 9551, Deduction for Qualified
Film and Television Production Costs, 76 F.R. 60721 (9/30/11). Section 181
provides for an election to deduct qualified film or television production
costs incurred in productions commenced prior to 1/1/12, as an expense not
chargeable to capital account in an amount up to $15 million for each
production, or $20 million for production expenses incurred in certain low
income or distressed county areas. A production qualifies for the election if
at least 75 percent of the total compensation for the production is for services
performed in the United States by actors, directors, producers, and
production personnel. Final regulations §§ 1.181-1 through -6, replacing
temporary and proposed regulations, clarify the owner of production costs,
the definition of aggregate production costs for purposes of the election and
limitations, and provisions applicable to participations and residuals.
b. Temporary and proposed regulations
update the rules. REG-146297-09, Deduction for Qualified Film and
Television Production Costs, 76 F.R. 64879 (10/19/11). The temporary
(Temp. Reg. §§ 1.181-OT, 1.181-IT) and proposed regulations clarify that
the $15 million (or $20 million) limitation under amendments to § 181
applies to limit the aggregate deduction for production costs paid or incurred
by all owners of a qualified film or television production for each qualified
production, rather than limit the aggregate production costs.
c. And now, "final" final regulations after
the provision expired. T.D. 9603, Deduction for Qualified Film and
Television Production Costs, 77 F.R. 72923 (12/7/12). The final regulations
(Reg. §§ 1.181-0, 1.181-1) remove the temporary regulations, and provide
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that whether production costs qualify for pre- or post-1/I/08 limitations,
compensation to actors is allocated to first unit principal photography.
d. Thank Dodd that special expensing rules
for film and television productions were extended to 2012 and 2013. The
2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 317,
extends through the end of 2013 the election under Code § 181 to expense up
to $15 million of qualified film and television production costs if 75 percent
of total compensation is for services performed in the U.S.
0 The limit is $20 million for production
costs incurred in low-income or distressed communities; are any members of
the film crew residents of those communities?
C. Reasonable Compensation
1. Non-limit limitations on excessive compensation
to corporate officers. REG-137125-08, Certain Employee Remuneration in
Excess of $1,000,000 Under Internal Revenue Code Section 162(m), 76 F.R.
37034 (6/24/11). Section 162(m) limits deductions for compensation to top
corporate officers of publicly traded corporations to $1 million with an
exception to performance-based compensation attributable to stock options
and stock appreciation rights. Proposed regulation § 1.162-27(e)(2)(iv)
would require that performance-based compensation plans designate the
maximum number of shares with respect to which options or rights may be
granted to an individual employee during a specified period. The preamble to
the proposed regulations indicates that the IRS rejects assertions that
specifying a limit is not necessary because such plans require shareholder
approval as contrary to its interpretation of legislative history as requiring an
objective formula for determining the maximum amount of compensation an
employee could receive if the employee's performance goal is met.
a. Performance-based compensation is
based in part on performance. Rev. Rul. 2012-19, 2012-28 I.R.B. 16
(6/25/12). The limitation of § 162(m) on deduction of employee
compensation to an applicable employee by a publically held company to
$1,000,000 does not apply to performance-based compensation. The IRS
rules that a corporate plan to pay dividends and dividend equivalents on
restricted stock granted to an employee that vests on meeting performance
goals is performance based compensation. However, dividends and dividend
equivalents payable on restricted stock regardless of whether the employee
meets performance goals does not qualify as performance-based
compensation. The ruling cites Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2), which provides that
performance-based compensation must be paid solely on account of pre-
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established performance goals based on an objective standard, on a grant-by-
grant basis.
2. Every time a reasonable compensation case is
appealable to the Seventh Circuit, it seems that whoever the judge is,
after doing the Exacto bit to satisfy Judge Posner, he or she adds
something like, "and in any event it wasn't deductible because it wasn't
intended to be compensation." Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-74 (3/31/11). The taxpayer, an accounting
and consulting firm operating as a C corporation, made payments to three
related entities owned by the three named principals of the corporation that
essentially resulted in zeroing out the taxpayer's income for the year. The
related entities performed no services for the taxpayer, and at trial the
taxpayer claimed that the payments were deductible as compensation to the
named principals, who did perform services for the taxpayer. The court
(Judge Morrison) held that even if the payments were viewed as
compensation to the named principals, the payments were not deductible.
Applying the "hypothetical independent investor" test of Exacto Spring
Corp. v. Commissioner, 196 F.3d 833 (7th Cir. 1999), because the case was
appealable to the Seventh Circuit, Judge Morrison found that the rate of
return on the firm's equity was "too low to create a presumption that the
amounts claimed as 'consulting fees' were reasonable compensation for the
[principals'] services." Because the taxpayer presented no other relevant
evidence that the payments were reasonable in amount, the deduction was
disallowed. Judge Morrison added that besides being reasonable in amount,
to be deductible the payment must be intended to be compensation, and the
payments in question were not intended to be compensation.
[The firm] intended for the payments to the related
entities to distribute profits, not to compensate for services..
. . Salvador chose the amount to pay each year so that the
payments distributed all (or nearly all) accumulated profit
for the year. He did this for tax planning purposes. Each
[principal's] percentage of the payments to the related
entities was tied to hours worked, but the firm's intent in
making the payments was to eliminate all taxable income.
The firm did not intend to compensate for services.
0 Accuracy related penalties were upheld,
with Judge Morrison taking special note of the fact that the taxpayer was an
accounting firm.
a. And Judge Posner agrees adding "Itihat
an accounting firm should so screw up its taxes is the most remarkable
feature of the case." Mulcahy, Pauritsch, Salvador & Co. v. Commissioner,
680 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 5/17/12). The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner)
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affirmed the Tax Court, holding that the consulting fee payments to the three
related entities owned by the three named principals of the C corporation, did
not constitute deductible compensation but, instead, constituted a return on
invested capital, i.e., dividends. This is because the taxpayer corporation was
not "a pane of glass" between the billings of a typical small professional
services firm and the salaries of its professionals where the amount of capital
invested is negligible. Here, the taxpayer corporation had 40 employees in
multiple branches, so the amount of invested capital was relatively large, and
the consulting fees constituted a return on that invested capital. Judge Posner
noted that treating the consulting fees as salary expenses, which reduced the
firm's return to equity to zero even though the firm was "doing fine,"
flunked the independent-investor test.
* During the course of the opinion, Judge
Posner managed to chide taxpayer's lawyers for "appear[ing] not to understand
the difference between compensation for services and compensation for
capital." He also chided taxpayer's expert witness for using "firm income per
partner" of comparable accounting firms without "divid[ing] firm income per
partner into salary and dividend components," which rendered his testimony
"irrelevant."
* Judge Posner noted his "puzzlement" that
the firm did not organize as a pass-through entity, but noted that it had to accept
the consequences of its entity choice, "that in this case include[d] a large tax
deficiency and a hefty penalty."
* See Pediatric Surgical Assocs., P.C. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-81 (relating to the non-deductibility of
compensation paid to shareholder employees derived from earnings resulting
from the efforts of non-shareholder professionals).
* Shades of Charles McCandless Tile
Service v. United States, 191 Ct. Cl. 108, 422 F.2d 1336 (Ct. Cl. 1970). It
held that 15 percent of profits (before stockholders' salaries) should be
considered as a dividend, and should reduce the deduction for salaries paid
accordingly. That case aroused a great deal of interest when it first came out,
and led to all sorts of closely held corporations paying out dividends of about
$1,000 per year to establish a history of paying dividends.
D. Miscellaneous Deductions
1. Standard mileage rate rules published in a
revenue procedure while the amounts will be disclosed in a separate
notice. Rev. Proc. 2010-51, 2010-51 I.R.B. 883 (12/3/10). The IRS indicated
that beginning in 2011 it will publish mileage rates in a separate annual
notice. The revenue procedure indicated that a taxpayer may use the business
standard mileage rate to substantiate expenses for business use of an
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automobile in lieu of fixed and variable costs. Parking fees and tolls are
deductible as separate items. The basis of an automobile used for business is
reduced by a per-mile amount published in the annual notice. Separate rates
are provided both for charitable use of an automobile and medical and
moving use of an automobile. The revenue procedure also provides details
for treating as substantiated a fixed and variable rate allowance for expenses
incurred by an employee in driving an automobile owned or leased by the
employee in performing services for the employer.
a. Standard mileage rates for 2012. Notice
2012-1, 2012-2 I.R.B. 260 (12/9/11). The standard mileage rate for rolling
the tires after 1/1/12 remains at 55.5 cents (23 cents representing
depreciation). The mileage rate for charitable service is 14 cents, and for
medical care or moving expenses the rate is slightly down to 23 cents. The
maximum standard automobile cost for computing the allowance under a
fixed and variable rate (FAVR) plan is $28,000 for automobiles and $29,300
for trucks and vans.
b. Add one cent per mile for 2013 (except
for charitable service). Notice 2012-72, 2012-50 I.R.B. 613 (11/21/12). The
standard mileage rate for business miles in 2013 goes up to 56.5 cents per
mile (with 23 cents representing depreciation), and the medical/moving rate
goes up to 24 cents per mile. The charitable mileage rate remains fixed by
§ 170(i) at 14 cents.
c. The IRS announces per diem rates for
travel away from home. Notice 2012-63, 2012-42 I.R.B. 496 (9/26/12). Per
diem reimbursement rates in lieu of substantiated expenses under Rev. Proc.
2011-47, 2011-42 I.R.B. 520, effective for travel after 10/1/12, are
unchanged from 2011. One revision, however, removes transportation
expenses between points, lodging and meals, and mailing expense for travel
vouchers from incidental expenses, so that these items may be separately
reimbursed for travelers using the per diem method. Per diem rates are as
follows:
* The special meals and incidental rates for
the transportation industry are $59 within CONUS and $64 OCONUS.
* Incidental expense deduction for any
location is $5 per day (the IRS believes in cheap tippers).
* Rates for travel within CONUS are $242
per day for high cost localities (listed in the notice) and $163 for all others. The
portion allowed for meals is $65 in a high-cost locality and $52 for others.
d. Rev. Rul. 2012-27, 2012-41 I.R.B. 435
(10/4/12). The IRS has provided standard industry fare level cents-per-mile
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and terminal charges for the second half of 2012 for determining the value of
non-commercial flights on employer provided aircraft. Under Reg. § 1.61-
21(g) the value of a non-commercial flight is determined by multiplying the
standard industry fare cents-per-mile rate by the applicable aircraft multiple
and adding the applicable terminal charge.
2. The Empire strikes back against the "Millennium
Plan." Goyak v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-13 (1/11/12). The
individual husband and wife taxpayers' wholly owned corporation, Goyak &
Associates, contributed $1.4 million to a purported § 419A(F)(6) employee
welfare benefit plan, known as the "Millennium Plan," of which the taxpayer
husband was the sole beneficiary with respect to Goyak & Associates, and
Goyak & Associates claimed a § 162 deduction. The Tax Court (Judge
Goeke) held that the amount was a constructive dividend to Mr. Goyak,
rather than a deductible ordinary and necessary business expense. The
covered employee, i.e., Mr. Goyak, in the plan was able to (1) freely void his
participation in the plan and have the life insurance policy maintained by the
plan distributed to him, or (2) receive life benefits at a time of his choosing
by "timing" a severance event. A 20 percent § 6662 accuracy-related penalty
was upheld.
3. Reimbursement insurance is really a deposit.
F.W. Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 459 Fed. Appx. 389 (5th Cir. 1/25/12).
The taxpayer, a temporary personnel agency, purchased insurance policies to
cover workers compensation and employer's liability. The policies required
the taxpayer to reimburse the insurer up to $500,000 for each claim. To
provide evidence of financial responsibility to the insurer, the taxpayer
entered into a second "insurance" contract to cover the reimbursement
obligation. The second contract provided for an estimated premium of $3.9
million. The actual premium would be determined at the end of the policy
year and provided for an increase or decrease in the amount owed depending
upon experience. The taxpayer claimed a § 162 deduction for the full
premium. Upholding the Tax Court, the Circuit Court agreed with the IRS
position that the premium paid was a non-deductible deposit on the
taxpayer's potential reimbursement liability under the first policy. The court
added that funds set aside for future reimbursement did not constitute
insurance as there was no shift in the risk of loss.
4. Family commune farm provides deductible meals
and medical care to its members. Stahl v. United States, 861 F. Supp. 2d
1226 (E.D. Wash. 3/20/12), on remand from 626 F.3d 520 (9th Cir. 2010).
The Stahl family (consisting of eight siblings and spouses plus children
numbering 65 people) maintains a Hutterite colony engaged in farming on
[Vol. 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
30,000 acres selling potatoes and dairy products. As participants in a
§ 501(d) nonprofit apostolic corporation, each member pays personal income
tax on the member's pro rata share of the corporation's income, determined
after allowable deductions. In a claim for refund the taxpayers asserted that
their share of the corporate income should be reduced by deductions for the
cost of meals and payments for a health plan maintained by the corporation.
On remand from the Ninth Circuit determination that the taxpayers were
employees of the corporation, the District Court upheld the taxpayers'
assertion that the corporate income of the colony is reduced by deductions
for meals and the health plan. The court noted that it was necessary within
the meaning of § 162 to maintain employees on the farm around the clock to
maintain the dairy herd and found that food and medical care represented
compensation to the employee family members who performed the work of
the farm. The court stated that it was appropriate to treat the food and
medical care as a form of "other compensation" deductible within the
meaning of § 162(a)(1). The court also held that the medical insurance
purchased by the corporation was a health plan within the meaning of Reg.
§ 1.106-1, excludable from income of the employee and deductible under
Reg. § 1.162-10. The court rejected the IRS's argument that the food and
health care were not deductible as personal expenses.
5. Don Draper likely would have tried to take
advantage of this rule had it been around when he was renting hotel
rooms in NYC. REG-137589-07, Local Lodging Expenses, 77 F.R. 24657
(4/25/12). Prop. Reg. § 1.162-31 would allow a deduction for local lodging,
i.e., lodging while the taxpayer is not away from home, in carrying on a
taxpayer's trade or business (whether or not as an employee) under a "facts
and circumstances" test. One factor is whether the taxpayer incurs the
expense because of a bona fide condition or requirement of employment
imposed by the taxpayer's employer. (For employees the question usually is
whether the employer-paid lodging is a working condition fringe benefit.)
The proposed regulations provide a safe harbor for local lodging at business
meetings and conferences. The examples indicate that there must be a bona
fide business reason for the overnight stay, and, if provided by an employer,
there must be a substantial noncompensatory reason. The regulations will be
effective upon final publication, but pending finalization, taxpayers may rely
on the proposed regulations.
& We foresee a deluge of future Tax Court
cases involving deductions claimed for nights (or mid-day stays) at a host of
no-tell motels.
6. Flying is entertainment, at least in the corporate
aircraft. T.D. 9597, 77 F.R. 45480 (8/1/12), corrected, 77 F.R. 50373
(8/21/12). The Treasury Department has promulgated final regulations
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revising Reg. § 1.61-21(g)(14) and adding Reg. §§ 1.274-9 and 1.274-10, in
addressing the disallowance of expenses under § 274(a) incurred in the use
of taxpayer owned aircraft for entertainment. Under the regulations both
fixed and variable expenses, including depreciation and interest expense,
attributable to the use of taxpayer owned aircraft for entertainment are
disallowed. Expenses are allocated on the basis of occupied seat miles or
hours for entertainment travel relative to total seat miles or hours of aircraft
use, or on a flight-by-flight basis. Expenses attributable to deadhead flights
returning empty from an entertainment flight are included in the calculation.
The Treasury Department rejected suggestions that expenses be determined
on the basis of the primary purpose of a specific flight. Depreciation for the
purpose of determining entertainment expenses may be calculated on a
straight-line basis regardless of the depreciation method used by the taxpayer
for other purposes. Aircraft with similar cost profiles that have the same type
and number of engines can be aggregated in determining expenses allocable
to use of the aircraft for entertainment. The regulations do not permit
aggregation of the costs of all aircraft operated by the taxpayer. Expenses
incurred for entertainment flights of specified employees (officers, directors,
10 percent owners) are excepted from disallowance under § 274(e)(2) only to
the extent included in income as compensation by the recipient. Expenses in
excess of the amounts included in income are disallowed. Also, expenses
incurred to provide entertainment flights in taxpayer owned business aircraft
to meet security concerns (which are excludable from the recipient's income
as a fringe benefit) remain disallowed as deductions under § 274(a). The loss
disallowance rules do not apply to expenses incurred by a commercial airline
providing entertainment flights to "specified individuals" on a regularly
scheduled flight on which 90 percent of the seats are offered for sale to the
general public to the extent the entertainment flight is includable in the gross
income of the specified individual.
7. The one who eats the food may not get the
haircut: Proposed regulations allocate the § 274(n) limitations with
respect to reimbursed meals. REG-101812-07, Reimbursed Entertainment
Expenses, 77 F.R. 45520 (8/1/12). Section 274(n) limits otherwise allowable
deductions for meals and entertainment to 50 percent of the expense. In the
case of reimbursed meal or entertainment expenses that are not treated as
income to the payor, § 274(e)(3) applies the limitation to the person claiming
a deduction for the reimbursement. In Transport Labor Contract/Leasing,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 461 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2006), the court held that in a
three-party reimbursement arrangement the § 274 limitation applied to the
client who reimbursed an employee leasing company for meal expenses paid
by the leasing company employer to contract truck drivers who were leased
to a trucking company. The Eighth Circuit's opinion defined reimbursement
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arrangements by reference to definitions of an employer's accountable plan
under § 62(a)(2)(A) and Reg. § 1.62-2. The proposed regulations would
provide an independent definition of a reimbursement or expense allowance
arrangement independent of the rules of § 62(a)(2)(A) and (c). Prop. Reg.
§ 1.274-2(f)(2)(iv)(a)(D) would define a reimbursement arrangement as one
under which an employee or independent contractor receives an advance,
allowance, or reimbursement from an employer, client, or contractor for
expenses incurred by the recipient. A reimbursement plan involving
payments to an independent contractor would have to be memorialized in a
written agreement that identifies the party subject to the § 274 limitations.
* In the case of an employer, the limitations
of § 274 apply to the employer's deduction of reimbursed expenses, except to
the extent that the employer treats the reimbursement or other payment as
compensation paid to the employee and wages for withholding purposes.
* In case of reimbursements to an
independent contractor, the limitations apply to the independent contractor to
the extent that the independent contractor does not account to the client or
customer for meals and entertainment expenses under the substantiation rules of
§ 274(d). Where the independent contractor accounts for meal and
entertainment expenses, the limitations are applicable to the client or customer.
The person responsible for the § 274 limitations can be specified in a written
agreement between the parties.
* The preamble to the proposed regulations
and proposed examples indicate that in a multiple party arrangement each
relationship will be treated as a two-party relationship subject to the
independent contractor rules, which thus would impose the § 274 limitations
upon the party that reimburses expenses substantiated to it by another party.
Again, persons in multiparty reimbursement arrangements would be permitted
to specify by agreement which party is subject to the § 274 limitations.
8. Cincinnati is one big metropolitan area. Saunders
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-200 (7/17/12). The taxpayer worked for
a single employer, had no principal place of business, and travelled directly
from home to temporary work sites located between 74 and 96 miles away.
The taxpayer lived in Manchester, Ohio [more than 70 miles away from
Cincinnati], and indicated that his "main area" was Cincinnati. The Tax
Court (Judge Thornton) refused to allow the taxpayer's claimed deductions
for travel away from home as expenses incurred for travel outside the
metropolitan area where the taxpayer lives and normally works. The court
noted that the term "metropolitan area" is ill defined, but concluded under
the facts and circumstances that the taxpayer failed to establish that any of
the temporary worksites to which the taxpayer travelled were outside of the
Cincinnati metropolitan area; the two worksites identified in the opinion
were 20 and 31 miles away from downtown Cincinnati, but were located
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within the Cincinnati-Middletown, OH-KY-IN Metropolitan Statistical Area
as defined in OMB Bulletin No. 08-01 (Nov. 20, 2007).
9. The Tax Court strikes a blow to the travel
expense of two-earner couples. Noz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-
272 (9/24/12). The court (Judge Morrison) disallowed travel expense
deductions to married taxpayers who worked as university professors, one in
New York, one in Stockholm. Although the married taxpayers collaborated
with each other on articles and books, the court held, "On the basis of the
frequency of travel, the personal relationship between the petitioners, and the
petitioners' failure to offer any evidence, beyond broad generalities, of how
the trips advanced any stated business purpose, we find that the New York-
Stockholm trips were motivated primarily by personal concerns."
10. Selling insurance is a service business not allowed
a cost of goods sold, even to a former IRS agent. Perry v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2012-237 (8/16/12). Along with denying unsubstantiated travel
and business expenses (including $3,000 to an airline employee to be
designated her "travel companion" for discounted airfare), the Tax Court
(Judge Kroupa) held that the taxpayer's business of selling insurance was not
the sale of a material product to which direct cost may be allocated to reduce
gross receipts as cost of goods sold.
11. IRS tries to put a lid on wages recharacterized as
reimbursements. Rev. Rul. 2012-25, 2012-37 I.R.B. 337 (9/10/12). The IRS
ruled that certain employer arrangements that substitute reimbursement for
tools, travel, supplies and the like under a purported "accountable plan" for
compensation for services do not meet the business connection requirement
of § 62(c) and therefore fail as accountable plans. The IRS noted that such
plans are intended to avoid the two-percent limitation on deduction of
employee business expenses and payment of employment taxes on wages
that are recharacterized as reimbursements. Citing Reg. § 1.62-2(d), the
ruling indicates with three factual situations that the business connection
requirement is not met where hourly compensation is reduced and replaced
with a reimbursement arrangement that pays the same gross amount to the
employee regardless of whether the employee incurs deductible business
expenses. The ruling states that the fact that the employee actually incurs a
deductible expense in connection with employment does not cure the wage
recharacterization. Second, a plan that pays the same amount of
reimbursement to employees who have not actually incurred deductible
expenses in connection with the employer's business fails the business
connection requirement. In situation 4 of the ruling, the IRS indicates that a
plan that reduces hourly compensation, but only reimburses employees who
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incur expenses in connection with the employer's business and who are
required to substantiate expenses, qualifies as a reimbursement plan
notwithstanding substitution for the reimbursement plan for a portion of the
hourly compensation.
12. Texas professors denied bad debt deductions for
related entity loans. Herrera v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-308
(11/5/12). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) denied business bad debt
deductions under § 166 for advances by one LLC to its sister, both of which
were owned by two University of Texas El Paso engineering professors who
used the LLCs for consulting and metal fabrication activities. Citing the 13
factors identified by the Fifth Circuit in Texas Farm Bureau v. United States,
725 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1984), the court found that advances were not bona
fide debt, stressing the lack of a promissory note, the lack of a definitive
maturity date, the lack of a repayment schedule, de facto subordination of the
debt to other creditors, the absence of a requirement for security, and the fact
that the source of payment was tied to the fortunes of the business. The court
stressed the fact that no interest was paid as being particularly important.
13. Friends from the Cheers bar don't provide
business bad debt deductions until all hope is gone. Alioto v.
Commissioner, 699 F.3d 948 (6th Cir. 11/7/12). After the taxpayer hired
John Ratzenberger (famous for his role in Cheers) he entered into a business
venture with Ratzenberger to use celebrity talent in short form media to be
sold as internet advertising. The taxpayer contended that he expected to be
fully reimbursed for advances of his own money to the venture. Afflrming
the Tax Court (T.C. Memo. 2011-151), the Sixth Circuit (Judge Moore)
denied business bad debt deductions because the taxpayer failed to meet his
burden of proof that his losses were no longer subject to a reasonable
prospect of recovery. The court rejected the taxpayer's testimony that he had
received an e-mail from Ratzenberger's agent notifying the taxpayer that no
further reimbursement would be forthcoming as insufficient proof, nor did
the court accept the fact that the taxpayer filed bankruptcy as evidence that
the debt was not recoverable. The court also denied the taxpayer's claim for
a theft loss on the ground that there was no proof that Ratzenberger's actions
amounted to larceny under Massachusetts law.
14. The CEO and sole shareholder of a janitorial
corporation used cocaine as a chick magnet, but can the corporation
deduct the cleanup costs? Held, the price paid for the cocaine overdose
death of the boss's girlfriend is not a deductible corporate business
expense. Cavanaugh v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-324 (11/26/12).
James Cavanaugh the CEO and sole shareholder of Jani-King International
took a holiday trip to the Cavanaugh's villa in St. Maarten with his 27 year-
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old girlfriend, a body guard, and another female Jani-King employee.
Unfortunately the girlfriend died from an overdose of cocaine. The
girlfriend's mother sued the individuals and the corporation for wrongful
death. The taxpayer's S corporation paid the full amount of the settlement,
including a $250,000 reimbursement to Cavanaugh and claimed a business
expense deduction. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) began its opinion in this
case submitted under Tax Court Rule 1222 as follows:
Twenty-seven-year-old Colony Anne (Claire)
Robinson left Texas in November 2002 for a Thanksgiving
vacation in the Caribbean with her boyfriend, his bodyguard,
and another employee of the company that he had spent
decades building.
She did not return home alive.
The coroner's report showed a massive amount of
illegal drugs in her body and concluded that they were the
likely cause of her death. Robinson's mother sued the
boyfriend and his company for wrongful death. The parties
settled. The company paid most of the $2.3 million
settlement directly; the boyfriend contributed $250,000,
which the company then reimbursed.
0 Siding with the IRS, Judge Holmes
looked to the origin of the claim, which the court held to be applicable to the
corporation's payment in settlement of the wrongful death claim. The court
concluded that although the claim related to the conduct of the three corporate
employees, the conduct was not related to the corporate business, i.e., its profit-
seeking activities. The court also rejected the taxpayer's theory that the
bodyguard supplied cocaine in the course of his employment as a bodyguard
and enabler for the CEO. Further, the court rejected the taxpayer's argument
that reimbursement of the taxpayer's contribution to the settlement was
contractually required under a corporate indemnity agreement. In addition, the
court found that the payment was not deductible under the theory that it was
2. RULE 122. SUBMISSION WITHOUT TRIAL
(a) General: Any case not requiring a trial for the submission of
evidence (as, for example, where sufficient facts have been
admitted, stipulated, established by deposition, or included in the
record in some other way) may be submitted at any time after
joinder of issue (see Rule 38) by motion of the parties filed with
the Court. The parties need not wait for the case to be calendared
for trial and need not appear in Court.
(b) Burden of Proof: The fact of submission of a case, under
paragraph (a) of this Rule, does not alter the burden of proof, or
the requirements otherwise applicable with respect to adducing
proof, or the effect of failure of proof.
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made to protect the corporation's business reputation because there was no
evidence that underlay that theory.
15. Puerto Rico may not be a state, but it's part of
the U.S.A. for § 199 domestic production purposes. The 2012 Taxpayer
Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 318, extends inclusion of
manufacturing and production activities in Puerto Rico as domestic
production activities for purposes of the § 199 domestic production activities
deduction for the first eight years of a taxpayer beginning after 12/31/05 and
before 1/1/14. Previously § 199 applied to the first six years of a taxpayer
beginning after 12/31/05 and before 1/1/12.
16. Extended power to empowerment zones. The
2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 327,
extends designations of empowerment zones through 12/31/13. The
designations, which were set to expire on 12/31/11, extends a 20 percent
wage credit under § 1396, additional $35,000 of first year expensing under
§ 179, tax-exempt bond financing under § 1394, and capital gains deferral on
replacement of qualified assets under § 1397B.
E. Depreciation & Amortization
1. No chickening out of the allocation agreement in
an applicable asset acquisition - even after a cost segregation study.
Peco Foods, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-18 (1/17/12). The
taxpayer entered into an agreement with the sellers of two poultry processing
plants that allocated a large portion of the purchase price to processing plants
on which the taxpayer claimed depreciation deductions as nonresidential real
property with a MACRS life of 39 years. The agreements separately listed an
agreed upon price for machinery and equipment. Subsequently, after a cost
segregation study, the taxpayer attempted to change its method of accounting
to separate out components of the plants as equipment and machinery and
claim accelerated depreciation on the basis of shorter MACRS recovery
periods. The Tax Court (Judge Laro) held that under Commissioner v.
Danielson, 378 F.2d 771, 775 (3d Cir. 1967) and § 1060, unless the taxpayer
could show fraud, undue influence, duress, etc., the taxpayer was bound by
the purchase price allocation agreement. The court rejected the taxpayer's
argument that nothing in § 1060 precluded the taxpayer from segregating
components of assets broadly described as a production plant into
components consisting of the real property and related equipment and
machinery. The court also refused to accept the taxpayer's assertion that the
agreements with the sellers should be disregarded because the use of the
terms "processing plant building" and "real property improvements" were
ambiguous. Finally the court agreed with the IRS that the IRS did not abuse
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its discretion in prohibiting the taxpayer from adopting depreciation
schedules that were inconsistent with the terms of the purchase agreements.
2. New accounting and disposition rules for
MACRS property. T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81060
(12/27/11), and REG-168745-03, Guidance Regarding Deduction and
Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property, 76 F.R. 81128
(12/27/11). The capitalization and repair regulations (discussed above)
provide significant new rules for the maintenance of multiple asset accounts
and disposition of property from MACRS single and multiple asset accounts.
0 Accounting for MACRS property.
Consistent with prior rules under Reg. § 1.167-7, Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-7T
allows taxpayers to account for MACRS property in a single asset account or
by combining multiple assets in a multiple asset account. Assets in a multiple
asset account must have been placed in service in the same taxable year, and
have the same recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to
different recovery rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets
subject to additional first year recovery, or property used partly for personal
purposes, may not be combined with assets subject to different recovery
provisions. Assets with the same recovery periods and conventions may be
combined in a multiple asset account even if the assets have different uses. In
addition, the taxpayer is permitted to use as many single and multiple asset
accounts as the taxpayer may choose.
* Dispositions. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
8T(d) defines a disposition of MACRS property as occurring when the asset is
transferred or permanently withdrawn from use in the taxpayer's trade or
business or from the production of income. Thus, a disposition includes the
sale, exchange, retirement, abandonment, or destruction of an asset.
Significantly, the definition of disposition is expanded in the temporary
regulation to include the retirement of a structural component of a building.
* Gain or loss. Gain or loss on the sale,
exchange or conversion of an asset is determined under applicable tax
principles. Loss on abandonment is determined from the "adjusted depreciable
basis" of the asset (basis adjusted for depreciation). Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
8T(d). Recognized loss on other dispositions is the excess of the adjusted
depreciable basis of the asset over fair market value. Identification of the asset
disposed of from a multiple asset account, and its basis, is generally determined
from the taxpayer's records. Temp. Reg. § 1. 168(i)-8T(e) & (f). The temporary
regulations provide rules for identifying assets if the taxpayer's records do not
do so; a first-in first-out method, a modified FIFO method, a mortality
dispersion table method, or any other method designated by the IRS. The asset
cannot be larger than a unit of property. In case of a disposition of a structural
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component of a building, the structural component is the asset disposed of. An
improvement placed in service after the asset is treated as a separate asset
provided that it is not larger than the unit of property. Temp. Reg. § 1. 168(i)-
8T(c)(4)(ii)(E). Disposition of an asset in a single asset account terminates
depreciation for the asset as of the time of the disposition. Disposition of an
asset in a multiple asset account removes the asset from the account as of the
beginning of the year of disposition, requires separate depreciation for the asset
in the year of disposition, and reduction of the depreciation reserve of the
multiple asset account by the unadjusted basis of the disposed asset as of the
first day of the taxable year of the disposition. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T(g).
* General Asset Accounts. Consistent with
prior Reg. § 1.168(i)-i, the temporary regulations provide for an election to
group assets into one or more general asset accounts. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1T(c)(2) provides for grouping assets in a general asset account as long as the
assets have been placed in service in the same taxable year and have the same
recovery period and convention. Assets that are subject to different recovery
rules or special limitations, such as automobiles, assets subject to first year
recovery, or property used partly for personal purposes, may not be combined
with assets subject to different recovery provisions. The temporary regulations
do not include the requirement of prior regulations that general asset accounts
include only assets in the same asset class. Assets eligible for additional first
year depreciation deductions must be grouped with assets eligible for the same
first year depreciation deductions and may not be grouped with assets not
eligible for additional first year depreciation. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1T(c)(2)(ii)(D) & (E). The temporary regulations expand existing rules for
dispositions of assets from a general asset account to encompass as a
disposition the retirement of a structural component of a building. As under
existing rules, the temporary regulations treat the basis of any asset disposed of
from a general asset account as zero, and any amount realized results in
ordinary gain. The taxpayer continues to deprecate assets in the general asset
account as if no disposition occurred. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-lT(e)(2).
However, consistent with existing regulations, the temporary regulations allow
a taxpayer to elect to terminate general asset account treatment on disposition of
an asset in a qualifying disposition, in which case gain or loss is recognized
under the rules of Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-8T. The list of qualifying dispositions
is expanded generally to include any disposition. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
IT(e)(3). In addition, general asset accounts are terminated in certain
nonrecognition dispositions and on termination of a partnership under
§ 708(b)(1)(B). Gain or loss may also be recognized on disposition of all of the
assets, or the last asset, in a general asset account. Temp. Reg. § 1.168(i)-
1T(e)(3)(ii).
a. IRS specifies the procedures for adopting
new accounting methods under the Temporary Regulations relating to
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depreciation of tangible property. Rev. Proc. 2012-20, 2012-14 I.R.B. 700
(3/7/12), modifying Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330. The IRS has
provided lengthy and detailed rules regarding automatic changes in methods
of accounting under Temp. Reg. §§ 1.167(a)-4T (amortizing or depreciating
leasehold improvements), 1.168(i)-1T (rules for general asset accounts),
1.168(i)-7T (accounting for MACRS property), and 1.168(i)-8T (dispositions
of MACRS property), all added by T.D. 9564, Guidance Regarding
Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible Property,
76 F.R. 81060 (12/27/11). The automatic change of accounting method of
Rev. Proc. 2011-14, 2011-1 C.B. 330, is applicable to property placed in
service in a taxable year ending after 12/29/03. With respect to assets placed
in service in a taxable year ending before 12/30/03, adopting the methods of
the temporary regulations requires an amended return for open years
including the placed-in-service years and all subsequent years. No § 481
adjustment is required or permitted with respect to the amended returns.
b. LB&I provides guidance under Rev.
Proc. 2012-20. LB&I-4-0312-004 (3/15/12). This directive to the field
applies to taxpayers who adopted a method of accounting relating to the
conversion of capitalized assets to repair expense under § 263(a).
c. Have your clients been wasting time
trying to comply with the Temporary Regulations in 2012? Yes, they
have. Further guidance announcing that pending final regulations will
apply only in years beginning in 2014 and thereafter. Notice 2012-73,
2012-51 I.R.B. 713 (11/20/12). The IRS announced that pending final
regulations will apply to taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/14, but that
taxpayers will be permitted to apply the final regulations to taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/12. The notice also indicates that the temporary
regulations may be revised with respect to the de minimis rule of § 1.263(a)-
2T(g); dispositions under §§ 1.168(i)-iT and 1.168(i)-8T; and the Safe
Harbor for Routine Maintenance under § 1.263(a)-3T(g).
d. Technical amendments to revise the
Temporary Regulations. More important, the effective date of the
12/27/11 temporary regulations is delayed to years beginning on or after
1/1/14, with optional retroactive applicability. T.D. 9564, Guidance
Regarding Deduction and Capitalization of Expenditures Related to Tangible
Property, 77 F.R. 74583 (12/17/12).
e. This announcement amends regulations
- really!!?? Announcement 2013-7, 2013-3 I.R.B. 308 (1/14/13). An
announcement amending regulations - the temporary regulations (T.D.
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9564), regarding the deduction and capitalization of expenditures under
§§ 162(a) and 263(a) relating to tangible property to apply to taxable years
beginning on or after 1/1/14, while permitting taxpayers to apply the
temporary regulations for taxable years beginning on or after 1/1/12, and
before the applicability date of the final regulations.
3. More trouble for cost segregation studies in an
opinion from a self-described "high plains drifter" (in which Judge
Holmes does to the taxpayer something like what The Stranger did to
Callie Travers). Should the determination be made by comparison with
a typical apartment building, or should it be made by comparison with a
generic shell building? AmeriSouth XXXII, Ltd. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-67 (3/12/12). The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected the
taxpayer's attempt to use a cost segregation study to break down an
apartment building and office complex into numerous components subject to
MACRS cost recovery other than the 27.5 year straight line recovery
attributable to residential real estate, in the process describing himself as a
lone rider over the "llano estacado." The court described the property as
"apartment buildings with over a thousand pieces of tangible personal
property that just happen to be attached." Following a renovation, the
taxpayer's cost segregation study broke down the property into several
categories including site preparation and earthwork; water-distribution
system; sanitary-sewer system; gas line; site electric; special HVAC; special
plumbing; special electric; finish carpentry; millwork; interior windows and
mirrors; and special painting. The court rejected the IRS's argument that the
taxpayer did not own a depreciable interest in the water and electric utility
lines and gas distribution systems crossing the property in utility owned
easements, but agreed with the IRS that the taxpayer did not have a
depreciable ownership interest in the sewer lines on the property. The court
rejected the taxpayer's assertion that site preparation costs were segregated
depreciable assets subject to 15 year recovery saying that the taxpayer failed
to overcome the presumption that the IRS correctly determined that the site
preparation costs were non-depreciable improvements to land. The taxpayer
failed to provide evidence that some of the costs were attributable to
depreciable sidewalks, parking and driveways. After a lengthy analysis of
rulings and case law, the court concluded that costs of installing water, gas,
and electrical distribution systems between utility mains and the numerous
buildings in the apartment complex constituted structural components of the
buildings and thus were not subject to shorter MACRS recovery. Turning to
the building itself, Judge Holmes rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
baseline for distinguishing structural components of the building from
tangible personal property was an unfinished building shell suitable for being
finished for a variety of purposes, instead agreeing with the IRS that the
baseline was a typical apartment building. Applying this standard, Judge
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Homes found that the only tangible personal property was the garbage
disposals, dryer-dedicated venting having no connection to the general
ventilation system, 220 amp power outlets dedicated to stoves, and 110 amp
power outlets dedicated to refrigerators. All of the following were structural
components of the buildings: venting connected to apartment stove hoods
and HVAC systems, connecting plumbing, sinks, plastic wash tubs, laundry
room drains, and gas lines (excepting individual gas line connectors to dryers
and stoves), recessed lights, paddle fans with recessed lights, and wall
outlets, finish carpentry (shelves, paneling, molding and the like), interior
windows and mirrors, and special painting. In reaching all of these
conclusions, the court refused to apply the holding in Hospital Corp. of
America v. Commissioner, 109 T.C 21 (1997), which allowed segregation of
certain rapidly depreciable tangible personal property that was not an
inherently permanent structural component from the structural components
of the hospital buildings in question in that case.
0 Some have suggested that the
precedential value of this decision might be limited because of the procedural
aspects described by the court as follows:
AmeriSouth sold Garden House about the time the
case was tried, and stopped responding to communications
from the Court, the Commissioner, and even its own
counsel. We suspended briefing in an attempt to figure out
what was going on and ended up ordering AmeriSouth to
show cause why its attorneys should not be allowed to
withdraw from its case. Without any response to the Court,
we granted the attorneys' motion to withdraw and so
AmeriSouth has been left representing itself. The Court then
ordered AmeriSouth to file a posttrial brief, which it never
did.
Because the Court ordered a posttrial brief and
AmeriSouth didn't file one, we could dismiss this case
entirely .... Despite AmeriSouth's lack of response and
mysterious disappearance, however, we will not do so. We
will, though, deem any factual matters not otherwise
contested to be conceded.
* On the other hand, it is a decided Tax
Court case, and according to rumor, this case presages further Tax Court
interest in the cost segregation studies area.
4. Shockwave's shocking mechanical defects fail to
hook GO Zone bonus depreciation. Blakeney v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-289 (10/15/12). In February 2006 the taxpayer took possession
of a new $3.9 million charter fishing yacht, Shockwave, to be based in
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Orange Beach, Alabama, a city within the Gulf Opportunity Zone.
Unfortunately multiple mechanical difficulties forced the boat to be tied up
for repairs in the Caribbean until October 2006 when it was delivered to
Orange Beach. Unfortunately, the fishing season ended in September so that
the etaxpayer was not able to charter the boat in Orange Beach during the
remainder of 2006. The taxpayer did, however, manage to charter the boat in
the Caribbean for 43 days between repairs. The 50 percent bonus
depreciation deduction of § 1400N is available for property placed in service
after 8/28/05, substantially all of the use of which in the active conduct of a
trade or business is in the Gulf Opportunity Zone. The court (Judge Vasquez)
held that the 74 days during which the boat was available for charter in
Orange Beach constituted use within the GO zone, even though the boat was
not hired for charter during that period. The court also held that the boat was
not available for use during the time it was laid up for repairs. However, the
court treated the 43 days of charter service in the Caribbean as use outside of
the GO zone and held that the 63 percent use (74/117) within the GO zone
was not substantially all under § 1400N(d)(2)(A)(ii). The court indicated that
it was not necessary to address whether the 80 percent use requirement of
Notice 2006-77, 2006-2 C.B. 590, was entitled to deference under Skidmore
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
5. First year bonus depreciation extended for one
year by the 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax
Act. The first year bonus depreciation of 50 percent of adjusted basis of
property with a MACRS recovery period of 20 years or less is extended to
property placed in service before 1/1/14 and to certain transportation
property placed in service before 1/1/15. The 50 percent allowance is
available for depreciable machinery and equipment and most other tangible
personal property, and is available for computer software and certain
leasehold improvements, the first use of which began with the taxpayer. The
2012 Act also extends the provisions in § 168(e)(3)(E) treating qualified
leasehold improvement property and qualified restaurant property as 15 year
property, also eligible for the first year bonus depreciation.
6. Section 179 limits are extended again - is this
becoming permanent like research credits? The 2012 Taxpayer Relief
Act, § 315(a) retroactively extended, the Code § 179 first year expensing for
tax years beginning in 2012 and 2013 in an amount not to exceed $500,000
with a phase-out amount beginning at $2,000,000. For tax years beginning
after 2014 the maximum deduction drops to $25,000 with the phase-out
beginning at $200,000 (at least until the business community again makes
sufficient campaign contributions to extend the higher numbers into later
years).
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a. The sunny side of inflation. Rev. Proc.
2011-52, 2011-45 I.R.B. 701, § 3.20 (11/7/11). As adjusted for inflation and
before extension by the 2012 Act, as provided in § 179(b)(6), the 2012
ceiling for expensing machinery and equipment and certain other § 1231
property was $139,000, and the phase-out threshold was $560,000. The
retroactive application of the 2012 extension to tax years beginning in 2012
provided a windfall to taxpayers who exceeded the 2012 thresholds.
b. Section 179 is applied to computer
software for another year. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act, extends for
another year eligibility as qualified Code § 179 property to off-the-shelf
computer software placed in service before 2014.
7. Mine safety equipment eligible for 50 percent
expensing. The 2012 Act, § 316, extends the election under § 179E to
expense 50 percent of mine safety equipment to apply to property placed in
service on or before 12/31/2013.
8. 2012 depreciation tables for business autos, light
trucks, and vans are to be increased by the 2012 Tax Relief Act with an
additional $8,000 of first year recovery. Rev. Proc. 2012-23, 2012-14
I.R.B. 712 (3/2/12). The IRS published depreciation tables with the
depreciation limits for business use of small vehicles:
Passenger Automobiles with § 168(k) first year recovery,
1st Tax Year $11,160
2nd Tax Year $5,100
3rd Tax Year $3,050
Each Succeeding Year $1,875
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Trucks and Vans with § 168(k) first year recovery,
1st Tax Year $11,360
2nd Tax Year $5,300
3rd Tax Year $3,150
Each Succeeding Year $1,875
Section 168(k), as extended by the 2012 Act to property placed in service by
12/31/13, provides an additional $8,000 first year recovery
Passenger Automobiles not eligible for § 168(k) first year recovery,
1st Tax Year $3,160
2nd Tax Year $5,100
3rd Tax Year $3,050
Each Succeeding Year $1,875
Trucks and Vans not eligible for § 168(k)first year recovery,
1st Tax Year $3,360
2nd Tax Year $5,300
3rd Tax Year $3,150
Each Succeeding Year $1,875
0 The revenue procedure also has tables for
leased vehicles.
9. The IRS identifies property eligible for 100
percent depreciation, including the unintended consequences for
business autos. Rev. Proc. 2011-26, 2011-16 I.R.B. 664 (3/29/11). 2010 tax
acts extended the placed-in-service date for property to be eligible for the
§ 168(k)(1) 50 percent first year depreciation allowance to property placed in
service before 2013 (2014 in the case of certain property described in
§ 168(k)(2)(B) and (C)) and adopted § 168(k)(5) to allow a 100 percent
depreciation deduction for qualified property acquired after 9/8/10 and
before 1/1/12, and placed in service before 1/1/12. The revenue procedure
sets out several rules for the application of these provisions.
* Reg. § 1.168(k)-i(b)(4)(iii)(C)(1) and (2)
provide that if the larger part of self-constructed property commences before the
applicable dates for the 50 percent depreciation deduction, components self-
constructed after the effective date are also ineligible for the accelerated
deduction. If the construction of the larger part of self-constructed property
begins before 9/9/10, but the qualified property otherwise qualifies for the 50
percent depreciation deduction, self-constructed components after 9/9/10, that
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are qualified property may be subject to an election to claim 100 percent
depreciation deductions with respect to the component.
. Section 168(k)(2)(D)(iii) provides an
election not to claim first year depreciation with respect to a "class of property"
placed in service during the taxable year. Reg. § 1.168(k)- I (e)(2)(i) applies the
election to each class of property described in § 168(e). The revenue procedure
allows an election to claim 50 percent first year depreciation rather than 100
percent depreciation for a class of property.
a. The passenger automobile anomaly. The
additional first year depreciation allowance is limited to $8,000 for passenger
automobiles and light trucks subject to the § 280F limitations ($3,060,
$4,900, $2,950 in years one through three respectively, and $1,775 in years
four through six). Thus the first year depreciation allowance in year one is
$11,060 ($3,060 plus $8,000). This allowance is treated as the 100 percent
depreciation deduction. Under § 280F(a)(1)(B)(i), unrecovered passenger
automobile basis is treated as a deductible expense (up to $1,775) in each
year after the sixth year. Unless the taxpayer elects to forego 100 percent
depreciation recovery with respect to a passenger automobile, the taxpayer
would be treated as claiming 100 percent depreciation in year one, with no
further deductions allowable in years two through six. The revenue
procedure provides a safe harbor method of accounting that the taxpayer is
deemed to apply by deducting depreciation of the passenger automobile for
the first taxable year succeeding the placed-in-service year. In effect, the
revenue procedure continues to treat passenger automobile and light truck
depreciation as if the first year deduction were 50 percent depreciation.
b. The 2012 Act extends the eligibility to
property placed in service before 1/1/14.
10. Not all self-created intangibles are
nonamortizable. Fitch v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-358 (12/26/12).
The taxpayer sold his CPA practice to another accountant for $900,000 after
suffering severe medical problems that led to brain surgery. Approximately
4-1/2 months after the sale, the purchaser suffered a seizure and was
hospitalized. Five days later, the purchaser sold the practice back to the
taxpayer for $900,000. The taxpayer claimed § 197 amortization deductions
with respect to the cost of intangibles reflected in the $900,000 repurchase
price, and the IRS denied the deductions. The IRS position was based on
alternative arguments that (1) "'the alleged sales agreements petitioners
submitted are untrustworthy and the alleged sales did not take place,"'
(2) that the original transaction was rescinded, and (3) that the taxpayer
reacquired self-created intangibles in a series of related transactions. The Tax
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Court (Judge Vasquez) found that in light of the circumstances leading to
each transaction, the two sales and purchase transactions were unrelated and
genuine. Furthermore, the second transaction was not a mere rescission.
Thus, the exception to the prohibition on amortization of certain self-created
intangibles in Reg. § 1.197-2(d)(2)(iii)(C), which allows amortization if a
taxpayer disposes of a self-created intangible and subsequently reacquires the
intangible from a seller (in whose hands the intangible is amortizable) in an
unrelated transaction, applied.
11. Tax incentives for "first peoples" - accelerated
depreciation for property on Indian Reservations is extended. The 2012
Tax Relief Act, extends the shortened recovery periods of § 168(j) to
property placed in service on Indian reservations before 12/31/13.
F. Credits
1. Save energy, save taxes. Notice 2012-26, 2012-17
I.R.B. 847 (3/28/12). Perpetually extended § 179D (through 2014 in the last
iteration) allows a deduction of up to $1.80 per square foot for the cost of
installing energy saving components if the total energy and power costs of a
building are reduced by more than 50 percent compared to a reference
building. A partial deduction is allowed for energy systems that do not meet
the 50 percent threshold but satisfy a specified lowered requirement. The
notice revises the percentage reductions figures of prior notices for the partial
deduction for heating, cooling, ventilation, and hot water systems from 16 to
15 percent, from 16 to 25 percent for interior lighting, and from 16 to 10
percent for reductions attributable to the building envelope. Thus, the
required percentage reductions in energy consumption for the partial
deduction that are provided in the notice are 15 percent for HVAC systems,
25 percent for lighting, and 10 percent for the building envelope.
2. The Tax Court just says "no" to R&D credits
claimed with 20/20 hindsight provided by alliantgroup. Shami v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-78 (3/21/12). The taxpayer's S corporation
hired alliantgroup to conduct § 41 research tax credit studies covering the
years in question. The research and development department staff ranged
from 18 to 27 and included chemists, technicians, and a vice president of
research and development who supervised the department. The alliantgroup
concluded that the corporation was entitled to claim the § 41 research credit
based in part on wages paid to two individuals who were, respectively, its
chairman of the board, chief executive officer, president, and secretary
(Shami), and its executive vice president and the sole member of its sales and
marketing committee (McCall), neither of whom had formal education or
training in any physical or biological science or engineering. The only issue
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in the case involved credits based on wages paid to the two executives. The
taxpayers "failed to provide any documentation that establishe[d] how much
time, if any, Mr. Shami or Mr. McCall spent performing research and
development services during the relevant years," but argued that the court
"must estimate the amount of wages allocable to qualified services if [it
found] either Mr. Shami or Mr. McCall performed qualified services." The
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) rejected the taxpayer's argument, on the basis that
the Cohan rule (Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-544 (2d Cir.
1930)) applies only if there is a reasonable basis on which the court can
make an estimate, and that in this case the taxpayer failed to satisfy the court
that there was sufficient evidence to estimate the appropriate allocation of
wages between qualified services and nonqualified services. Judge Kroupa
found United States v. McFerrin, 570 F.3d 672 (5th Cir. 2009), which did
apply the Cohan rule in determining the § 41 research credit, to be
inapposite, stating that in McFerrin "the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit did not overrule, or even address, the basic requirement under Cohan
that a court must have a reasonable basis upon which to make an estimate."
3. You can't consume your supplies in research and
sell them too. Union Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 697 F.3d 104 (2d Cir.
9/7/12) Affirming the Tax Court, T.C. Memo. 2009-50, the Second Circuit
(Judge Pooler) held that raw materials used in three discontinued research
products that were ultimately converted to products sold by the taxpayer
were not eligible for inclusion as part of qualified research expenditures for
the 20 percent research credit of § 41(a). The court specifically held that the
costs of supplies used during research projects that would have been used in
the course of the taxpayer's manufacturing process regardless of the research
do not qualify under §§ 41(b)(2)(A)(ii) and 41(h)(1)(B) as "an amount paid
or incurred for supplies used in the conduct of qualified research." The court,
not willing to make "a fortress out of the dictionary," determined that the
phrase "used in the conduct of qualified research" encompassed only
supplies purchased for the purpose of conducting research, although supplies
consumed in the normal manufacturing process were necessary to the
research focused on more efficient methods of converting the raw materials
to finished product. The court also noted that any ambiguity in the statute
could be resolved by giving deference to the agency interpretation of the
statute "even if that interpretation appears in a legal brief." The court found
that the IRS's interpretation of the statute was consistent with the purpose of
the research credit. In a concurring opinion Judge Pooler observed that if
Congress had intended the supplies at issue to be creditable, it would have so
provided in precise terms on a subject of industry lobbying.
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4. Gross receipts are not defined by the narrow
definition of Black's Law Dictionary, the regulations provide better
guidance. Hewlett-Packard Company v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 8
(9/24/12). For the tax years at issue the taxpayer elected the alternative
incremental research credit (AIRC) method of computing the § 41 research
credit, which provided a credit equal to the sum of: (i) 2.65% (1.65% for
1999) of so much of the qualified research expenditures (QRE) from the tax
year as exceeded 1% of annual adjusted gross receipts (AAGR), but did not
exceed 1.5% of those AAGR; (ii) 3.2% (2.2% for 1999) of so much of the
QRE from the tax year as exceeded 1.5% of AAGR, but did not exceed 2%
of those AAGR; and (iii) 3.75% (2.75% for 1999) of so much of the QRE
from the tax year as exceeded 2% of AAGR. In 1999 Treasury proposed
regulations to provide that adjusted gross receipts for this purpose include in
addition to sales receipts (as adjusted for returns and allowances) other
sources of gross income such as interest, dividends and rents. The final
regulations adopted the provision but with an effective date for tax years
beginning after the date of the final regulations, 1/3/01. For its tax years 1999
through 2001 the taxpayer calculated its credit on the basis of adjusted gross
receipts that did not include income other than sales income. The Tax Court
(Judge Goeke) concluded that the final regulations were a proper
interpretation of the statutory language and legislative intent and that the
Treasury's logic in embracing a definition of gross receipts as articulated in
the preamble to the proposed regulations applies to taxable years preceding
the effective date of the regulations. Thus the court adopted a definition of
gross receipts that includes the total amount derived by a taxpayer from all
activities and sources. The court rejected the taxpayer's argument that by
adopting § 41(c)(4) (excluding "returns and allowances" from gross
receipts), Congress indicated an intent to limit the concept of gross receipts
for § 41 purposes to sales receipts. The court also refused to adopt a narrow
"common law meaning" of gross receipts from Black's Law Dictionary as
undermined by numerous statutory authorities using the term. Further, the
court indicated that the maximum "expressio unius est exclusio alterius"
applies to indicate that congressional enumeration of specific exceptions to
gross receipts means that other exceptions are not to be implied.
5. Business tax credits extended and liberalized by
the 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act. The
business tax credits extended include:
a. Research credit of § 41 for 20 percent of
research expenditures over a base amount, 20 percent of basic research
payments to universities and 20 percent of qualified energy research by an
energy consortium is retroactively extended for two years to cover research
expenditures incurred before 1/1/14. The new law also provides that the
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acquirer of a trade or business, or of a substantial portion of a business unit,
may include certain qualified research expenditures of the predecessor and
must include the gross receipts of the predecessor in calculating credits
available to the acquirer. For controlled corporations, under § 41(f) all of the
members are treated as a single taxpayer and the research credit and the
credit allowable to each member is to be determined in proportion to its share
of research expenditures.
b. Railroad track maintenance. The 2012
Act, § 306, extends the 50 percent credit of § 45G for qualified railroad track
maintenance expenditures of up to $3500 per mile incurred by a qualified
railroad owner to tax years beginning before 1/1/14.
c. Mine Rescue Training. The 2012 Act,
§ 307, extends the 20 percent credit of § 45N for costs of training qualified
mine rescue employees to taxable years beginning before 12/31/13.
G. Natural Resources Deductions & Credits
1. Business energy related tax credits extended by
the 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act. The
tax credits extended include:
a. Alternative vehicle fuel property. Section
402 of the Act extends the Code § 30C alternative fuel vehicle refueling
property 30 percent credit, limited to $30,000 for depreciable property and
$1,000 for other property, to property placed in service before 1/1/14.
b. Electric vehicles. Section 403 of the Act
extends the Code § 30D credit for two or three wheel electric vehicles of
$2,500 to $5,000 depending on battery power to vehicles acquired before
1/1/14.
c. Plant gas. Section 404 of the Act extends
the per gallon credit for alcohol used as fuel to production before 1/1/14, and
provides rules for using algae as qualified feedstock for fuel produced after
1/2/13 [the date of enactment]. In addition, § 410(b) of the Act extends the
additional 50 percent depreciation allowance of Code § 168(l)(2) for biofuel
plant property placed in service before 1/1/14.
d. Biodiesel, i.e., the timing of the Iowa
primary; even Al Gore has given up on ethanol. Section 405 of the Act
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extends the Code § 40A $1.00 per gallon credit for biodiesel mixtures to fuel
sold or used before 1/1/14.
e. Indian coal. Section 406 of the Act extends
the $2 per ton additional renewable energy credit under § 45(e)(10) for coal
produced at an Indian coal production facility and sold by the taxpayer
during an eight year period beginning on 1/1/06.
f. Energy efficient homes. Section 407 of the
Act extends the Code § 45L credit to contractors of $2,000 (or $1,000 in the
case of certain manufactured homes) that are certified as energy efficient to
homes acquired from the contractor for use as a residence on or before
12/31/13.
g. Refrigerators, dishwashers and washing
machines. Section 409 of the Act retroactively extends for two years the
credit under Code § 45M to energy efficient appliances manufactured in
2012 and 2013.
h. Transmission line sales. Section 411 of the
Act extends the Code § 45 1(i) eight year amortization of gain recognized on
sales of transmission lines by a qualified vertically integrated electric utility
to an independent transmission company to sales before 1/1/14.
i. Alternative fuel excise tax credit. Section
412 of the Act retroactively extends through 2013 the excise tax credits of
Code § 6426 for alternative fuels and fuels mixtures.
H. Loss Transactions, Bad Debts, and NOLs
1. Unless you think you have a CERT - no it's
neither a breath nor a candy mint - or a CERIL, don't punish yourself
by reading these proposed regulations just for fun. REG-140668-07,
Regulations Regarding the Application of Section 172(h) Including
Consolidated Groups, 77 F.R. 57452 (9/17/12). The corporate equity
reduction transaction (CERT) rules of § 172(b)(1)(E) and (h) were enacted in
1989 to limit a corporation's ability to obtain tax refunds as the result of the
carryback of NOLs that were attributable to interest deductions allocable to
leveraged buyout transactions. Sections 72(b)(1)(E) and (h) limit the
carryback of the portion of an NOL that constitutes a "corporate equity
reduction interest loss" (CERIL) of an "applicable corporation" in any "loss
limitation year." Prop. Reg. §§ 172(h)-0 through -5 provide general rules
addressing whether a CERT has occurred, the computation of a CERIL, and
the treatment of successor corporations.
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2. ATNOLD is not a breath mint to relieve your
AMT problems. Metro One Telecommunications Inc. v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. 573 (12/15/10). In computing AMTI, § 56(a)(4) allows a corporation to
claim an AMT NOL in lieu of a regular NOL deduction allowed under § 72.
The taxpayer claimed an AMT NOL deduction for 2002 based on a
carryback of an AMT NOL from 2004. Analyzing a very complicated
statutory pattern, Judge Paris held that § 56(a)(1) does not allow for an AMT
NOL carryover to a prior year.
a. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirms and
holds that a "carryover" is a "carryforward," but not a "carryback."
Metro One Telecommunications, Inc. v. Commissioner, 704 F.3d 1057 (9th
Cir. 12/19/12). For tax years 2002 through 2009 the Relief Rule of § 56(d)(1)
allowed taxpayers to offset 100 percent of AMTI by an alternative tax net
operating loss deduction (ATNOLD) which consisted of NOLs that were (1)
"carryovers" to the 2001 and 2002 tax years or (2) carried back from 2001 or
2002 tax years to a prior year. The Ninth Circuit (Judge N.R. Smith) ruled
that Metro One was precluded from carrying back net operating losses from
2004 to offset 100 percent of 2002 AMTI, but was limited to offsetting 90
percent of the 2002 AMT under former § 56(d)(1)A)(i)(II). The court
indicated that the "plain meaning" of the term "carryovers" in the Relief
Rule prevents taxpayers from using NOLs that are carried back from a later
tax year. The use of the term "carryover" in § 172 is synonymous with
"carryforward."
I. At-Risk and Passive Activity Losses
1. Ya gotta keep time records. Vandegrift v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-14 (1/12/12). The taxpayer, who was
employed as a salesman, invested in nine rental properties. Six of the
properties were rented. The taxpayer acquired three properties for rental after
renovations were completed, but sold the properties before they were rented.
The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the taxpayer failed to establish that
he was a real estate professional under § 469(c)(7), because the taxpayer was
unable to provide contemporaneous verification of the time he devoted to the
real estate activity. The court also held that the taxpayer's rental real estate
activity was a passive trade or business that included all nine properties.
Thus, the taxpayer was permitted to offset losses from the rental properties
against the capital gain recognized on the sale of three properties. The court
rejected the IRS's argument that since the three properties that produced
short-term capital gain were never rented the gain could not be offset by the
losses.
[Vol. 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
2. Yeah, it's true - Ya really do gotta keep records
of hours worked. Iversen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-19 (1/18/12).
The Tax Court (Judge Swift) held that the taxpayer failed to prove he had
satisfied the 500 hour participation test of Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) in the
operation of a Rocky Mountain cattle ranch that was principally run by a
resident manager. Evidence of eleven trips (along with his children) to the
ranch (which had a 20,000 square foot lodge) in a private plane funded by
the taxpayer's successful medical supplies business and telephone
conversations with the ranch manager did not convince the court that the
taxpayer was a material participant. In addition, the court concluded that
much of the taxpayer's activities were in the capacity of an investor, which
do not qualify as participation under Reg. § 1.469-5T(f)(2)(ii)(A) and (B).
The court did not sustain accuracy related penalties on the ground that the
taxpayer reasonably relied on his accountant to prepare the returns.
3. Self-rent to the taxpayer's business was not
passive income. Samarasinghe v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-23
(1/19/12). Applying Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6), the Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held
that income from the taxpayer's rental of a building owned by the taxpayer,
which was used in the taxpayer's medical practice was not passive activity
income that could be offset with the taxpayer's losses from passive activities.
The court also held that, under New Jersey state law, the original lease for
the medical building entered into in 1980 was not subject to the transitional
rule of Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6), which is not applicable to binding contracts
entered into before 1988. The court determined that the original lease had
been ignored by the parties and not followed in the 2004 through 2009 time
period at issue in the case. The court refused to impose § 6662 penalties
because it found that the taxpayers reasonably relied on their tax advisor with
respect to the treatment of the lease payments.
4. When good at-risk notes go bad there are tax
consequences to the maker. Zeluck v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-98
(4/3/12). In 2001, the taxpayer invested in an oil and gas partnership,
investing $310,000 - $110,000 of cash and $200,000 in the form of a
subscription recourse promissory note. He was initially at risk for $310,000,
because the debt obligation was "genuine" through 2002, but by 2003, when
the partnership terminated, his at-risk amount had been reduced to zero as a
result of receiving passed-through losses and distributions totaling $3 10,000.
After he had reduced his at-risk amount to zero, upon the termination of the
partnership in 2003 his liability for the $200,000 note became "nongenuine."
No principal payments had been made to the partnership and there was no
evidence that the note was transferred or distributed to anyone upon
dissolution of the partnership. After the termination of the partnership, there
was no person or entity to which the taxpayer was liable for payment on the
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subscription note. He never received any written notification of the balance
due on the subscription note, made no inquiry regarding the balance due, and
has made no arrangements to pay the balance due. No demand for payment
was made by any party as a result of the subscription notes, even after the
due date. The taxpayer never signed an extension of the subscription note or
otherwise pushed back the maturity date. As a result of the note becoming
nongenuine, under § 465(b)(2) the taxpayer's at-risk amount was reduced to
negative $200,000 in 2003. Thus, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke) decided that
the taxpayer recognized a $200,000 gain for 2003 pursuant to § 465(e).
0 The 20 percent accuracy-related penalty
under § 6662(a), imposed for taxpayer's negligence in failing to reduce his
amount at risk, was upheld by the court.
5. The Tax Court shines some light on passive solar
energy installations. Wilson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-101
(4/10/12); Uyemura v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-102 (4/10/12); Lum
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-103 (4/10/12). In three nearly identical
opinions the Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that losses from a micro-utility
activity involving purchase and rental of solar equipment were passive
activity losses. The taxpayers each purchased photovoltaic systems from a
company doing business in Hawaii as Mercury Solar. Under the program, the
taxpayer also acquired an investment solar system that was installed at the
residence of a ratepayer, who paid a monthly fee to purchase the energy
produced by the investment system. Each taxpayer acquired a single
investment system that was installed in the residence of the "ratepayer." The
system was installed at the ratepayer's residence by Mercury Solar. The
taxpayer contracted with another company to collect the monthly payments
on behalf of the taxpayer as the equipment owner. The collection company
maintained records and made payments on the taxpayers' loans to acquire the
equipment. The court rejected the taxpayers' assertions that they qualified as
material participants as the persons engaged in substantially all of the
participation in the activity and held that that the taxpayers failed to meet
their burden of proving that they participated in the activity for more than
100 hours, which was not less than the participation of any other individual.
See Temp. Reg. § 1.469-5T(b)(2). The court noted that the participation of
Mercury Solar and the collection company were also substantial. In the
absence of material participation by the taxpayers in the three cases, the court
did not need to consider whether the activity was a rental activity. In addition
to disallowing deductions for losses under § 469, in Uyemura and Lum the
court disallowed the taxpayers' claims for the § 48 business energy credit not
subject to the passive activity loss limitation because the taxpayers had no
tax liability with respect to the micro-utility and because no § 38 general
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business credits are allowable with respect to property for which a § 179
election to expense business assets is made.
6. The taxpayer loses, but not as badly as he would
have had the IRS properly argued the case. Veriha v. Commissioner, 139
T.C. No. 3 (8/8/12). The taxpayer was the sole owner of JVT, a C
corporation that conduced a trucking business in which he actively
participated. JVT leased the tractors and trailers used in its business from
TRI, an S corporation in which the taxpayer owned 99 percent of the stock,
and JRV, a single-member LLC wholly owned by the taxpayer and thus a
disregarded entity. Each lease of a tractor or trailer was governed by a
separate contract. During the year in issue, TRI realized net income and JRV
realized a net loss. The taxpayer treated the net income from TRI as passive
income and treated the net loss from JRV as a passive loss. The IRS
determined that pursuant to Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6) - the self-rental
recharacterization rule - each tractor and each trailer should be considered a
separate "item of property" and that the income the taxpayer received from
TRI should be recharacterized as nonpassive income, while the net loss
realized by JRV remained a passive activity loss. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6)
provides as follows: "An amount of the taxpayer's gross rental activity
income for the taxable year from an item of property equal to the net rental
activity income for the year from that item of property is treated as not from
a passive activity if the property- (i) Is rented for use in a trade or business
activity ... in which the taxpayer materially participates . . . ." The Tax
Court (Judge Wells) rejected the taxpayer's argument that all of the tractors
and trailers collectively were one "item of property," and looking to
Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1203 (2002) for the definition
of the term "item" held that for purposes of applying Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6),
each individual tractor or trailer was an "item of property," and the income
received from TRI was subject to recharacterization. However, because the
IRS had not contested the taxpayer's netting of gains and losses within TRI,
only TRI's net income was recharacterized as nonpassive income that could
not be offset by losses from JRV.
* Judge Wells noted that the result was
more favorable to the taxpayer than the result would have been if the IRS had
taken the position - which was consistent with Judge Well's analysis of the
meaning of the regulations - that the income from each tractor or trailer within
TRI and JRV should have been recharacterized as nonpassive.
7. Cell tower rentals escape the self-rental rule.
Dirico v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 16 (11/13/12). The taxpayer's wholly
owned S corporation was engaged in the business of operating specialized
mobile radio services (SMIR, a precursor to cellular services) which included
numerous antenna towers. The taxpayer individually leased towers to the S
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corporation, which in turn leased space on the towers to cellular companies.
The S corporation reported all of its income from its combined activities as
ordinary business income. The IRS recharacterized the taxpayer's rental
income from profitable tower leases as non-passive activity income under the
self-rental rule of Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6), which applies to rental income from
property rented for use in a trade or business in which the taxpayer is a
material participant. (The IRS characterized losses from unprofitable leases
as passive.) The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) rejected the IRS argument that
the S corporation rented cell tower space to third parties as part of its SMR
business. The court concluded that the minimal services provided by the S
corporation to third-party lessees such as painting the towers, making sure
the lights worked, and removing snow, meant that the leasing of towers and
land to unrelated parties was a rental activity within the meaning of§ 4690)(8) and Temp. Reg. § 1.469-1T(e)(3)(i). The rental activity
complemented, but was not part of the SMR business. The court also rejected
the IRS argument that the S corporation's grouping of the rental income with
ordinary business income was proper and binding on the taxpayer even
though the taxpayer had the same proportionate ownership in the S
corporation business and the rental property under Reg. § 1.469-
4(d)(1)(i)(C). The court indicated that no portion of the S corporation's use
of the towers in its SMR business was rental and thus its rental of towers to
third parties produced only rental income. Thus, the corporation's use of the
towers for rental did not produce trade or business income supporting
application of the self-rental to the taxpayer that could properly be combined
into a single economic activity. Because the taxpayer derived his rental
income from the S corporation as a lessor to the corporation, and not as its
shareholder, the court held that the erroneous grouping of activities by the
corporation was not binding on the taxpayer under the last sentence of Reg.
§ 1.469-4(d)(5)(i) ("A shareholder *** may not treat activities grouped
together by a section 469 entity as separate activities"). The court concluded
that while Reg. § 1.469-4(e)(1) "prohibits only the regrouping of activities by
"the taxpayer" (in this case, [the corporation]) and, therefore, constitutes a
limitation on the manner in which the taxpayer (i.e., [the corporation])
reports its income for purposes of section 469. It does not affect petitioner's
reporting of [the corporation's] rental payments to him."
0 The IRS also classified land rental
income as non-passive under Temp. Reg. § 1.469-2T(f)(3), which provides that
if less than 30 percent of the unadjusted basis of rental property is subject to
depreciation under § 167 net passive activity income from the property will be
treated as non-passive income. The regulation converts rental income from raw
land to non-passive income. The court agreed with the IRS that under Reg.
§ 1.469-4(d)(2) an activity involving the rental of real property and an activity
involving the rental personal property cannot be combined into a single activity.
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Thus, the unadjusted basis of the towers and land could not be combined with
the basis of raw land for purposes of the 30-percent rule.
* The court further rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the IRS assertion of the 30-percent rule should be rejected
because it was first raised on brief. While the court agreed that the IRS's raising
the argument was not timely, causing an element of surprise, the court found
that the taxpayer was not prejudiced by the argument since all of the evidence
necessary to resolve the issue was presented at trial.
8. I11 bank president is not a real estate professional.
Harnett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-191 (8/11/11). The taxpayer
founded a savings and loan association to provide financing to customers of
his real estate development company. In 2003 the taxpayer suffered a heart
attack and other health problems. He resigned as CEO of the bank in 2005,
but continued to work as a consultant to the bank and served as chairman of
the board. After 2003 the taxpayer had stopped renting his real estate
properties and had begun trying to sell them. The real estate was managed
partly by the taxpayer's son, his wife, and his former bank secretary. The
court (Judge Thornton) found that the taxpayer's unsubstantiated testimony
did not meet the burden of proof required to establish that the taxpayer had
performed more than 750 hours of service during the tax years at issue and
thus failed to qualify as a real estate professional for purposes of § 469(c)(7).
The taxpayer's real estate losses were, therefore, passive activity losses not
deductible against active income sources. The court found that the taxpayer's
statement that he spent most of his time on real estate activities and only 10
hours a month at the bank strained credibility since "for most of this period
he was both chairman of the board and CEO of the bank, with wide-ranging
responsibilities and six-figure compensation" and added that the court saw
no reason to think that managing the taxpayer's dormant real estate holdings
required him to spend anywhere near 750 hours each year.
a. Affirmed per curiam. Harrnett v.
Commissioner, 110 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-6628 (1 1th Cir. 11/14/12) (unpublished
opinion.)
III. INVESTMENT GAIN AND INCOME
A. Gains and Losses
1. Section 1221(a)(1) says "to customers in the
ordinary course of business" (emphasis added), not "to a customer."
Bennett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-193 (7/12/12). The taxpayer
was a "serial entrepreneur" who constructed a single residence for purposes
of resale at profit, but which he sold at a substantial loss after five years. The
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Tax Court (Judge Wherry) upheld the IRS's determination that the residence
was a capital asset, not property held for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of business described in § 1221(a)(1), thereby denying ordinary loss
treatment and subjecting the loss to § 1211 limitations. The taxpayer was not
a real estate broker, had never before (or after) dealt in real estate, and did
not have a contract to sell the property in place when he commenced
construction. He did not meet the burden of showing that the real estate
activity was a trade or business rather than an investment.
2. The taxpayer lost his claim that a qui tam
relator's reward for rafting out HCA for Medicare fraud was a capital
asset, while in the meanwhile the alleged mastermind of the HCA
Medicare fraud scheme won the Florida gubernatorial race. Alderson v.
United States, 686 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 7/18/12). The taxpayer was a qui tam
relator who filed a refund claim based on the argument that his share of the
government's recovery (16 percent of $631 million) from the Hospital
Corporation of America, Inc. (and several medical providers related to HCA)
for Medicare fraud was capital gain rather than ordinary income. When
Alderson, who was the CFO of an HCA related corporation (Quorum), was
asked to prepare two sets of books, one for the hospital's financial auditors
and one to serve as the basis for the hospital's Medicare cost reports, he
refused to prepare separate books and was fired. Using information obtained
during discovery in his wrongful termination suit, Alderson filed a qui tam
suit against Quorum, HCA, and affiliated companies under the False Claims
Act (31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 et seq.). Alderson made available to the United
States the documents he had received during discovery, and eventually the
government intervened in the suit. The Ninth Circuit (Judge Fletcher)
affirmed the District Court's holding for the government. First, the court
rejected the taxpayer's claim that he 'exchanged his documents, information
and know-how[ ] and . . . received cash, thus consummating a sale or
exchange . . .,' reasoning that the taxpayer "did not 'sell' or 'exchange' his
information." His right to a relator's share for pursuing his qui tam suit that
was conferred by the FCA was subject to a statutory precondition that he
share his information with the government. Second, the information
regarding HCA and its affiliates was not the taxpayer's "property." The
taxpayer had no legal right to exclude others from use of the information, the
information was known to other officials in the companies, and the taxpayer
had no right to prevent those officials from providing the information to
others. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that his relator's
share, which he argued appreciated in value from the time he filed his suit
until he received payment, was the relevant capital asset. The taxpayer had
no "underlying investment of capital," and the increase in value "did not
'reflect an accretion in value over cost to [the] underlying asset."' The
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taxpayer "was not an investor who bought and held an asset that increased in
value during the holding period," but "worked intensively... to increase the
likelihood that his qui tam suit would be successful." Finally, the court
summarily dismissed the taxpayer's argument that the increase in value of
the claim was a capital asset under § 1234A, on the grounds that § 1234A
only applies with respect to assets that are capital assets to start with.
3. Be still open transaction doctrine! Let's fight
over the proper basis apportionment method. Dorrance v. United States,
877 F. Supp. 2d 827 (D. Ariz. 7/9/12). The taxpayers, who originally had
purchased life insurance from a mutual life insurance company, received
stock when the life insurance company demutualized; they retained the life
insurance policies. The Form 1099-B that the taxpayers received, consistent
with IRS policy, listed the basis in the stock as zero. When the taxpayers sold
the stock, they reported it as having a zero basis and filed a refund claim
seeking summary judgment based on the argument that the open transaction
doctrine applied to the demutualization and that the basis in the life insurance
policies resulting from the payment of premiums should be allocated to the
stock with the result that all of the proceeds from the stock sale were a return
of capital and they thus owed no tax. The government sought summary
judgment on the theory that no part of the insurance premiums was paid to
acquire the mutual rights under the policy, and that the entire premium was
paid to purchase the policy, with the result that the stock received in
exchange for the mutual rights had a zero basis. The District Court denied
both motions, holding, first, that the open transaction doctrine did not apply,
rejecting the Court of Federal Claims decision in Fisher v. United States, 82
Fed. Cl. 780 (Fed. Cl. 2008), which accepted the taxpayer's argument that
the open transaction doctrine applied, allowing the taxpayer to treat all of the
premium payments he had made during the course of the policy as capital
investment where the taxpayer received a cash payment in exchange for his
mutual rights during the demutualization of a life insurance company. The
court noted that if the taxpayer was "allowed to use the open transaction
doctrine in the context of stock received during demutualization, he 'is
getting a windfall, because all of the basis may be allocated to the assets that
will be sold, while the asset that does not require basis has had its basis
reduced."' The court also rejected the government's position, finding that the
value of both the mutual rights and the policy itself at the time of
demutualization could be determined. However, neither party had presented
evidence from which the court could equitably apportion the premiums paid
before demutualization as basis in the mutual rights and basis in the policies
themselves. The court instructed the parties to bring forward arguments for
choosing between two different valuation methods: (1) compare the cost of
the policies to the cost of comparable policies issued by non-mutual
insurance companies at the time of issuance; or (2)comparing the market
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value of the policy and the stock at the time of demutualization, and applying
that ratio to the premium payments.
4. Should the name of the promoter of this tax scam
have been "Devious," instead of "Derivium?" Calloway v. Commissioner,
135 T.C. 26 (7/8/10) (reviewed). In 2001 the taxpayer entered into an
agreement with Derivium Capital LLC pursuant to which he transferred 990
shares of IBM common stock to Derivium under its 90-percent-stock-loan
program. The terms of the agreement characterized the transaction as a loan,
with the IBM stock pledged as collateral. (Derivium was not registered with
the New York Stock Exchange or the National Association of Securities
Dealers/Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.) The purported loan was
nonrecourse; interest accrued but was not payable until maturity; all
dividends were applied against interest due; prepayment during the 3-year
term of the purported loan was prohibited. The terms of the agreement
allowed Derivium to sell the stock and retain the proceeds, which it did
immediately upon receipt, receiving $103,918.18. The taxpayer received
$93,586.23 from Derivium, the amount of the payment being determined,
and payment being made, only after Derivium had sold the stock. Upon
maturity of the "loan," the taxpayer had the option of (1) paying the balance
due and having an equivalent amount of IBM stock returned to him,
(2) renewing the purported loan for an additional term, or (3) satisfying the
"loan" by surrendering any right to receive IBM stock. At maturity in August
2004 the balance due was $124,429.09, which was $40,924.57 more than the
then $83,318.40 value of the IBM stock. (Derivium had credited against the
accrued interest the amount of dividends that would have been received had
the stock not been sold, but the taxpayer never received a Form-1099-DIV or
included any dividends in income.) The taxpayer elected to satisfy his
purported loan by surrendering any right to receive IBM stock. The taxpayer
never made any payments toward either principal or interest on the purported
loan. Citing Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945), and
Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), for the proposition that
substance controls over form, the Tax Court, in a reviewed opinion by Judge
Ruwe (with no dissents but with Judges Halpern, Wherry, and Holmes
concurring in result only), held that the 2001 transaction between taxpayer
and Derivium was a sale, not a loan, under the test factors set forth in Grodt
& McKay Realty, Inc. v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1221 (1981). The taxpayer
had transferred all the benefits and burdens of ownership of the stock to
Derivium. Legal and equitable title, as well as possession and control of the
stock were transferred in exchange for $93,586.23 with no obligation to
repay that amount. "At best [the taxpayer] had an option to purchase an
equivalent number of IBM shares after 3 years at a price equivalent to
$93,586.23 plus 'interest."' The transaction was not a true loan because
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"[flor a transaction to be a bona fide loan the parties must have actually
intended to establish a debtor-creditor relationship at the time the funds were
advanced." There was no such intent. After the 2001 transaction the taxpayer
never treated the transaction as a loan; in 2004 he did not report either a sale
of the stock or cancellation of debt income, positions which were
inconsistent with treating the transaction as a loan. Because Derivium was
not acting as a broker, the court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that
the transaction was analogous to the securities lending arrangement in Rev.
Rul. 57-451, 1957-2 C.B. 295, which held that no sale occurred when the
owner of stock deposited shares with a broker who could lend the securities
until such time as the shareholder received from the broker property other
than identical securities. Nor was the transaction equivalent to a securities
lending arrangement under § 1058, because the agreement did not meet the
requirements of that provision, which under Samueli v. Commissioner, 132
T.C. 37 (2009), requires that the transferor of the stock retain "all of the
benefits and burdens of ownership of the transferred securities" and the right
to "be able to terminate the loan agreement upon demand." Because the
taxpayer could not regain possession of the stock for three years, his
opportunity for gain was diminished.
* Section 6662 accuracy-related penalties
were sustained.
" Judge Halpern's concurring opinion
emphasized that the Grodt & McKay test, while appropriate for determining
whether there had been a sale of property that was not fungible, was not useful
in the determination of whether there had been a sale of fungible property, such
as corporate stock. It was enough for him that the taxpayer "gave Derivium the
right and authority to sell the IBM common stock in question for its own
account, which Derivium in fact did."
0 Judge Holmes's concurring opinion
emphasized that the majority's test for a sale was too broad and could be
applied to treat too wide a range of collateralized nonrecourse loan
arrangements as sales. He concluded that the majority erred in treating the
taxpayer's transfer of the stock to Derivium and Derivium's subsequent sale of
the stock as one integrated transaction, because Derivium had represented to its
customers that it would hold the stock and never told them of the quick sale.
Instead, he would have treated Derivium's sale of the stock as the event
triggering recognition by the taxpayer, under the Tufts principle that "when a
nonrecourse liability is discharged by sale of collateral, the borrower must
recognize income at that point - the amount realized is the amount of
nonrecourse liability discharged as a result of the sale," since Reg. § 1.1001 -
2(a)(4)(i) provides that "the sale . . . of property that secures a nonrecourse
liability discharges the transferor from the liability." He recognized that under
his analysis, "the tax consequences to Calloway would be remarkably similar to
those flowing from the result reached by the majority."
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* The Tax Court majority opinion noted in
a footnote that other cases involving Derivium transactions are pending in the
Tax Court. From 1998 to 2002 Derivium engaged in approximately 1,700
similar transactions involving approximately $1 billion. The Government
estimated the total tax loss associated with Derivium's scheme to be
approximately $235 million.
* Nagy v. United States, 104 A.F.T.R.2d
2009-7789, 2010-1 U.S.T.C. 50,177 (D. S.C. 2009), and United States v.
Cathcart, 104 A.F.T.R.2d 2009-6625, 2009-2 U.S.T.C. 50,658 (N.D. Calif.
2009) held, in § 6700 penalty cases, that the 90-percent stock- loan-program
transactions offered by Derivium were sales of securities, not bona fide loans.
* District Court had enjoined Derivium
Capital USA from promoting its 90 percent loan program. United States v.
Cathcar, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-1293 (N.D. Calif 3/5/10).
a. And the Eleventh Circuit teaches even
more about how to distinguish sales from loans in affirming the Tax
Court. Calloway v. Commissioner, 691 F.3d 1315 (1 lth Cir. 8/23/12). In an
opinion by Judge Ripple, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
decision, essentially following the rationale of the Tax Court's majority
opinion. Like the Tax Court, the Court of Appeals considered the Grodt &
McKay factors to determine whether there had been a transfer of the benefits
and burdens of ownership, which would thereby constitute a "sale," while
pointing out that "'[N]one of these factors is necessarily controlling; the
incidence of ownership, rather, depends upon all the facts and
circumstances,"' citing H.J. Heinz Co. & Subsidiaries v. United States, 76
Fed. Cl. 570, 582 (2007). The Court of Appeals also considered the
somewhat overlapping factors applied by the Tax Court in Dunne v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2008-63 specifically with respect to ownership of
stock:
(1) Whether the person has legal title or a contractual right to obtain
legal title in the future;
(2) whether the person has the right to receive consideration from the
transferee of the stock;
(3) whether the person enjoys the economic benefits and burdens of
being a shareholder;
(4) whether the person has the power to control the company;
(5) whether the person has the right to attend shareholder meetings;
(6) whether the person has the ability to vote the shares;
(7) whether the stock certificates are in the person's possession or
are being held in escrow for the benefit of that person;
(8) whether the corporation lists the person as a shareholder on its
tax returns;
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(9) whether the person lists himself as a shareholder on his
individual tax return;
(10) whether the person has been compensated for the amount of
income taxes due by reason of the person's shareholder status;
(11) whether the person has access to the corporate books; and
(12) whether the person shows by his overt acts that he believes he is
the owner of the stock.
0 Applying the Grodt & McKay factors, as
"refined" by Dunne, the court concluded that the most relevant factors "firmly"
established that the transaction was a sale. Notwithstanding their labels, the
agreements as a whole made it clear that during the period of time covered by
the "loan," Derivium owned the stock. The court looked to its precedents under
which 'the characteristics typically associated with "stock" are that it grants
'the right to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of profits'; is
negotiable; grants 'the ability to be pledged or hypothecated'; 'confer[s][ ]
voting rights in proportion to the number of shares owned'; and has 'the
capacity to appreciate in value."' When the taxpayer transferred the stock to
Derivium pursuant to the agreements, "he ceded these rights of stock ownership
to Derivium." Other Grodt & McKay benefits and burdens test factors also led
to the conclusion that the transaction was a sale. The agreements granted
"Derivium the right to possess the stock, the equity in the stock, and the right to
receive the profits from either holding or disposing of the stock;" that the loan
was nonrecourse assured that the risk of loss was shifted entirely to Derivium.
* The Court of Appeals rejected the
approach taken by Judge Halpern in his concurring opinion, concluding that
"Judge Halpern's approach risk[ed] transforming, for income tax purposes, all
interests secured by stock into sales of stock." It also rejected the approach
taken by Judge Holmes in his concurring opinion, concluding that "Judge
Holmes's test could result in understatements of income when taxpayers have
absolutely no way to determine that a taxable event has occurred."
b. Devious Derivium strikes again. Raifman
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-228 (8/7/12). The taxpayer transferred
stock to Derivium under its infamous "90% Stock Loan" program. Following
Calloway v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 26 (2010), the Tax Court (Judge Wells)
granted the IRS's motion for summary judgment that the transactions were
sales and not loans, but denied the IRS's motion for summary judgment on
the taxpayer's claim for a theft loss deduction, concluding that genuine
issues of material fact remained regarding whether the taxpayer was entitled
to a theft loss deduction for the amount of the value of the options they
purchased from Derivium. The taxpayer's affidavit alleged that Derivium
misrepresented the nature of the transaction because Derivium never engaged
in a plausible hedging strategy, but rather appeared to be massively betting
that the price of all of its clients' stocks would fall, "hedged" only by a Ponzi
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scheme, and that the taxpayer relied on Derivium's misrepresentations when
he entered into the 90% Stock Loan program by which he was defrauded.
The instant case is distinguishable from prior Derivium cases in that none of
the prior cases considered the taxpayer's attempt to exercise the rights to a
return of the collateral after the maturity dates.
5. This case disproves the old adage "you can't lose
for trying." Sollberger v. Commissioner, 691 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 8/16/12).
The taxpayer entered into an agreement with Optech pursuant to which he
transferred floating rate notes (FRNs) worth approximately $1 million to
Optech in return for a nonrecourse loan of 90 percent of the value of the
FRNs. Under the agreement Optech had the right to receive all dividends and
interest on the FRNs, and the right to sell the FRNs during the loan term
without Sollberger's consent. Optech did not hold the FRNs as collateral for
the loan, but immediately sold the FRNs and transferred 90 percent of the
proceeds to the taxpayer. The taxpayer treated the transaction as a loan rather
than as a sale. The Ninth Circuit (Judge Smith) affirmed the Tax Court's
holding (T.C. Memo. 2011-78) that the transaction was a sale. The court
stated:
Although the transaction took the form of a loan,
Sollberger transferred the FRNs to Optech, and gave Optech
the right to sell the FRNs (which Optech promptly
exercised), to transfer the registration of the FRNs into its
own name, and to keep all interest due from the FRNs.
Sollberger would not be personally liable if he did not make
payments on the loan since it was nonrecourse. .
Nonrecourse financing, which is sometimes viewed as an
"indicator of a sham transaction," Sacks v. Comm 'r, 69 F.3d
982, 988 (9th Cir. 1995), placed Sollberger more in the
position of a seller than a debtor. Nowhere in the Master
Agreement or the Loan Schedule did Sollberger promise to
repay the money "lent" to him. Instead, Optech merely
agreed to return the FRNs if Sollberger repaid the loan at the
end of the seven-year loan term, thereby giving Sollberger
the option of repurchasing the FRNs in seven years, but not
requiring him to do so. Thus, the transaction was more akin
to an option contract, whereunder the FRNs were sold, but
the seller retained a call option to reacquire them after seven
years, if he elected to do so, than a true loan....
Sollberger's and Optech's conduct also confirms our
conclusion that the transaction was, in substance, a sale.
Although interest accrued on the loan, Sollberger stopped
receiving account statements and making interest payments
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after the first quarter of 2005, less than one year into the
seven-year loan term. Thus, neither Sollberger nor Optech
maintained the appearance that a genuine debt existed for
long. The total amount that Sollberger paid to Optech was de
minimis compared to the size of the loan. The FRNs were
also sold before Sollberger received the loan from Optech,
which suggests that Optech funded the majority of the "loan
amount" with the proceeds received from the sale of the
FRNs. The apparent lack of any ability or intention by
Optech to hold the FRNs as collateral to secure repayment of
the loan further buttresses our conclusion that the transaction
was merely a sale in the false garb of a loan.
0 The court also rejected the taxpayer's
argument that the transaction came within the § 1058 safe harbor for securities
lending transactions because the requirements of that section clearly had not
been met.
6. The Cap Gemini exchange cases:
a. Gain is recognized on an exchange even if
the taxpayer didn't yet have what she got and she might not have gotten
to keep it. United States v. Culp, 99 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-618 (M.D. Tenn.
12/29/06). The government was granted summary judgment in an erroneous
refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her partnership interest in Ernst &
Young for stock of a corporation acquiring E&Y's consulting business, in a
transaction that was not a statutory nonrecognition event; however, the stock
was held in escrow to enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer
failed to perform certain services as an employee of the acquiring
corporation. The court held that the open transaction doctrine was not
applicable. If a taxpayer exchanges one property for a different property, the
gain realized on the exchange must be recognized in the year the exchange
occurs, even though the property received in the exchange is forfeitable if
contractual provisions or representations in the contract for exchange are not
subsequently satisfied and even though the property received in the exchange
is held in escrow to assure enforcement of the forfeitability provisions.
b. The Seventh Circuit affirmed taxable
exchange treatment for an E&Y consulting partner in a Capgemini
exchange. United States v. Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 4/10/09), aff'g
101 A.F.T.R.2d 2008-588 (N.D. Ill. 1/15/08). In this 2000 exchange of
taxpayer's partnership interest in E&Y for restricted stock of Capgemini, the
Seventh Circuit (Judge Easterbrook) affirmed the summary judgment award
to the government in this erroneous refund suit, and in the process
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"Fletcherized ' 3 the E&Y consulting partner involved because she initially
took the position of the parties to the transaction that all of the Capgemini
shares received vested in the year 2000 [the year of the exchange], but after
the stock declined in value took the position that she received income in
2000 only to the extent of cash she received in that year and the remainder of
her income was recognized in 2003 [when the stock was worth less than one-
fifth of its 2000 value].
* Judge Easterbrook did not appreciate the
argument that she signed the "consulting partner transaction agreement" [which
provided for taxable gain in 2000] only because she was afraid she would be
fired if she did not do so. Both the district court and the Seventh Circuit held
that under either Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967), or
the alternative "strong proof' test, taxpayer was bound by the agreement she
signed. he stated that:
Fletcher argues that she didn't "really" agree to the
structure that Ernst & Young and Cap Gemini (and most of
her partners) wanted in 2000. If she had voted no and
refused to sign, she maintains, she would have been
excluded from the economic benefits and might have been
fired. If this is so, then she had a difficult choice to make; it
does not relieve her of the choice's consequences. Hard
choices may be gut-wrenching, but they are choices
nonetheless. Even naive people baffled by the fine print in
contracts are held to their terms; a sophisticated business
consultant who agrees to a multi-million-dollar transaction is
not entitled to demand the deal's benefits while avoiding its
detriments. The argument that Fletcher can avoid the terms
as a matter of contract law is frivolous. All that matters now
are the tax consequences of the contracts she signed.
* Judge Easterbrook concluded:
The more likely it is that the conditions will be
satisfied, and all restrictions lifted, the more sensible it is to
treat all of the stock as constructively received when
deposited in the account. To see this, suppose that the parties
had wanted to defer the recognition of income and had put
$2.5 million in each partner's account, with the condition
that the whole amount would be forfeited if the temperature
in Barrow, Alaska, exceeded 80 [degrees] F on January 1,
2005. Would the remote possibility of an Arctic heat wave
enable the partners to defer paying taxes? Surely not. See
3. Horace Fletcher (1849-1919), a health food faddist, argued that food
should be chewed thirty-two times before being swallowed. "Nature will castigate
those who don't masticate."
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Cemco Investors, LLC v. United States, 515 F.3d 749 (7th
Cir. 2008). If, on the other hand, the parties agreed that the
ex-partners would receive $ 2.5 million only if the
temperature in Barrow on January 1, 2005, exceeded 80
[degrees] F, then none of the partners would constructively
receive income in 2000; everything would depend on events
in 2005.
The sort of contingencies that could lead to
forfeitures were within the ex-partners' control. That implies
taxability in 2000, for control is a form of constructive
possession. And the agreement to discount the stock by only
5% tells us that the parties deemed forfeitures unlikely.
Fletcher's acknowledgment that the risk of forfeiture was
small shows that the conditions of constructive receipt in
2000 have been satisfied.
Thus although we agree with Fletcher that the ex-
partners are entitled to contest the tax treatment called for by
the 2000 contracts, we hold that the shares are taxable in
2000 at their value on the date of deposit to the accounts at
Merrill Lynch. Income was constructively received in that
year not because the contract said that everyone would
report it so to the IRS, but because the parties were right to
think that this transaction's actual provisions made the
income attributable to 2000. That the price of Capgemini
stock dropped in 2001 and later does not entitle the parties to
defer the recognition of income. Fletcher must repay the
refund (and amend her returns for later years to reflect
receipt of the income in 2000).
C. Ex-post recharacterization is not an
option for taxpayers. United States v. Bergbauer, 602 F.3d 569 (4th Cir.
4/16/10). The Fourth Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the
government in an erroneous refund suit. The taxpayer exchanged her
partnership interest in Ernst & Young for stock of Cap Gemini, a corporation
acquiring E&Y's consulting business, in a transaction that was not a
statutory nonrecognition event; however, the stock was held in escrow to
enforce a forfeiture provision if the seller-taxpayer failed to perform certain
services as an employee of the acquiring corporation. The taxpayer initially
reported that all of the Cap Gemini shares received vested in the year 2000
(the year of the exchange), but after the stock declined in value took the
position that income was realized in 2000 only to the extent of cash received
in that year and the remainder of the income was recognized in 2003 (when
the stock was worth less than one-fifth of its 2000 value). The court held that
if a taxpayer exchanges one property for a different property, the gain
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realized on the exchange must be recognized in the year the exchange occurs,
even though the property received in the exchange is forfeitable if
contractual provisions or representations in the contract for exchange are not
subsequently satisfied and even though the property received in the exchange
is held in escrow to assure enforcement of the forfeitability provisions.
Furthermore, the court refused to accept the taxpayer's argument that the
transaction could be recast into a form different than that which it had taken.
To put it plainly, we have bound taxpayers to "the
'form' of their transaction" when they attempt to
recharacterize an otherwise valid agreement bargained for in
good faith. [citation omitted] We have also refused to
entertain arguments "that the 'substance' of their transaction
triggers different tax consequences." [citation omitted] This
precept not only maintains the vital public policy of
enforcing otherwise valid contracts, but also assures the
reliability of agreed tax consequences to the public fisc. ....
There is no "disparity" in allowing "the
Commissioner alone to pierce formal" agreements as
"taxpayers have it within their own control to choose in the
first place whatever arrangements they care to make."
[citation omitted]
0 Earlier cases that reached the same result
for other taxpayers involved in the same transaction include United States v.
Fletcher, 562 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 4/10/09); United States v. Culp, 99 A.F.T.R.2d
2007-618, 2007-1 U.S.T.C. 50,399 (M.D. Tenn. 12/29/06); and United States
v. Nackel, 105 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-474 (C.D. Cal. 10/20/09).
d. Judge Dyk stuck his finger into the Cap
Gemini pie and pulled out a constructive receipt plum. Hartman v. United
States, 694 F.3d 96 (Fed. Cir. 9/10/12). This Cap Gemini case was decided in
favor of the government, as were all of the other Cap Gemini cases. The
Federal Circuit (Judge Dyk) rejected the government's argument that
taxpayer was bound under Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir.
1967), by his agreement to recognize for federal income tax purposes in the
year 2000 all the shares of Cap Gemini that were placed in escrow for him in
that year because Danielson was limited to situations where "a taxpayer
challenges express allocations of monetary consideration." Instead, Judge
Dyk found that taxpayer was in constructive receipt of all the Cap Gemini
stock that was received for him in exchange for his E&Y partnership interest
even though the stock was placed into an escrow account and he could not
receive the stock until subsequent years - subject to the risk of forfeiture
should he sooner voluntarily terminate his employment with Cap Gemini.
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7. Extended tax-free capital gains for "small" C
corporation stock. Who is going to rush out and form a C corporation to
grab this benefit? The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand
compromise) Tax Act extends help to qualified small business stock.
Gain realized on a sale or exchange of qualified small business stock under
§ 1202, which was acquired after the date of enactment of the 2010 Small
Business Act [9/27/10] and before 1/1/11 [subsequently extended to "before
1/1/12"], was subject to 100 percent exclusion from gross income. The 2012
Act, § 324(b), extends the 100 percent exclusion to stock acquired before
1/1/12 to before 1/1/14. Gain attributable to qualified small business stock
acquired between 9/27/10 and 1/1/14 is not treated as an AMT preference
item. The exclusion is applicable to noncorporate shareholders who acquire
stock at original issue and hold the stock for a minimum of five years. Under
the former 50 percent and 75 percent exclusions, included gain was subject
to tax at the 28 percent capital gains rates. The amount of excluded gain
attributable to any one corporation is limited to the greater of ten times the
taxpayer's basis in a corporation's stock sold during the taxable year or $10
million reduced by gain attributable to the corporation stock excluded in
prior years. Qualified small business stock is stock issued by a C corporation
engaged in the active conduct of a trade or business with gross assets (cash
plus adjusted basis of assets) not in excess of $50 million.
8. Application of the step transaction doctrine
obviates the need to apply a statutory anti-abuse rule. G.D. Parker, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-327 (11/27/12). A Panamanian corporation
(Vicmar) owned a minority interest in a Peruvian telecommunications
corporation (Tele2000). The stock had a built-in loss of over $12 million. In
March 2004, BellSouth, the owner, though a subsidiary of the majority
interest, agreed to sell its stock of Tele2000 to Telefonica (a Spanish
corporation). Telefonica's announced plan was to purchase 100 percent of
Tele2000. During the period between March 2004 and December 21, 2004,
Vicmar took steps to transfer its stock of Tele2000 to the taxpayer, G.D.
Parker, Inc. On December 16, the parties, including the taxpayer, entered
into a share transfer and settlement agreement, and the sale was finalized on
December 21, 2004. The taxpayer was made a party to the share transfer
agreement at the last minute after the sole shareholder of Vicmar represented
to Bell South and Telefonica that the taxpayer was the owner of the Tele2000
shares. Before the last-minute representation, BellSouth's representative was
unaware of the taxpayer's existence. Applying the end result version of the
step transaction doctrine, the Tax Court (Judge Haines) held that Vicmar, the
Panamanian corporation, not the taxpayer U.S. corporation, was the true
seller of the stock and disallowed the taxpayer's loss deduction.
[I]t is clear from the record that, from the start, the
acquisition of the Tele2000 shares by petitioner and the
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subsequent sale to Telefonica were really steps of a single
transaction intended to be taken for the purpose of reaching
the ultimate result. Those steps constituted part of a
prearranged plan to have Telefonica obtain the Tele2000
shares while having the capital loss shifted to petitioner. Had
Telefonica acquired the shares directly from Vilanova, this
shift in the capital loss would not have occurred, and
petitioner would have been obligated to report a capital gain
rather than a capital loss that it could carry back to prior
years. Petitioner may not avoid this result by employing
mere formalisms thinly disguised to mask its true intentions.
... Hence under the end-result test petitioner's ownership of
the Tele2000 shares must be ignored, with Telefonica being
viewed as having acquired the shares from Vilanova.
a The IRS also argued that § 362(e), which
would have reduced the taxpayer's basis in the stock to fair market value,
applied, but Judge Haines concluded that there was no need to reach a decision
with respect to § 362(e) because under the step transaction doctrine there was
no transfer of the stock from Vicmar to the taxpayer for income tax purposes.
9. The taxpayer passed the benefits and burdens of
ownership to his wholly owned corporation, so he sold the property and
recognized a gain. Gaggero v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-331
(11/29/12). In the early 1990s, the taxpayer bought, for $3 million, and
moved into a rundown beach house in Malibu that was renovated into a
splendid mansion while he lived in it as his primary residence. Before
renovations began, in 1991 he entered into a Land Contract Purchase and
Sale Agreement and a Development Contract (BCC), a real estate
development corporation that was wholly owned by the taxpayer. The
essence of the deal was that BCC would provide the development services
and BCC would receive an equal share in any increase in the property's
value between the time the contract was signed and the time the property was
sold to a third party, even though the taxpayer would pay most of the costs of
the project. BBC would receive its interest if it completed its work. The
project was completed in 1997 and the residence was sold for $9.6 million.
The taxpayer reported a receipt of $6.6 million, but claimed that pursuant to
former § 1034 none of it was recognizable because he purchased a new
residence for $6.7 million. BBC reported ordinary income of $3 million. The
IRS contended that the taxpayer never sold any interest in the residence to
BBC and that he realized $9 million on its sale and should have reported a
$2.9 million gain. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) engaged in an extensive
factual inquiry of whether the benefits and burdens of ownership in a partial
interest in the residence had passed to BBC prior to the sale to the ultimate
[Vol. 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
purchaser, and concluded that because benefits and burdens of ownership
had been transferred, a partial ownership had passed from the taxpayer to
BBC prior to the sale to the ultimate purchaser. That the taxpayer continued
to maintain the property as his primary residence did not alter that fact.
Accordingly, a sale had occurred. However, the sale from the taxpayer to
BBC occurred in 1997, when BBC's interest vested, and the amount realized
on that sale was $3 million; the remaining $6.6 million was realized by the
taxpayer on the sale of the remaining interest. Since he realized $9.6 million
of the sale of his residence and purchased a replacement residence for only
$6.7 million, he should have recognized a gain of $2.9 million. However, the
court did not uphold penalties, finding that the taxpayer relied in good faith
on his tax advisor.
B. Interest, Dividends, and Other Current Income
1. The statute might read "State or local bond" but
it means "State or local obligation." DeNaples v. Commissioner, 674 F.3d
172 (3d Cir. 3/19/12). The Third Circuit (Judge Fuentes) held that the § 103
exclusion for state and local bond interest applied to interest on an obligation
issued by a state government that provided for deferred payments, with
interest, to compensate the taxpayers for condemned land. Even though
§ 103 refers to "bond[s]," it applies to any "obligation" of a state that is
incurred "under the borrowing power." However, it does not to apply when a
government's obligation to pay interest arises by operation of law. In this
case the state's obligation to pay interest arose from voluntary bargaining in
which the state invoked its borrowing power.
2. What does "traded on an established securities
market" mean in the Internet era? REG-131947-10, Property Traded on
an Established Market, 76 F.R. 1101 (1/7/11). Under the OID rules, if a debt
instrument is issued for stock or other debt instruments (or other property)
that is traded on an established securities market (often referred to as
"publicly traded"), the issue price of the debt instrument is the fair market
value of the stock or other property. Similarly, if a debt instrument issued for
property, such as another debt instrument, is traded on an established
securities market, the issue price of the debt instrument is the fair market
value of the debt instrument. See Reg. § 1.1273-2(c). Among other issues, a
debt-for-debt exchange (including a significant modification of existing debt)
in the context of a work-out may result in a reduced issue price for the new
debt, which generally would produce (1) COD income for the issuer (i.e.,
debtor), (2) a loss to a holder (i.e., creditor) whose basis is greater than the
issue price of the new debt, and (3) OLD that must be accounted for by both
the issuer and the holder of the new debt. The Treasury has published
proposed regulations that are intended to simplify and clarify the
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determination of when property is traded on an established market. Prop.
Reg. § 1.1273-2(f)(1) would identify four ways for property to be traded on
an established market: (1) the property is publicly traded on an exchange (as
defined), which is relatively unusual for debt instruments other than
corporate bonds; (2) a sales price for the property is reasonably available -
it appears in a medium that is made available to persons that regularly
purchase or sell debt instruments, or persons that broker purchases or sales of
debt instruments" ("a sale that is reported electronically at any time in the
31-day time period, such as in the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine
("TRACE") database maintained by the Financial Industry Regulatory
Authority, would cause the instrument to be publicly traded, as would other
pricing services and trading platforms that report prices of executed sales on
a general basis or to subscribers"); (3) if a firm price quote to buy or sell the
property is available; or (4) a price quote (other than a firm quote) that meets
certain standards set forth in the regulations is provided by a dealer, a broker,
or a pricing service (an indicative quote). In all four cases, the time for
determining whether the property is publicly traded is the 31-day period
ending fifteen days after the issue date of the debt instrument. There would
be an exception for "small debt issues - those below $50 million. The
regulations will apply to debt instruments that have an issue date on or after
the promulgation of final regulations.
a. Finalized with some important changes.
T.D. 9599, Property Traded on an Established Market, 77 F.R. 56533
(9/13/12). Final Reg. § 1.1273-2(f)(1) substantially follows the framework of
the proposed regulations but provides only three rules for determining that
property is traded on an established market. Reg. § 1.1273-2(f)(1) provides
that property is traded on an established market if at any time in the 3 1-day
time period ending 15 days after the issue date of a debt instrument: (1) a
sales price for the property is reasonably available - it appears in a medium
that is made available to persons that regularly purchase or sell debt
instruments, or persons that broker purchases or sales of debt instruments (a
sale that is reported electronically such as in the Trade Reporting and
Compliance Engine (TRACE) database maintained by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Authority, would cause the instrument to be publicly traded, as
would other pricing services and trading platforms that report prices of
executed sales on a general basis or to subscribers); (2) a firm price quote to
buy or sell the property is available; or (3) a price quote (other than a firm
quote) that meets certain standards set forth in the regulations, is provided by
a dealer, a broker, or a pricing service (an "indicative quote"). Very
significantly, Reg. § 1.1273-2()(6) provides that a debt instrument will not
be treated as traded on an established market if at the time the determination
is made the outstanding stated principal amount of the issue that includes the
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debt instrument does not exceed $100 million (rather than $50 million as
provided in the proposed regulations). The other significant change made in
the final regulations is to require that the issue price be reported consistently
by issuers and holders.
* The regulations generally apply to a debt
instrument issued on or after 11/13/12.
* According to the preamble:
The final regulations dispense with the category of exchange
listed property because the small amount of debt that is
listed rarely actually trades over the exchange. Moreover,
although stock, commodities, and similar property are
commonly listed on and traded over a board or exchange,
such property typically will be the subject of frequent sales
or quotes and would be covered in a separate category of
publicly traded property. A debt instrument that is issued for
stock, commodities, or similar exchange traded property is
therefore tested under the rule for property where there is a
sales price or quote within the 31-day period ending 15 days
after the issue date of the debt instrument. Eliminating the
category of property listed on an exchange also eliminates
the need for the de minimis trading exception in the
proposed regulations, which was intended to exclude
property that is listed on an exchange but trades in a
negligible quantity.
3. Ouch! He got nothing in pocket, but his realized
income was $29,093.30. Brown v. Commissioner, 693 F.3d 765 (7th Cir.
9/11/12). The taxpayer owned an insurance policy on which he had borrowed
money in excess of the cash surrender value. At the time that the policy was
cancelled by the insurance company, the taxpayer had paid $44,205.00 in
premiums, but the insurance company had applied $31,063.30 of policy
dividends to the purchase of additional insurance above the $100,000 face
value of the policy, and $4,869.94 of dividends had been applied to pay
premiums and repay policy loans. The additional paid up life insurance had
been surrendered for its cash value to repay policy loans prior to the
cancellation of the base $100,000 policy. The Seventh Circuit (Judge Posner)
affirmed a Tax Court decision holding that the taxpayer's investment in the
contract had been reduced from $44,205.00 to $8,271.76 as a result of the
application of $35,933.24 of dividends as described. Accordingly, because
the cash surrender value of the policy, which was applied against policy
loans when it was cancelled was $37,365.06, taxpayer realized income of
$29,093.30 ($37,365.06 - $8,271.76).
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4. Exempt financing for New York Liberty Zone
bonds extended. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act, § 328, extends the issue
date for exempt New York Liberty Bonds to bonds issued before January 1,
2014.
C. Profit-Seeking Individual Deductions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
D. Section 121
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
E. Section 1031
1. Judge Goeke lets the taxpayer get away with a
like-kind exchange claim where the replacement property was used as
taxpayer's principal residence. Reesink v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2012-118 (4/23/12). The taxpayer disposed of an undivided one-half interest
in an apartment building (along with his estranged brother) and acquired a
single family home (the Laurel Lane property), which was originally
acquired as investment or rental property, but into which the taxpayer and his
family moved, as their principal residence, eight months after the acquisition.
According to the Tax Court (Judge Goeke), the only issue in the case relating
to whether the acquisition and disposition of the two properties qualified as a
like kind-exchange was whether the taxpayer held the acquired property
"with investment intent at the time of the exchange." Based on a number of
factors, including the taxpayer's efforts to rent the acquired property, that he
did not sell his principal residence in another city until six months after the
acquisition, and the testimony of the taxpayer's estranged brother that the
taxpayer did not plan to relocate until his son was finished with high-school,
which he was not at the time of the transaction, Judge Goeke held that the
taxpayer had acquired the property for investment.
2. Rental property occupied by the taxpayer's son
was investment property, not personal-use property. Adams v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2013-7 (1/10/13). The taxpayer engaged in a
deferred like-kind exchange through an intermediary in which he surrendered
a property held for rental and acquired a new residential property that was
dilapidated and in need of rehabilitation. The taxpayer and his son entered
into an agreement whereby the son and his family could live in the new
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house after renovations. The son and his family worked on the house an
aggregate of 60 hours per week for three months before moving in. The son
and his family bore all of the rehabilitation expenses; their services were
worth $3,600. After three months of work, the son's family moved-in,
resided in the house for three years, and paid rent that was a few hundred
dollars per month less than the fair rental value. The IRS took the position
that the transaction was not a § 1031 like-kind exchange because the
taxpayer acquired the new house for personal purposes - i.e., "with the
intention of letting his son and family live there at below market rent" - and
that the taxpayer thus must recognize gain on the sale. The Tax Court (Judge
Morrison) found that the taxpayer had acquired the new house for investment
purposes and that the transaction thus qualified as a § 1031 like-kind
exchange. Furthermore, the limitations on deductions imposed by § 280A did
not apply to the new house rented to the son. Pursuant to § 280A(d)(2), a
taxpayer is treated as using a dwelling unit during the taxable year as a
residence if the taxpayer rents the dwelling unit to a family member, unless
the taxpayer rents the dwelling unit to the family member "at a fair rental"
and for use as that family member's principal residence. The son used the
residence as his principal residence and, although the $1,200 per month cash
rent was slightly below market, it was fair rent considering the work that the
son had performed with respect to the house. Thus the § 280A(a) prohibition
of deductions for dwelling units used as residences did not apply.
F. Section 1033
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
G. Section 1035
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
H. Miscellaneous
1. It takes a paper trail to prove that stock is
"qualified small business stock," but a bribery attempt by taxpayer's
representative [an enrolled agent] during the audit was not sufficient to
support a fraud penalty. Holmes v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-251
(8/30/12). Section 1045 provides for elective nonrecognition of capital gain
on the sale of "qualified small business stock," as defined in § 1202, if the
stock has been held for more than six months, and if the taxpayer purchases
replacement qualified small business stock within 60 days of the date of the
sale. The taxpayer's efforts to defer gain on the sale of stock in this case
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failed. The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that § 1045 did not apply
because, among other reasons, the taxpayer failed to prove that (1) as
required by § 1202(c)(1)(B), he acquired the stock at its original issue in
exchange for money, or (2) as required by § 1202(d)(1)(A) and (B), the
corporation's aggregate gross assets immediately after the stock issuance did
not exceed $50 million. The taxpayer offered no documentary evidence, such
as stock certificates or book entries from the corporation, indicating from
whom he acquired the stock. Nor did the taxpayer introduce into evidence
corporate balance sheets or other financial statements showing the amount of
cash and property held by the corporation before and immediately after each
date he acquired stock.
0 Even though the taxpayer's return
preparer/representative during the audit, an enrolled agent, attempted to bribe
the Revenue Agent conducting the audit, behavior that Judge Halpem described
as "highly inappropriate," such behavior was not sufficient to support
imposition of a fraud penalty, because, among other facts, the record was
"devoid of evidence indicating that Mr. Afshar's actions towards Agent
Mahamoud, while highly inappropriate, were part of petitioner's scheme of tax
evasion initiated at the time of filing the subject tax returns. As we have stated
above, it seems more likely that Mr. Afshar's actions were a continuation of his
attempt at mitigating the tax preparation errors."
0 Compare: The taxpayer's conduct was
not fraudulent, but maybe he wasn't an innocent babe in the woods either. The
return was fraudulent even though the taxpayer did not know it. Allen v.
Commissioner, 128 T.C. 37 (3/5/07). Judge Kroupa held that the statute of
limitations for a fraudulent return is extended under § 6501(c)(1), even though
it was solely the return preparer, rather than the taxpayer, who had the intent to
evade tax. The taxpayer was a truck driver who filed timely returns for the years
at issue. He gave his Form W-2, 401(k) statement, mortgage interest statement,
and other relevant documents to his return preparer (Goosby) who prepared the
returns and filed them. As prepared by Goosby, the returns claimed false and
fraudulent itemized deductions for charitable contributions, meals and
entertainment, and pager and computer expenses, as well as various other
expenses. The taxpayer received complete copies of the returns for the years at
issue after they had been filed, but he did not file any amended tax returns.
Judge Kroupa reasoned as follows:
We do not find it unduly burdensome for taxpayers to
review their returns for items that are obviously false or
incorrect. It is every taxpayer's obligation. Petitioner cannot
hide behind an agent's fraudulent preparation of his returns
and escape paying tax if the Government is unable to
investigate fully the fraud within the limitations period.
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* She further noted that the IRS was
seeking to collect only the deficiency (and interest) from the taxpayer.
IV. COMPENSATION ISSUES
A. Fringe Benefits
1. The IRS modifies guidance on reporting of
employer-provided healthcare coverage despite the fact that the
amounts reported have no relevance whatsoever to anyone's taxes.
Notice 2012-9; 2012-4 I.R.B. 315 (1/3/12), superseding Notice 2011-28,
2011-16 I.R.B. 656. The IRS has issued interim guidance on informational
reporting to employees of the cost of their group health insurance coverage
under § 6051(a)(14). The notice includes the following statement: "This
reporting to employees is for their information only. The reporting is
intended to inform them of the cost of their health care coverage, and does
not cause excludable employer-provided health care coverage to become
taxable. Nothing in § 6051(a)(14), this notice, or the additional guidance that
is contemplated under § 6051(a)(14), causes or will cause otherwise
excludable employer-provided health care coverage to become taxable."
2. The IRS began ramping up for the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act even before the Supreme Court
upheld it. Notice 2012-17, 2012-9 I.R.B. 430 (2/9/12). The IRS (along with
the Labor Department and Department of Health and Human Services) has
issued guidance in Q-&-A format that is intended to identify likely direction
and scope of future regulations and other published guidance addressing
provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that become
effective beginning in 2014. The guidance explains (1) automatic enrollment
of new full-time employees where employer has more than 200 full-time
employees; (2) employer shared responsibility and assessable payment; and,
(3) 90-day limitation on waiting period.
3. The value of those corporate jets that some
people want to tax. Rev. Rul. 2012-10, 2012-14 I.R.B. 614 (3/29/12). The
IRS has announced the cents-per-mile and terminal charges for calculating
the value of noncommercial flights on employer-provided aircraft as a fringe
benefit for the period January 1 through June 30, 2012. The cents-per-mile is
multiplied by the aircraft multiple (based on size) in Reg. § 1.6 1-21(g)(7),
then increased by the terminal charge. The mileage rates are, up to 500 miles,
$0.2455 per mile; 501-1500 miles, $0.1872 per mile; and over 1500 miles,
$0.1800 per mile. The terminal charge is $44.88.
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4. This one hits parents of special needs children the
hardest. Wouldn't it just be easier to have a government-run national
health care program? Then we could have rationing by queue. Notice
2012-40, 2012-26 I.R.B. 1046 (5/30/12). This Notice provides guidance on
the limits in § 125(i) on salary reduction contributions to health flexible
spending arrangements, effective for cafeteria plan years beginning after
12/31/12, and requests comments on possible modification to the "use-or-
lose" rule in the proposed § 125 regulations. The Notice provides that the
$2,500 limit does not apply for plan years that begin before 2013 and plans
may adopt the required amendments to reflect the $2,500 limit at any time
through the end of calendar year 2014. (Indexing of the $2,500 limit applies
to plan years beginning after 12/31/13.) For plans providing a grace period
(which may be up to two months and 15 days), unused salary reduction
contributions to the health FSA for plan years beginning in 2012 or later that
are carried over into the grace period for that plan year will not count against
the $2,500 limit for the subsequent plan year.
5. Did the Tax Court really mean to deny a
deduction for a taxable fringe benefit? DKD Enterprises, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-29 (1/31/11). The Tax Court (Judge
Chiechi) upheld the IRS's denial of the corporation's deduction of the cost of
medical insurance premiums for a policy covering its employee/sole
shareholder because the corporation "failed to carry its burden of
establishing that it had in effect during any of the years at issue a sickness,
hospitalization, medical expense, or similar benefit plan for employees." For
that same reason, the individual shareholder/employee was not entitled to
exclude the amount of the premiums under either § 105 or § 106.
0 Notably, the court did not expressly
recharacterize the premium payment as a constructive dividend.
a. And the Eighth Circuit also seems to be
smoking suspicious substances in analyzing this issue. DKD Enterprises,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 7/17/12). The Eighth Circuit, in
an opinion by Judge Riley, affirmed "[b]ecause the tax court permissibly
found DKD failed to prove the payments were made pursuant to a pre-
determined plan for the benefit of employees." Although acknowledging that
under Reg. § 1.105-5, "a plan may cover a single employee or limited class
of employees; need not be in writing; and need not be enforceable by the
employee," the court held that there was no "plan" because while the
taxpayer "testified DKD 'paid [her] quarterly medical insurance,' paying
approximately the same amount for her insurance in 2003, 2004, and 2005,"
she "did not testify these payments were made according to a pre-determined
'plan' intended to benefit employees."
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0 We wonder whether the court's reasoning
indicates that it thought twelve consecutive payments for medical insurance
were made by accident. "Plan" versus "accident;" are there any other
alternatives?
6. Premiums for corporate welfare benefit plans for
principal owners fail the smell test, with penalties. Curcio v.
Commissioner, 689 F.3d 217 (2d Cir. 8/9/12). In consolidated cases
involving three different subchapter S corporations, Judge Chin upheld the
Tax Court's denial of deductions for premiums paid to maintain welfare
benefit plans consisting of individual life insurance policies for selected
employees, the so-called Benistar 419 plan, a multi-employer welfare benefit
trust. The plan allowed the policy beneficiaries to withdraw the life insurance
policies from the plan and obtain the net surrender value. In each case the
court found that the life insurance policies were provided to key employees
(shareholders) for the personal benefit of the employees (to fund a buy/sell
agreement, to provide retirement planning, and to divert business profits).
While the court acknowledged that contributions to a welfare benefit plan
may be deductible, in these cases the court indicated that the Tax Court did
not err in finding that the contributions were not helpful for the development
of the taxpayers' businesses and were made instead for the personal benefit
of the S corporation shareholders. The court observed that the plan was
designed to benefit the owners and their families, not the respective business
entities. In addition to upholding tax deficiencies representing increased
pass-through income to the taxpayers, the court upheld § 6662(a) accuracy-
related penalties, again indicating that the Tax Court did not err in
concluding that the taxpayers were negligent and acted in disregard of the tax
rules and regulations. The court further rejected the taxpayer's assertion that
they relied on the advice of their accountants noting that there was little
reason for the taxpayers to believe that their accountants were experts in the
tax treatment of welfare benefit plan contributions or that the accountants
had sufficiently researched the issue.
7. Putin might be fighting American adoptions, but
Congress likes adoptions. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand
compromise) Tax Act, § 104, made permanent the Code § 137 exclusion for
employer-provided adoption assistance. The maximum exclusion is $12,170
(adjusted for inflation), and the phase-out range is $182,520 to $222,520
(adjusted for inflation).
B. Qualified Deferred Compensation Plans
1. Rev. Proc. 2013-12, 2013-4 I.R.B. 313 (12/31/12),
modifying and superseding Rev. Proc. 2008-50, 2008-2 C.B. 464. This
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revenue procedure updates the comprehensive system of correction programs
for sponsors of retirement plans that are intended to satisfy the requirements
of §§ 401(a), 403(a), 403(b), 408(k), or 408(p) of the Code, but that have not
met these requirements for a period of time. This system, the Employee
Plans Compliance Resolution System ("EPCRS"), permits Plan Sponsors to
correct these failures and thereby continue to provide their employees with
retirement benefits on a tax-favored basis. The components of EPCRS are
the Self-Correction Program ("SCP"), the Voluntary Correction Program
("VCP"), and the Audit Closing Agreement Program ("Audit CAP").
C. Nonqualified Deferred Compensation, Section 83, and
Stock Options
1. A sad story involving non-qualified stock options,
with a different twist. McLaine v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 10
(3/13/12). In this review of a CDP proceeding, the Tax Court, in a reviewed
opinion by Judge Colvin, sustained the IRS's determination to proceed with
a levy against the taxpayer to collect unpaid taxes resulting from his exercise
of non-qualified stock options. The taxpayer argued that in the CDP
proceeding the IRS wrongly denied him a § 31 credit for a third-party
payment by a successor to his former employer of the taxes that should have
been withheld from the stock proceeds but which the taxpayer claimed were
paid in the year after the year in which he filed his tax return. Judge Colvin
found that there was no evidence that any such payment occurred.
0 Judge Halpem (joined by Judge Holmes)
concurred, but would have held that as a matter of law, even if the successor
company paid the non-withheld taxes associated with the option exercise in a
later year, the taxpayer would not have been entitled to a § 31 (a) credit for the
payment. He wrote:
I believe the law is clear that an employer's (or former
employer's) payment to the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
of taxes that should have been, but were not, withheld in a
prior year does not entitle the employee to a section 31(a)
credit for that payment. Under those circumstances we have
a duty not to mislead taxpayers by perpetuating a case ...
that may very well encourage needless litigation. Therefore,
we should hold, in the alternative, that, as a matter of law,
the VarTec payment alleged by petitioner, even if proven,
would not entitle him to a section 3 1(a) credit therefor.
2. 20/20 hindsight doesn't change the value of stock
purchased through stock options. Sheedy v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2012-69 (3/14/12). In June 2006, the taxpayer exercised nonstatutory stock
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options in his employer, which six months later was bankrupt. The stock was
not publicly traded but was bought and sold through an investment bank that
maintained a trading desk with the ability to facilitate secondary trading
among and between accredited investors and qualified institutional buyers;
the investment bank did not set these prices but reported prices resulting
from a bid-ask process in which it acted as the market maker. Between
January 11, 2005, and February 22, 2007, the price per share ranged between
$1.50 and $10.25. At the time the taxpayer exercised the options, and for
several months thereafter, the investment bank sold several blocks of stock
for $3 per share. The taxpayer received a W-2 showing $744,466.25 in gross
income - the difference between the $750,000 fair market value of the stock
(at $3 per share) on the exercise date and the $5,533.75 the taxpayer paid for
the stock. Nevertheless, the taxpayer argued that the stock was worthless on
the date of exercise and that he therefore realized no income. The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) rejected that argument. Citing First National Bank of Kenosha
v. United States, 763 F.2d 891, 894 (7th Cir. 1985) as controlling authority,
the court held that "subsequent events should not be used to determine fair
market value, except to the extent that they were reasonably foreseeable on
the valuation date." On the record, the bankruptcy and the worthlessness of
the stock were not reasonably foreseeable events on the exercise date.
Following the principle that "price of stock in a liquid market is
presumptively the one to use in judicial proceedings," the court accepted the
IRS's valuation of $3 per share. The taxpayer was required to include
$744,466.25 in gross income - the difference between the $750,000 fair
market value of the stock on the exercise date and the $5,533.75 that he paid
for the stock.
3. Tightening the meaning of "substantial risk of
forfeiture." REG-141075--09, Property Transferred in Connection With the
Performance of Services Under Section 83, 77 F.R. 31783 (5/30/12). The
Treasury Department has proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.83-3 to clarify
the meaning of "substantial risk of forfeiture." Under the proposed
amendments, a substantial risk of forfeiture may be established only through
a service condition or a condition related to the purpose of the transfer. When
determining whether a substantial risk of forfeiture exists based on a
condition related to the purpose of the transfer, both the likelihood that the
forfeiture event will occur and the likelihood that the forfeiture will be
enforced must be considered. In addition, the proposed amendments clarify
that except as specifically provided in § 83(c)(3) and Reg. § 1.83-30) and
(k), transfer restrictions do not create a substantial risk of forfeiture,
including transfer restrictions which carry the potential for forfeiture or
disgorgement of some or all of the property, or other penalties, if the
restriction is violated. The proposed amendments would add two additional
examples to Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(4) illustrating that a substantial risk of
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forfeiture is not created solely as a result of potential liability under Rule
lob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or a lock-up agreement. (This
change incorporates the holding of Rev. Rul. 2005-48, 2005-2 C.B. 259,
holding that if an employee exercises a nonstatutory option more than six
months after grant, and thus outside the period covered by § 16 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, but is subject to restrictions on his ability
to sell the stock obtained through exercise of the option under Rule 1Ob-5
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and "lock-up" contractual
provisions imposed by the employer in connection with a public offering, the
employee is required to recognize income under § 83 at the time of the
exercise of the option because full enjoyment of the shares is not conditioned
on any obligation to provide future services.)
0 The proposed amendments are proposed
to apply to property transferred on or after 1/1/13. Taxpayers may rely on the
proposed regulations for property transferred after 5/30/12.
4. The IRS provides help to avoid messing up your
§ 83(b) election, but you still have to remember to file it on time, i.e.,
within 30 days. Rev. Proc. 2012-29, 2012-28 I.R.B. 49 (6/27/12). This
Revenue Procedure provides sample language that may be used, but is not
required to be used, for making a § 83(b) election. It also provides several
examples of the consequences of making a § 83(b) election.
D. Individual Retirement Accounts
1. The "use a C corporation to increase IRA
contributions" scam is struck down. Repetto v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-168 (6/14/12). The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) imposed the 6
percent excess contribution tax under § 4973 for a scheme established by the
taxpayers' CPA. The taxpayers formed two corporations, most of the stock
of which was held by the taxpayers' newly formed IRAs. One of the two
corporations was intended to provide office and support services, and the
other to provide marketing and business development services to the
taxpayers' construction and rental property businesses operated through an S
corporation and LLC. The court indicated that the preponderance of the
evidence supported a finding that the service agreements and the payments to
the Roth IRA owned corporations "were nothing more than a mechanism for
transferring value to the IRA." The court stated that the service agreements
did not change the identity of the person providing services to the
construction businesses, the taxpayers continued to do the work as they had
done before the arrangement was structured, and the taxpayers provided no
written documentation of the services provided. The court's conclusion was
bolstered by the language of the engagement letter with the CPA, which
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supported the finding that payment of dividends to the Roth IRAs was the
primary goal of the support agreements. The court determined that the
amount contributed to the Roth IRA and the amount of excess contributions
should be determined based on the fair market value of the Roth IRA at year
end. The court rejected the IRS approach that would have treated payments
to the corporations as distributions to the taxpayers who subsequently
contributed the amounts to the Roth IRAs.
* In the consolidated cases the court also
held that amounts distributed by the taxpayers' S corporation were to be treated
as wages rather than distributions.
* Amounts paid for medical plans that
benefited the taxpayers by the IRA-owned C corporations were disallowed as
deductions by the corporations because the employment relationship with Mrs.
Repetto was a sham.
* The taxpayers were liable for a 5 percent
penalty for failure to file Form 5329 reporting excess contributions to their
IRAs and that the taxpayers' reliance on the tax professionals who promoted the
scheme was not reasonable.
* The taxpayers were liable for the 20
percent penalty of § 6662A incurred for an understatement attributable to a
reportable transaction. The transaction was substantially similar to the listed
transaction described in Notice 2004-8, 2007-1 C.B. 333, promulgated before
the taxpayers filed returns involving the transaction. In addition, the taxpayers
were held liable for the increased 30 percent penalty of § 6662A(c) for failing
to file a disclosure of their participation in a listed transaction. Again the court
found that taxpayers did not reasonably rely on the advice of independent tax
professionals.
* The court revised the IRS computation of
the understatement subject to penalties by holding that understatements
attributable to wages paid by the taxpayers' S corporation and the disallowance
of medical expense deductions were not related to the listed transaction.
V. PERSONAL INCOME AND DEDUCTIONS
A. Rates
1. DOMA could be on its way to the Supreme
Court. On the other hand, might this case lead to DOMA becoming the
Twenty-Eighth Amendment? Not likely, unless it was left to the bigoted
voters. Massachusetts v. United States Dept. of Health and Human Services,
682 F.3d 1 (1 st Cir. 5/31/12), aff'g Gill v. Office of Personnel Management,
699 F. Supp. 2d 374 (D. Mass. 7/8/10). In an opinion by Judge Boudin, the
First Circuit held that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7,
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which limits the meaning of the word "marriage" to "a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife," and provides that "the word
'spouse' refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or
wife" for purposes of all federal laws is an unconstitutional denial of equal
protection in violation the equal protection principles embodied in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Joint return filing status under the
Code was one of the issues addressed in the case, as well as government
benefits available to married individuals, e.g., employee health benefits,
social security benefits. The court further ordered:
Anticipating that certiorari will be sought and that Supreme
Court review of DOMA is highly likely, the mandate is
stayed, maintaining the district court's stay of its injunctive
judgment, pending further order of this court.
a. The Second Circuit agrees in a split
decision. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 10/18/12) (2-1),
cert. granted, 184 L. Ed. 2d 527 (12/7/12). In an appeal from a grant of
summary judgment in a tax refund suit by the District Court for the Southern
District of New York, the Second Circuit (Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs)
affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the surviving spouse of a same-
sex couple that was married in Canada in 2007 and resided in New York at
the time of her spouse's death in 2009 who was denied the benefit of the
§ 2056 marital deduction for federal estate tax on the ground that § 7 of the
Defense of Marriage Act violated the equal protection clause for want of a
rational basis.
* The court concluded that review of § 7
required heightened scrutiny because (A) homosexuals as a group have
historically endured persecution and discrimination; (B) homosexuality has no
relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; (C) homosexuals are a
discernible group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics, especially in
the subset of those who enter same-sex marriages; and (D) the class remains a
politically weakened minority. The circuit court further concluded that the class
was quasi-suspect (rather than suspect) based on the weight of the factors and
on analogy to the classifications recognized as suspect and quasi-suspect. The
circuit court held that the rationale premised on uniformity was not an
exceedingly persuasive justification for DOMA, and that DOMA was not
substantially related to the important government interest of protecting the fisc.
* Judge Straub dissented on the following
basic ground:
The majority holds DOMA unconstitutional, a
federal law which formalizes the understanding of marriage
in the federal context extant in the Congress, the Presidency,
and the Judiciary at the time of DOMA's enactment and, I
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daresay, throughout our nation's history. If this
understanding is to be changed, I believe it is for the
American people to do so ...
At bottom, the issue here is marriage at the federal
level for federal purposes, and not other legitimate interests.
The Congress and the President formalized in DOMA, for
federal purposes, the basic human condition ofjoining a man
and a woman in a long-term relationship and the only one
which is inherently capable of producing another generation
of humanity. Whether that understanding is to continue is for
the American people to decide via their choices in electing
the Congress and the President. It is not for the Judiciary to
search for new standards by which to negate a rational
expression of the nation via the Congress.
2. Net investment income tax of 3.8 percent.4 Section
1411 of the Code, added by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation
Act of 2010, imposes a 3.8 percent tax on the net investment income of
individuals, estates, and trusts in taxable years beginning after 12/31/12. For
individuals (except nonresident aliens), the tax applies only to the lesser of
(1) net investment income or (2) the excess of modified adjusted gross
income over a threshold amount. I.R.C. § 1411(a)(1). The threshold amount
is $250,000 for spouses filing a joint return or a surviving spouse, $125,000
for married individuals filing separate returns, and $200,000 for single
taxpayers (including heads of household). I.R.C. § 1411 (b). These threshold
amounts for individuals are not adjusted for inflation. Modified adjusted
gross income is adjusted gross income increased by the amount of foreign
earned income excluded under § 911 (a)(1) (net of the deductions and
exclusions disallowed with respect to the foreign earned income). I.R.C. §
1411(d). For estates and trusts, the tax is levied on the lesser of
(1) undistributed net investment income, or (2) the excess of adjusted gross
income (as defined in § 67(e)) over the dollar amount at which the highest
income tax bracket applicable to an estate or trust begins for the tax year
($11,950 for 2013). I.R.C. § 141 l(a)(2). The tax does not apply to a trust that
is tax-exempt under § 501, is a charitable remainder trust tax-exempt under
§ 664, or all of the unexpired interests of which are devoted to charitable
purposes. Net investment income is investment income reduced by the
deductions properly allocable to that income. Investment income is the sum
of (1) gross income from interest, dividends, annuities, royalties, and rents
(other than income derived from any trade or business to which the tax does
not apply), (2) other gross income derived from any trade or business to
4. We thank Professor Bruce McGovern, South Texas College of Law for
contributing this description of § 1411 and the regulations thereunder.
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which the tax applies, and (3) net gain (to the extent taken into account in
computing taxable income) attributable to the disposition of property other
than property held in a trade or business to which the tax does not apply.
I.R.C. § 141 l(c)(1). The § 1411 tax applies to trade or business income from
(1) a passive activity, and (2) trading financial instruments or commodities
(as defined in § 475(e)(2)): I.R.C. § 1411(c)(2). It does not apply to any other
trade or business income. However, income on the investment of working
capital is not treated as derived from a trade or business and is subject to tax
under § 1411. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(3). Gain or loss from the disposition of a
partnership interest or stock in an S corporation is taken into account only to
the extent gain or loss would be taken into account by the partner or
shareholder if the entity had sold all its properties for fair market value
immediately before the disposition. I.R.C. § 1411(c)(4). Thus there is a
deemed basis adjustment that results in taking into account only the net gain
or loss attributable to the entity's property that is not attributable to an active
trade or business. Investment income does not include any distributions from
a qualified retirement plan or any income subject to self-employment tax.
I.R.C. § 1411(c)(5)-(6). Unlike self-employment taxes, no part of the § 1411
tax is deductible in computing taxable income under Chapter 1. The tax on
net investment income is subject to the estimated tax provisions. I.R.C. §
6654(a).
a. Proposed regulations provide extensive
guidance on the tax on net investment income. On 11/30/12, the
Treasury Department issued proposed regulations regarding the § 1411
tax on net investment income. REG-130507-11, Net Investment Income
Tax, 77 F.R. 72612 (12/05/12). The proposed regulations generally are
proposed to be effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/13. The Treasury
Department intends to issue final regulations during 2013. However, § 1411
is effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/12. Taxpayers may rely on the
proposed regulations for purposes of complying with § 1411 until the
effective date of the final regulations.
0 General provisions. Section 1411 is the
only provision in chapter 2A of subtitle A of the Code. Chapter 2A does not
contain any other operational or definitional provisions. The proposed
regulations provide that, except as otherwise provided, all Code provisions that
apply for purposes of chapter 1 in determining taxable income as defined in
§ 63(a) also apply in determining the tax imposed by § 1411. Prop. Reg.
§ 1.1411-1(a).
* Application to estates and trusts. The
proposed regulations provide as a general rule that the § 1411 tax applies to all
estates and trusts that are subject to the provisions of part I of subchapter J of
chapter 1 of subtitle A of the Code. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-3(a)(1)(i).
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Accordingly, the § 1411 tax does not apply to trusts that are not classified as
trusts under the check-the-box regulations (such as business trusts). It also does
not apply to trusts that are exempt from taxes imposed by subtitle A of the
Code. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-3(b)(2)-(4). This is true even if the trust is subject to
tax on its unrelated business taxable income. The proposed regulations clarify
that grantor trusts are not subject to the tax. The grantor or other person who
takes into account the grantor trust's income and deductions is treated as
receiving and paying those items directly for purposes of calculating that
person's liability for the § 1411 tax. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-3(b)(5). Special
computational rules apply to electing small business trusts and charitable
remainder trusts. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-3(c)(2). Although charitable remainder
trusts are not subject to the tax, annuity and unitrust distributions may be net
investment income to the non-charitable beneficiary who receives them. The
proposed regulations provide detailed rules regarding the calculation of an
estate or trust's undistributed net investment income. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-
3(c)(e). Generally, the rules for calculating undistributed net investment income
are guided by the subchapter J concept of distributable net income, which
apportions income between the trust and its beneficiaries.
* Net investment income. Because trade or
business income from a passive activity is net investment income, the status of
activities as passive and the grouping of activities for purposes of the passive
activity loss rules are significant. The proposed regulations provide taxpayers
with a fresh start to regroup activities in the first tax year that begins after
12/31/13 in which § 1411 would apply to the taxpayer. Prop. Reg. § 1.469-
1 l(b)(3)(iv). Net investment income, which is investment income reduced by
the deductions properly allocable to that income, cannot be less than zero.
Deductions that exceed investment income can be carried forward only to the
extent provided in chapter 1 of the Code. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-4(f)(1)(ii).
Deductions carried over to a tax year because they were suspended or
disallowed by other provisions, such as the investment interest, basis, at-risk or
passive activity loss limitations, and allowed for that year in determining
adjusted gross income are also allowed in determining net investment income.
This is true regardless of whether the taxable year from which the deductions
are carried precedes the effective date of § 1411. If items of net investment
income (including the properly allocable deductions) pass through to an
individual, estate, or trust from a partnership or S corporation, the allocation of
the items must be separately stated under § 702 or § 1366. The proposed
regulations provide detailed guidance on determining the net investment
income arising from the disposition of interests in partnerships or S
corporations. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-7.
* International issues. Under § 951(a),
United States shareholders who own stock in a controlled foreign corporation
on the last day of the corporation's taxable year must include in gross income
their pro rata share of the CFC's subpart F income. Similarly, United States
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persons who hold stock of a passive foreign investment company and elect to
treat the PFIC as a qualified electing fund must include in gross income
currently under § 1293 a pro rata share of the PFIC's earnings and profits.
When the CFC or PFIC later distributes its earnings, the shareholders can
exclude the distributions from gross income to the extent they previously were
taxed on them. These income inclusions and exclusions result in positive and
negative stock basis adjustments. Because these income inclusions are not
treated as dividends unless expressly provided for in the Code, the proposed
regulations do not treat the income inclusions as net investment income for
purposes of § 1411. Instead, CFC shareholders and PFIC shareholders who
have made a qualified electing fund election must treat actual distributions of
previously taxed earnings as net investment income. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-
10(c)(2)(i). One effect of this rule is that a CFC or PFIC shareholder can have
one stock basis for purposes of chapter 1 of the Code and a different stock basis
for purposes of the § 1411 tax. To avoid these complexities, the proposed
regulations allow a taxpayer to elect to treat the income inclusions required by
§ 951(a) and § 1293 as net investment income. Prop. Reg. § 1.1411-10(g). The
election can be revoked only with the Service's consent. Although the proposed
regulations do not address the issue, it appears that the § 1411 tax cannot be
reduced with foreign tax credits because foreign tax credits reduce taxes
imposed by chapter 1 of the Code, and § 1411 is located in chapter 2A.
0 See also, FAQs on the net investment
income tax, released by the IRS on 11/29/12, 2012 TNT 23247.
3. "Middle class" tax rates extended "permanently"
by the 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act,
but the "rich" must pay more. These changes made by Act §§ 101 and 102
include:
* Individual income tax rates. The 10%,
15%, 25%, 28%, 33%, and 35% tax rates enacted in 2001 have been made
permanent (including the expansion of the 15% bracket to mitigate the
"marriage penalty"). However, the 39.6% rate from pre-2001 Act law has been
restored for taxable incomes in excess of the following amounts: (1) $450,000
for married couples filing jointly and surviving spouses; (2) $425,000 for head-
of-households; (3) $400,000 for single taxpayers; (4) $225,000 for married
taxpayers filing separately. For tax years after 2013, these highest bracket
threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation with 2012 as the base year. (For
trusts and estates the brackets are 15%, 25%, 28%, 33% and, for income in
excess of$11,950, 39.6%; there is no 35% rate bracket.)
* Capital gains and dividends. Taxing
qualified dividends at the same rate as long-term capital gains has been made
permanent, but the maximum rate has been increased. The maximum rates are
as follows: 20% for income otherwise in the 39.6% bracket, 15% for income
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otherwise in the 25% or higher bracket (but below the 39.6%), and zero for
income otherwise in the 10% or 15% bracket.
* The above rates are in addition to the
Affordable Care Act investment income tax. Beginning in 2013, the 3.8%
net investment income tax under Code § 1411 applies to taxpayers whose
modified adjusted gross income exceeds (1) $250,000 for joint returns and
surviving spouses; (2) $125,000 for separate returns, and (3) $200,000 for all
other taxpayers. Thus, for qualified dividends and most capital gains, the
overall rate for taxpayers in the 39.6% rate bracket will be 23.8%. For taxpayers
who are subject to a 25%-or-greater rate on ordinary income, but whose income
is below the 39.6% rate threshold and are subject to the net investment income
tax, the rate will be 18.8%.
B. Miscellaneous Income
1. The Treasury Department uses regulations to
reverse a principle established in a Supreme Court decision that the
government won. Do Mayo doubters think that the Treasury exceeds its
powers when it issues regulations giving away government victories in
the Supreme Court? T.D. 9573, Damages Received on Account of Personal
Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 77 F.R. 3106 (1/23/12). The Treasury
Department has finalized proposed amendments (REG-127270-06, Damages
Received on Account of Personal Physical Injuries or Physical Sickness, 74
F.R. 47152 (9/15/09)) to Reg. § 1.104-1(c) under § 104(a)(2) to reflect
amendments to § 104 and certain judicial decisions. The amended
regulations provide that the § 104(a)(2) exclusion applies to personal
physical injuries or physical sickness. Emotional distress is not considered to
be a physical injury or physical sickness. However, the regulations provide
that damages for emotional distress attributable to a physical injury or
physical sickness are excludable under § 104(a)(2). The regulations do not
address loss of consortium or emotional distress from witnessing physical
injury to another person. Under the amended regulations, the term
"damages" means an amount received (other than workers' compensation)
through prosecution of a legal suit or action, or through a settlement
agreement entered into in lieu of prosecution. Notably, the amended
regulations eliminate the requirement in the prior regulations that to be
excludable under § 104(a)(2) the damages must have been "based upon tort
or tort type rights." Thus, damages for physical injuries may qualify for
exclusion under § 104(a)(2) even though the injury giving rise to the
damages is not defined as a tort under state or common law. The reason for
the change was the Treasury Department's concern that the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the tort type rights test in United States v. Burke, 504 U.S.
229 (1992), limiting the § 104(a)(2) exclusion to damages for personal
injuries for which the full range of tort-type remedies is available, could
2013]
Florida Tax Review
preclude an exclusion under § 104(a)(2) for redress of physical personal
injuries under a "no-fault" statute that does not provide traditional tort-type
remedies.
Taxpayers may apply the amended
regulations to amounts paid pursuant to a written binding agreement, court
decree, or mediation award entered into or issued after 9/13/95 and received
after 8/20/96.
2. Compensation to victims of human trafficking is
tax-free. The IRS would have been pilloried if it had ruled the other
way. Notice 2012-12, 2012-6 I.R.B. 365 (1/19/12). Mandatory restitution
payments awarded under 18 U.S.C. § 1593, which criminalizes (1) holding a
person to a condition of peonage; (2) kidnapping or carrying away a person
to sell the person into involuntary servitude or to be held as a slave,
(3) providing or obtaining a person's services or labor by actual or threatened
use of certain means including force, physical restraint, serious harm, and
abuse of legal process, and (4) sex trafficking of children or by force, fraud,
or coercion, are excluded from gross income.
3. It pays really big tax benefits to run your own
church and give yourself two parsonage allowances. Driscoll v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. 557 (12/14/10) (reviewed, 4-4-6). The taxpayer
(Phillip Driscoll) received a parsonage allowance from Mighty Horn
Ministries, Inc., later known as Phil Driscoll Ministries, Inc., that was
applied to the acquisition and maintenance of not only a principal residence
but also a second home - a vacation residence. The IRS disallowed a § 107
exclusion for the portion of the parsonage allowance received with respect to
the second home - for four years amounts totaled over $400,000 - on the
grounds that § 107(a) refers to "a home" and that the legislative history
limited the § 107 exclusion to only one home. The Tax Court majority, in an
opinion by Judge Chiechi (in which four judges joined), with four
concurrences, rejected the IRS's argument, stating "[w]e find nothing in
section 107, its legislative history, or the regulations under section 107,
which, as respondent points out, all use the phrase 'a home,' that allows, let
alone requires, respondent, or us, to rewrite that phrase in section 107." The
opinion pointed to § 7701(p)(1) [(m)(1) for the years at issue)], which refers
to the definition in 1 U.S.C. § 1 that provides that in interpreting the United
States Code, the singular includes the plural, unless the context indicates
otherwise.
Judge Gustafson, joined by five other
judges, dissented, on the grounds that exclusions should be interpreted
narrowly, and "[T]he chance that Congress in 1954 thought it was permitting
the exclusion of multiple parsonage allowances seems remote."
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a. Reversed and remanded. A home means
only one home. Commissioner v. Driscoll, 669 F.3d 1309 (1 lth Cir. 2/8/12).
In a per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the rental allowance
taxpayers received for their second house was not excluded from income
under § 107(2) because the proposition that singular terms also include their
plural terms, contained in the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. 1, does not apply if
"'the context indicates otherwise"' and the use of "home" in § 107(2) "has
decidedly singular connotations."
4. "Home" means where the taxpayer actually
resides, not just any old house the taxpayer owns. Stromme v.
Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 9 (3/13/12). Section 131 provides an exclusion
for certain amounts paid by a state or local government (or a "qualified foster
care placement agency") to a "foster care provider for caring for a qualified
foster individual in the foster care provider's home," or which is a "difficulty
of care payment." The taxpayers cared for several developmentally disabled
adults at a home they owned and in which they worked, but in which they
did not reside and received several hundred thousand dollars from the local
government. The Tax Court (Judge Colvin) held that § 131 did not apply to
exclude payments from the local government to provide foster care, because
§ 131 applies only if the care is provided in the home in which the taxpayer
actually resides.
5. Who ever heard of a local real property tax
appraisal that was anywhere near accurate? Shepherd v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2012-212 (7/24/12). The taxpayers compromised a consumer
credit card debt for $4,412 less than the balance and claimed that pursuant to
§ 108(a)(1)(B) none of the COD income should be recognized because they
were insolvent. The IRS and taxpayers agreed on the amount of the
taxpayers' debts and the value of all of their property with three exceptions:
(1) the value of their principal residence, (2) the value of a beach house, and
(3) whether a pension was an asset to be included in the determination of
insolvency. The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) held that taxpayers were not able to
demonstrate insolvency because they failed to establish the value of the
residences. Local tax assessments introduced by the taxpayers were
insufficient evidence of value because "a value placed upon property for
local taxation purposes is not determinative of fair market value of the
property for Federal income tax purposes in the absence of evidence of the
method used in arriving at that valuation." Appraisals introduced into
evidence were based on "comparable" sales more than two years after the
date of discharge, and thus were not probative of the value of the homes at
the time of the debt cancellation. The portion of the pension that could have
been withdrawn (or borrowed), but not the excess thereover, was included in
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the value of assets, because "the word 'assets' as used in the definition of the
term 'insolvent' for section 108(d)(3) includes 'assets exempt from the
claims of creditors under applicable State law' citing Carlson v.
Commissioner, 116 T.C. 87, 105 (2001). The taxpayers were not insolvent,
and the COD income was includible in income.
6. If you take the Fifth in front of a Senate
investigating committee, you may become a martyr, but if you take the
Fifth in front of the Tax Court, you lose. A Cicero, Illinois politician
fraudulently underreported income by omitting conversion of $350,000
campaign funds to personal use, but that's small potatoes compared to
the more than $10 million insurance fraud scheme for which she spent
time in the federal slammer. There may well be a falcon mixed up in
here as well, but no sign of it appears in the Tax Court opinion. Loren-
Maltese v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-214 (7/30/12). The taxpayer,
Betty Loren-Maltese, was the President of Cicero, Illinois - "a suburb of
Chicago that sits on its western hip like a well-holstered gun, and that has a
colorful history that reaches back into the 1920s when Al Capone took
refuge there" - and the Republican Committeeman of Cicero Township in
1994. She also served as Cicero's deputy liquor commissioner, a position to
which she was appointed by her husband, a "prominent Cicero politician
who confessed to being a mob bookmaker and pleaded guilty to a federal
gambling charge," when the previous deputy liquor commissioner resigned
during an FBI investigation into his practice of taking bribes and skimming
money off liquor-license renewal fees. In 2002, Loren-Maltese was
convicted of conspiracy to defraud Cicero through a pattern of racketeering
via multiple acts of bribery, money laundering, mail and wire fraud, official
misconduct, and interstate transportation of stolen property. The conviction
ended her political career, and she was sentenced to eight years in prison.
The government tried her separately on criminal tax fraud charges, but the
trial ended in a hung jury, and the government decided not to try her again.
In the instant case, the IRS asserted a deficiency for unreported income and
civil fraud penalties based on Loren-Maltese's purchase of a 1993 classic
black Cadillac Allante convertible for her personal use and her investment in
a luxury golf course and clubhouse with checks totaling more than $350,000
drawn on her "Committeeman Fund" account. (For the year in question,
Illinois law allowed public officials, who like Loren-Maltese, were also
political-party officials, to raise money from donors in their capacity as party
officials, in amounts that they could keep secret. The evidence established
that Cicero's town attorney explained to Loren-Maltese that she could
supplement her salary by taking money from the Committeeman Fund to buy
something for herself or to make an investment for her own personal benefit,
but the money would be personal income to her and she would owe tax on it
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in the year that she took it.) The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) found that both
items should have been included in Loren-Maltese's income and that her
failure to do so was due to fraud. Importantly, Loren-Maltese was mostly
silent during her trial, relying on her attorney's advice to take shelter under
the Fifth Amendment. Judge Holmes found that Loren-Maltese's valid
invocation of the Fifth Amendment nevertheless allowed the court to draw a
negative inference from her refusal to answer question where the IRS
produced some additional supporting evidence. Similarly, he drew inferences
from Loren-Maltese's silence where, under the circumstances, it would have
been natural for her to object.
7. It looks like-the home mortgage crisis continues,
so the mortgage COD exclusion continues. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act,
§ 202, extends the exclusion from income of discharged principal residence
indebtedness under § 108(a)(1)(E) to indebtedness discharged before 1/1/14.
8. Excludible mass transit and parking fringe
benefits are brought to sweet harmony. For 2012, employees were allowed
to exclude $240 per month for parking but only $125 for employer-provided
mass-transit and vanpool benefits. Congress came to the rescue in the 2012
Taxpayer Relief Act to provide the same benefit (indexed to $245) through
2013. Congress did not explain how the benefit will apply retroactively in
2012. Perhaps the IRS can figure it out.
C. Hobby Losses and § 280A Home Office and Vacation
Homes
1. This space cadet didn't get a secret decoder ring.
He might have succeeded had he had limited himself to saying "to the
Moon!" Barker v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-77 (3/20/12). The Tax
Court (Judge Goeke) sustained the IRS's disallowance of deductions claimed
by the taxpayer, an experienced NASA scientist, relating to planning the
exploration of Mars, including "ways to actually live off the land once
people have arrived on Mars as opposed to taking all supplies along on the
flight." Judge Goeke held that the taxpayer was not engaged in an active
trade or business because under the factors in Reg. § 1.183-2(b), the taxpayer
did not conduct his activities with the intention of earning a profit.
Furthermore, his nascent business had not yet begun to function as a going
concern; at most he was merely researching or investigating a potential
business, which is insufficient to demonstrate that a taxpayer is engaged in a
trade or business.
2. Only a doctor could think he could win this case.
Verrett v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-223 (8/2/12). The taxpayer was
2013]
Florida Tax Review
a physician who had an annual salary as such of approximately $120,000 in
each of the three years at issue. He claimed losses from a construction
business run from his home for which he had no license and had never
showed a profit in 17 years. Most of his services during the years at issue
involved uncompensated projects for his family and his church. Obviously,
the losses were disallowed under § 183.
D. Deductions and Credits for Personal Expenses
1. Only in the IRC can "first-time" mean not within
the past three years, but these taxpayers still weren't "property virgins."
Foster v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 51 (1/30/12). The taxpayers bought a
home on July 28, 2009 and claimed the temporary, then-in-effect § 36 first-
time homebuyer credit. They had listed their previously-owned house for
sale in February 2006 and spent "considerable time" at one of their parents'
house; the taxpayers sold their old house on June 6, 2007 and rented an
apartment that month. The Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that the taxpayers
did not qualify for the credit. Under § 36(c)(1), a "first-time homebuyer" is
any individual who has not owned a principal residence for three years prior
to the date of purchase of a new principal residence. Thus, the taxpayers
could have qualified if they had not owned a principal residence after July
27, 2006, and before July 28, 2009 (i.e., the period three years prior to the
purchase of their new house). Although the taxpayers owned the old house
until June 6, 2007, they argued that they ceased using it as their principal
residence in February 2006. Judge Foley found that the taxpayers' original
home remained their principal residence through at least July, 2006 - a date
within the three years preceding the purchase of the new home - because
until it was sold the original home was fully furnished, and taxpayers
maintained utility services, frequently stayed overnight, hosted family
holiday gatherings, kept personal belongings, accessed the Internet, and
received bills and correspondence at that home, as well as listing it as the
address for renewing a driver's license and filing federal income tax returns.
2. Two unmarried male cohabitants holding
residences in joint ownership were not entitled to double the § 163(h)(3)
limits, but were instead restricted to mortgage interest deductions on
only $1.1 million of loans. Sophy v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 8 (3/5/12).
The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) decided that the $1.1 million § 163(h)(3)
limitations on qualified residence indebtedness should be applied on both a
per taxpayer and a per-residence basis with respect to residence owners who
are not married to each other, rather than solely on the per-taxpayer basis
argued for by the unmarried taxpayers who jointly owned the residence in
question on which the purchase money mortgage exceeded $1.1 million.
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Thus, each of the two taxpayers was limited to deducting interest on only
$500,000 of acquisition debt on their two residences and $50,000 of home
equity indebtedness on their principal residence. The decision was based
upon congressional intent, as shown by the statute's repeated use of phrases
"with respect to any qualified residence" and "with respect to such
residence," which would have been superfluous had Congress intended that
the limitations be applied on a per-taxpayer basis.
3. Married filing separately status can put a big
dent in the home mortgage interest deduction. Bronstein v.
Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 21 (5/17/12). The taxpayer, who was married,
purchased a residence as joint tenants with rights of survivorship together
with her father-in-law. The taxpayer and her husband resided in the home,
and her father-in-law did not. The amount of the mortgage exceeded $1.3
million, and the taxpayer made all of the payments on the mortgage. The
taxpayer, who filed separately, deducted interest on $1.1 million of the
mortgage. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) applied § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii), which
provides that a married individual filing a separate return is limited to a
deduction for interest paid on $500,000 of home acquisition indebtedness,
and § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii), which provides that a married individual filing a
separate return is limited to a deduction for interest paid on $50,000 of home
equity indebtedness, which limits the taxpayer's total deduction to interest on
$550,000 of mortgage debt. Section 6662 accuracy-related penalties were
upheld, even though the taxpayer claimed to have relied on her tax advisor in
taking her return position, because "she ... made no attempt to establish that
the reliance was reasonable."
0 Interestingly, the same tax advisor who
prepared her return also represented her in the Tax Court litigation.
4. No dependency or child credits for nonresident,
noncitizen children. Carlebach v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 1 (7/19/12).
This case involved whether the taxpayers were allowed § 151 dependency
exemption deductions and § 21 and § 24 child-related credits, which require
that the children satisfy the same statutory test, for non-resident, non-citizen
children. One of the married taxpayers was a U.S. citizen and the other an
Israeli, and they lived in Israel; the children were born in, and lived in Israel.
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) applied § 152(b)(3)(A), which provides that
"[t]he term 'dependent' does not include an individual who is not a citizen or
national of the United States unless such individual is a resident of the
United States or a country contiguous to the United States," and Reg.
§ 1. 152-2(a)(1), which provides that "to qualify as a dependent an individual
must be a citizen or resident of the United States ... at some time during the
calendar year in which the taxable year of the taxpayer begins" to deny the
deductions and credits. He rejected the taxpayers' argument that because the
2013]
Florida Tax Review
children were citizens in the year (2007) in which returns were filed, they
qualified as dependents for the years at issue (2004 through 2006). He also
rejected the taxpayers' argument that the children had "derivative
citizenship" under 8 U.S.C. § 1433, because such citizenship is not
automatic, but requires an application and naturalization, which had not
occurred during the years in question. Finally, he rejected the taxpayers
argument that because § 152(b)(3)(A) does not require citizenship during the
year in question, Reg. § 1.152-2(a)(1), which does require citizenship during
the year in question, was invalid. The regulation was a reasonable
interpretation of § 152(b)(3)(A), which he interpreted "in the context of
subtitle A of the Internal Revenue Code, which deals with income taxes, and
in which the concept of an annual accounting system is deeply embedded."
Section 6662 accuracy related penalties were upheld.
5. An incomplete effort to collect on a homeowner's
insurance policy is all that's necessary to secure a casualty loss
deduction. Ambrose v. United States, 106 Fed. Cl. 152 (8/3/12). The
taxpayers' home was destroyed in a fire, and the next day they filed a timely
claim with their homeowner's insurance company. However, they failed to
file a timely "proof of loss" as required by the insurance policy; they sued
the insurance company in state court and lost. The IRS applied
§ 165(h)(5)(E) to deny the taxpayer's claim for a casualty loss deduction.
Section 165(h)(5)(E) provides that "[a]ny loss of an individual described in
subsection (c)(3) to the extent covered by insurance shall be taken into
account under this section only if the individual files a timely insurance
claim with respect to such loss." The Court of Federal Claims (Judge
Allegra) upheld the taxpayers' refund claim, allowing the casualty loss
deduction, on the ground that § 165(h)(5)(E) does not apply to a taxpayer
who files a timely claim but whose claim is rejected by the insurance
company when the taxpayer fails to timely file a "proof of loss" as required
by the insurance policy. Reading from Webster's Dictionary to divine the
meaning of the terms "file" and "claim" in § 165(h)(5)(E), Judge Alegra
concluded that there is a "distinction between the filing of a claim, i.e. the
'deliver[y] . . . to the proper officer' of a 'demand for something due or
believed to be due' and the subsequent submission of proof of the validity of
that claim," and that in enacting § 165(h)(5)(E), Congress intended to require
only the former. He rejected the government's argument that "an insurance
'claim' [includes fulfilling] all of the conditions on recovery found in a given
policy."
6. If you don't plead the right theory, you lose -
even though had you pled the correct theory, you might have won.
Halata v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-351 (12/19/12). In 2007, the
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taxpayer was suckered into paying $180,000 in a scam "bank guarantee
transaction" that promised a return of $2.5 million, with the first installment
to be received only a few weeks after the payment was made. The
"opportunity" was presented through one Montgomery, a California lawyer,
who provided the taxpayer with documents memorializing the transaction.
No funds ever were received. The taxpayer hired a lawyer to attempt to
recover the funds. Montgomery insisted that the purported bank-guaranty
transaction was a legitimate transaction, but that he was merely a facilitator
of the transaction, received no money, and had no information about how the
transaction worked or the identities and roles of the parties to the transaction.
In 2009, the taxpayer's lawyer advised her that a suit against Montgomery
likely would be fruitless. The taxpayer did not claim a theft deduction on her
2007 tax return and did not file a 2008 tax return. The IRS audited her for
2007 and 2008 and proposed deficiencies. In the Tax Court, the taxpayer
argued that she suffered a theft loss in 2007 and 2008 that would offset her
otherwise unreported income. The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) agreed with
the taxpayer that a theft had occurred under the relevant state law and that
Montgomery most likely was the thief, but denied a deduction for the year
before the court because the loss was not sustained until 2009. Based on all
of the facts, prior to 2009, she had a reasonable prospect of recovery.
Furthermore, the taxpayer never filed a pleading asserting her theory that
there was a net-operating loss for 2009 that should be carried back to prior
years.
7. One P&S, one loan, one property - all residence.
Norman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-360 (12/27/12). The taxpayers
purchased a principal residence on 8.875 acres of land for $1.8 million. The
land was zoned for 1/4 acre lots, and the taxpayers hired a civil engineering
firm to study the feasibility of development. However, the purchase contract
did not allocate the price between the residence with a limited amount of
acres and remaining acreage, and the taxpayers obtained a single mortgage of
$1,860,000. The land was never subdivided. The taxpayers deducted all of
the interest on the mortgage, but the IRS allowed only the interest on $1.1
million as qualified home mortgage interest, rejecting the taxpayer's claim
that they paid $1 million was for the dwelling unit plus three acres and
$800,000 for "investment property" consisting of the other 6.875 acres. The
Tax Court (Judge Thornton) upheld the deficiency, largely on the grounds
that the purchase contract did not allocate the price between the residence
and the acreage that was purportedly investment property and the acquisition
was financed with a single loan, which included not only the purchase price,
but also a line of credit for renovations to the house.
8. The validity and effect of an admittedly executed
Form 8332 is beyond question. George v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 19
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(12/19/12). The taxpayer, who was the custodial spouse following a divorce,
in compliance with a state court order, executed a Form 8332 (Release of
Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated Parents), which
stated that "I agree not to claim an exemption for" her daughter as a
dependent for the years at issue. However, the taxpayer believed that the
state court order was improper, because she thought that court lacked
jurisdiction to issue such an order and because any such order should have
taken into account her former husband's past arrears in child support before
enabling him to obtain the dependency exemption. As a result, she
nevertheless claimed a dependency exemption and a child tax credit for the
child. The taxpayer's former spouse also claimed the child as a dependent for
those years and attached the executed Form 8332 to his tax returns. The Tax
Court (Judge Gustafson), held that the taxpayer was not entitled to the
dependency exemption. The executed Form 8332 was not rendered invalid
by any error in the state court order requiring it or by the fact that the
taxpayer signed the Form 8332 under the compulsion of that state court
order. The release of the claim to the exemption was valid. Likewise the
child credit was disallowed.
9. If an ex-spouse disobeys a court order to sign
Form 8332, the noncustodial spouse still loses. What's a guy gotta do?
Armstrong v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 18 (12/19/12). The taxpayer and
his wife divorced, and his ex-wife had custody of their son. A state court
order provided that the taxpayer would be entitled to the dependency
exemption and explicitly required his ex-wife to execute in his favor a Form
8332, "Release of Claim to Exemption for Child of Divorced or Separated
Parents") provided that the taxpayer met child support obligations. The
taxpayer met his child support obligations, but his ex-wife failed to provide
the executed Form 8332. The IRS disallowed the taxpayer's claimed
dependency exemption, even though he appended to his tax return the court
order and provided the IRS evidence that he had met his support obligations.
In a reviewed opinion (12-3) by Judge Gustafson, the Tax Court upheld the
denial of the exemption. The state court order, even though countersigned by
the taxpayer's ex-wife was not a substitute for a Form 8332 because it failed
to unconditionally declare that the ex-wife "will not claim such child as a
dependent" for the year at issue. That defect is not cured by the noncustodial
parent's proof that he has fulfilled support conditions beyond those in the
statute. Likewise the child credit was disallowed.
0 Judge Holmes wrote a very, very lengthy
dissent, in which Judges Halpern and Vasquez joined. The essence of the
dissent was that the statutory requirement to "attach" the waiver to the tax
return properly requires only that it be "associated with" or "connected to by
attribution" to the return. Thus, all relevant documents should be considered to
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be "attached" to a taxpayer's return, without regard to the point in time those
documents are provided to the IRS.
10. Miscellaneous not-so-permanent extensions
through 2013. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise)
Tax Act extends multiple expiring individual deductions, but only
through 2013, so Congress can be sure it has some work to do next year.
These include extenders for:
a. Teachers. Section 201 of the Act extends
the § 62(a)(D) above-the-line deduction for up to $250 of classroom related
expenditures of elementary and secondary school teachers for expenses
incurred in taxable years beginning in 2012 and 2013.
And who says that the Federal government
doesn't abundantly support quality education for children?
b. Mortgage insurance. Section 204 of the
Act extends the Code § 164(b)(5) deduction as qualified residence interest
provided for mortgage insurance premiums incurred in connection with
acquisition indebtedness for a qualified residence that are paid or accrued
before 1/1/14.
c. State and local taxes: A not-so-permanent
extension of the election to deduct state sales taxes. Section 205 extends
the Code § 164(b)(5) election to deduct state and local sales and use taxes in
lieu of state and local income taxes to tax years beginning before 1/1/14.
0 Thank you! Professor Shepard (Texas)
and Professor McMahon (Florida) thank Congress and the President for their
solicitude on this issue. For Professor Simmons (California), this provision is
irrelevant.
11. Standard deduction marriage penalty relief is
now permanent. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise)
Tax Act made permanent the provisions in Code § 63 providing a basic
standard deduction for a married couple filing a joint return double the basic
standard deduction for single individuals. The basic standard deduction for
married taxpayers filing separately is the same as the basic standard
deduction for single taxpayers.
12. PEP and PEASE zombie-like arise from the
grave.
a. PEP. The 201.2 Taxpayer Relief (and not so
grand compromise) Tax Act permanently revived the phase-out of personal
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exemptions for high-income taxpayers for years beginning after 2012. The
phase-out kicks in the following AGI levels: (1) $300,000 for joint returns or
surviving spouses; (2) $150,000; and for married taxpayers filing separately;
(3) $275,000 for heads of household; and (4) $250,000 for single taxpayers.
After 2013, the threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation. The amount of
the phase-out, as previously, is 2% of the exemption amount for each $2,500
($1,500 for married taxpayers filing separate returns), or portion thereof, by
which AGI exceeds the phase-out threshold.
b. PEASE The Act also permanently revived
for years beginning after 2012 the limitation on itemized deductions. Like
PEP, the phase-out begins at the following AGI levels: (1) $300,000 for joint
returns filers or surviving spouses; (2) $150,000; and for married taxpayers
filing separately; (3) $275,000 for heads of household; and (4) $250,000 for
single taxpayers. After 2013, the threshold amounts are adjusted for inflation.
The amount of the phase-out, as previously, is 3% of the excess of certain
itemized deductions over the threshold amount, but not by more than 80% of
the itemized deductions subject to the limitation. (As previously, the
limitation does not apply to medical expenses, investment interest, casualty
and theft losses, and wagering losses.)
13. Making children permanently cheaper. The
Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act extended
permanently the increase of the § 24 child credit for taxpayers having
children under age 17 to $1,000. (No inflation adjustment has been added.)
The refundability of the credit to the extent of 15% of the taxpayer's earned
income in excess of $3,000 (unindexed) has been extended only through
2017.
14. Send the kids to day care, get a tax break. The
Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act extended
permanently the increases to the § 21 dependent care credit in the EGTRRA
2001. The credit is 35% of up to $3,000 of eligible expenses (maximum
$1,050) for one qualifying dependent, and 35% of up to $6,000 of eligible
expenses (maximum $2,100) for two or more qualifying dependents. The
35% credit rate is reduced, but not below 20%, by one percentage point for
each $2,000 (or fraction thereof) of AGI above $15,000.
15. It's tax-smart to adopt rather than to procreate.
The Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act extended
permanently the EGTRRA Code § 23 credit for adoption expenses, but not
the changes in the credit in the Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care
Act. As a result: (1) the maximum per-child credit is $10,000 (inflation
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adjusted) for all adoptions; (2) the credit begins to phase-out at a modified
AGI of $150,000 (inflation adjusted); (3) for special needs adoptions, the
credit is $10,000 regardless of actual expenses; and (4) the credit is allowed
against the AMT. The credit remains nonrefundable. For 2013 the maximum
credit is expected to be approximately $12,770 and the phase-out is expected
to begin at approximately $189,710, after inflation adjustments.
16. EITC 2001 simplification and expansion is made
permanent and 2009 expansion is extended five years. The Taxpayer
Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act made permanent the 2001
simplifying revisions to the Code § 32 earned income tax credit, as amended
by the 2003 Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act and the 2004
Working Families Tax Relief Act, and also extended the 2009 increases in
the earned income credit for taxpayers with three or more qualifying children
through 2017. Through 2017, the phase-out threshold for married taxpayers
filing joint returns will be $5,000 (inflation adjusted) higher than for other
taxpayers, and starting in 2018 the phase-out threshold for married taxpayers
filing joint returns will be $5,000 (inflation adjusted) higher than for other
taxpayers.
E. Divorce Tax Issues
1. The test for whether it's "alimony" is objective,
not subjective. Rood v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-122 (4/25/12).
The taxpayer was obligated under Florida law to pay his former spouse a
"lump sum alimony" award of $300,000 payable over 60 months in $5,000
payments. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the payments were not
deductible as "alimony" because under Florida law the taxpayer's obligation
did not terminate upon his former wife's death. The court declined to
consider extrinsic evidence in determining the nature of the payments: "The
intent of the parties is irrelevant in determining whether such an obligation
would terminate at death." Even though the purpose of the requirement of
§ 71 (b)(1)(D) that the payment terminate upon death is to prevent deductions
of amounts that are attributable to support of the payee, the relevant inquiry
is entirely objective; the intent of the parties regarding the purpose of the
payments is irrelevant.
2. A QDRO can't lend tax-free disability payment
status to a substitute payee. Fernandez v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 20
(5/14/12). The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) held that § 104(a)(1) does not
apply to exclude disability payments paid to the disabled worker's former
spouse pursuant to a § 414(p) qualified domestic relations order (QDRO).
Section 402(a) provides that amounts distributed from
employee trusts are taxable to the distributee "Except as
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otherwise provided in this section", and section 72 provides
that "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter gross
income includes any amount received as an annuity ***
under an *** endowment, or life insurance contract."
Nowhere in section 402(a) or section 72 is section 104(a)
mentioned. Section 402(e)(1)(A) explicitly provides: "For
purposes of subsection (a) [of section 402] and section 72,
an alternate payee who is the spouse or former spouse of the
participant shall be treated as the distributee of any
distribution or payment made to the alternate payee under a
qualified domestic relations order." If Congress had included
section 104 in this portion of the statute, the result in this
case might be different. However, without congressional
approval we decline to expand the reach of section
402(e)(1)(A) beyond the sections specifically referred to in
its text.
3. Counting to six distinguishes child support from
alimony. Schilling v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-256 (9/5/12). The
Tax Court (Judge Swift) applied § 71(c) and Temp. Reg. § 1.71-IT(c), Q&A
18, to hold that the amount by which payments received pursuant to a
divorce decree were reduced on dates that corresponded to taxpayer's
children attaining age 18 or starting college were child support. However, an
amount by which payments were reduced to zero on a fourth date, in the
sixth post-separation year was treated as alimony. Although the complete
termination of payments occurred within six months of one child's twenty-
first birthday, which ordinarily would be treated as related to a contingency
relating to a child under § 71(c)(2)(B), Temp. Reg. § 1.71-IT(c), Q&A 18,
expressly provides that complete cessation of support payments during the
sixth post-separation year does not qualify as a contingency relating to a
child.
F. Education
1. Congress encourages universities to raise tuition
even more in the next five years. The Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand
compromise) Tax Act extended the 2009 expansion of the Code § 25A
American Opportunity Tax Credit (formerly known as the Hope Scholarship
credit) through 2017.
a. Doubling down on encouraging
universities to raise tuition even more in the next five years. Section 207
of the Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act reinstates and
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extends the above-the-line deduction of higher education expenses provided
in Code § 222(d) for expenses incurred in taxable years 2012 and 2013.
Previously § 222(d) applied only to expenses incurred before 12/31/11.
2. Helping banks keep student loan interest rates
higher. The 2012 Tax Act made permanent the EGTRRA changes to the
Code § 221 above-the-line deduction for qualified higher education student
loan interest.
3. Helping banks market education IRAs. The 2012
Tax Act made permanent the many EGTRRA changes to the Coverdell
education savings account ("Coverdell ESA," or "CESA," formerly called an
"education IRA") rules (§§ 25A, 530). The 2001 changes that have been
extended permanently are extensive and since they have been in place for
twelve years, we won't bore you with them.
4. Encouraging employers to pay for employee's
education. The 2012 Tax Act made permanent the Code § 127 tax-free
fringe benefit for up to $5,250 annually for amounts paid or expenses
incurred by the employer in providing educational assistance to employees
under an educational assistance program (including graduate courses).
G. Alternative Minimum Tax
1. Finally - permanent AMT relief!! The 2012
Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 104, has
provided permanent AMT relief. Beginning in 2012, the AMT exemption
amount has been increased to: (1) $78,750 for married couples filing jointly
and surviving spouses; (2) $39,375 for married individuals filing separate
returns; and (3) $50,600 for single taxpayers. These amounts are subject to
automatic adjustment for inflation after 2012 using 2011 as the base year.
The AMT exemption is phased out by an amount equal to 25% of the amount
by which AMT exceeds the following thresholds: (1) $150,000 for married
couples filing jointly and surviving spouses; (2) $75,000 for married
individuals filing separate returns; and (3) $112,500 for single taxpayers. The
phase-out thresholds are likewise subject to inflation adjustments. (The 2012
Act did not change the $22,500 exemption amount for estates and trusts.)
The 2012 Act also provides permanent 0%, 15%, and 20% (for taxpayers
otherwise in the 39.6% bracket for ordinary income) AMT rates for long-
term capital gains and qualified dividends. The rule under Code § 26(a)(2)
allowing various nonrefundable personal credits to offset AMT has been
made permanent. Finally, by an amendment to Code § 26, the § 24
refundable child credit offset of AMT has been made permanent.
2013.]
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VI. CORPORATIONS
A. Entity and Formation
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
B. Distributions and Redemptions
1. The cat's out of the bag! DKD Enterprises, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 685 F.3d 730 (8th Cir. 7/17/12), aff'g T.C. Memo. 2011-29
(1/31/11). The Eighth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Riley, held that
expenses incurred by a corporation to operate a cattery, the deductions for
which were disallowed because the cattery was not operated with a genuine
profit-seeking motive, constituted constructive dividends to the corporation's
sole shareholder because the corporation operated the cattery "for the
personal pleasure of ... its sole stockholder, and that during each of those
years that activity was incident to [her] personal hobby." Because the
corporation did not have "a legitimate business purpose to operate the
cattery," the expenditures to operate constituted a constructive dividend
"even though this activity conferred no tangible economic benefit on [the
shareholder]."
2. Is section 306 like the human appendix - a
vestige of something that might have once served a purpose? The 2012
Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act made permanent
the treatment as qualified dividend income of ordinary income realized under
Code § 306. The only effect of § 306 now is to affect basis recovery.
C. Liquidations
1. Adios collapsible corporations. But how will tax
professors be able to torture their students now? The 2012 Taxpayer
Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act permanently repealed the
infamous Code § 341.
D. S Corporations
1. Poison pill warrants issued in an S corporation
tax shelter scheme turn truly poisonous to S corporation status. Santa
Clara Valley Housing Group, Inc. v. United States, 108 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-
6361 (N.D. Cal. 9/21/11). The stock of Santa Clara Valley Housing Group,
Inc. (SCVHG) originally was held by a husband and wife and their children.
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To implement a KPMG tax shelter product known as the S Corporation
Charitable Contribution strategy (SC2), SCVHG recapitalized itself so as to
have 100 shares of voting stock and 900 shares of nonvoting stock. SCVHG
also issued to each shareholder a warrant to purchase ten shares of nonvoting
stock for each share of voting stock (which was tax-free under § 305(a)). The
warrants were issued solely to protect the original shareholders' interest in
SCVHG while they engaged in the SC2 strategy. (The warrants protected
against the possibility that the donee charity would refuse to sell its stock
back to the original shareholders after the agreed-upon length of time,
because if the warrants were exercised, the warrants would dilute the stock
held by the charity to such an extent that the original shareholders would end
up owning approximately 90 percent of the outstanding shares.) Thereafter,
the shareholders transferred all of the nonvoting stock to the City of Los
Angeles Safety Members Pension Plan (CLASMPP), a tax-exempt entity as a
"donation," with the understanding that CLASMPP would sell the shares
back after a certain period of time. While CLASMPP held the stock, SCVHG
reported over $114 million of income, of which more than $100 million was
passed through to CLASMPP, but CLASMPP received distributions of only
$202,500, representing .02 percent of the income allocated to CLASMPP.
After four years, CLASMPP sold the 900 shares of stock back to the original
shareholders for $1,645,002, and the warrants were cancelled. The IRS
concluded that the transaction was an abusive tax shelter. The IRS concluded
that under Reg. § 1.1361-1(/)(4)(ii) the warrants constituted a second class of
stock in SCVHG and SCVHG's status as an S corporation was terminated
and issued a deficiency notice based upon treating SCVHG as a C
corporation. The District Court agreed with the IRS. The warrants "constitute
equity," and were intended to prevent CLASMPP "from enjoying the rights
of distribution or liquidation that ordinarily would come with ownership of
the majority of a successful company's shares." Thus the warrants were a
second class stock and SCVHG's S corporation status was terminated.
However, the warrants were not a second class of stock under Reg. § 1.1361 -
1(l)(4)(iii), which provides that options are a second class if, under the facts
and circumstances, (1) the option is substantially certain to be exercised and
(2) has an exercise price substantially below the fair market value of the
underlying stock on the date the option is issued. In this case it was never
intended that the options be exercised; they were a "poison pill."
a. Reconsidered. Santa Clara Valley Housing
Group, Inc. v. United States, 109 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-554 (N.D. Cal. 1/18/12).
On reconsideration of its summary judgment, the court determined that there
is a triable issue of fact whether the warrants are protected from being treated
as a second class of stock under the safe harbor of Reg. § 1.1361-
l(f)(4)(iii)(C), which provides that a call option will not be treated as a
second class of stock if the strike price is at least 90 percent of the fair
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market value of the underlying stock on the date the option is issued,
transferred to an ineligible shareholder, or materially modified. The
regulation also directs that a good faith determination of value will be
respected unless it can be shown that the valuation was substantially in error
and the determination was not made with reasonable diligence. The court
indicated that there is conflicting evidence regarding the value of the stock at
the time the warrants were issued.
2. QSub status is a property right of the QSub. In re
The Majestic Star Casino, LLC, 109 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-698 (Bankr. D. Del.
1/24/12). A debtor QSub, but not its parent S corporation, was in bankruptcy.
The court held that the parent corporation's post-bankruptcy petition
revocation of its S corporation status, which under § 1361(b)(3)(C)
automatically terminated the debtor-subsidiary's QSub status, converting it
into a C corporation, was an avoidable transfer of estate property in violation
of Bankruptcy Code § 549. The debtor's QSub status was property of the
bankruptcy estate, and as a result of the loss of that status was required to,
and did, pay state income taxes it would not otherwise have been required to
pay. (The corporation had not paid any federal income taxes, but the IRS's
claim for any deficiency would be affected, so the IRS opposed the debtor's
argument that its QSub status was property of the bankruptcy estate.)
Accordingly, the revocation of the parent's status as an S corporation and the
termination of the debtor's status as a QSub were held to be "void and of no
effect."
* In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 107 B.R. 832
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), afid, 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir. 1991), followed.
3. Roth IRA is not an eligible S corporation
shareholder. Taproot Administrative Services, Inc. v. Commissioner, 133
T.C. 202 (9/29/09) (reviewed, 12-4). The taxpayer corporation's sole
shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA account. Eligible S corporation
shareholders as defined in § 1361 include individuals, estates, certain
specifically designated trusts and certain exempt organizations. With an
effective date after the year involved in this case, § 1361(c)(2)(A)(vi) was
enacted to allow a bank whose stock is held by an IRA or Roth IRA to elect
S corporation status. Reg. § 1.1361-1(e)(1) provides that a person for whom
S corporation stock is held by a nominee, guardian, custodian, or agent is
deemed to be the S corporation shareholder. However, in Rev. Rul. 92-73,
1992-2 C.B. 224, the IRS ruled that a trust that qualifies as an IRA is not a
permitted S corporation shareholder. Declaring the issue as one of first
impression, and indicating that under Skidmore deference to revenue rulings
depends upon their persuasiveness, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry) agreed
with the IRS's rationale in the ruling that IRAs are not eligible S corporation
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shareholders because the beneficiary of the IRA is not taxed currently on the
trust's share of corporate income unlike the beneficiary of a custodial
account or the grantor of a grantor trust who is subject to tax on the pass-
through corporate income. (The income of the corporation owned by a Roth
IRA would never be subject to tax.)
0 Judge Holmes dissented in a beautifully-
reasoned opinion which made the point that an IRA account is owned by a
custodian for the benefit of an individual, who is to be treated as the
shareholder, and any unwarranted tax benefits would not accrue because the
income of the IRA would be taxed under § 511 as UBIT. His opinion
concluded:
This case is a reminder that tax law does not cascade into the
real world through a single channel. It meanders instead
through a vast delta, and any general principles tugged along
by its current are just as likely to sink in the braided and re-
braided rivulets of specific Code provisions and the murk of
regulations as they are to survive and be useful in deciding
real cases. Taproot thinks it found a course through the
confluence of the subchapter S and IRA rules that it could
successfully navigate. Its route would be new, but the stakes
are not that great, and the sky will remain standing if we had
just read and applied the regulation as it is.
a. Yes, it would be too good to be true, so a
Roth IRA isn't an eligible shareholder. Taproot Administrative Services,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 679 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 3/21/12). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's holding that a Roth IRA is not an eligible
shareholder for an S corporation, and that the taxpayer corporation thus was
a C corporation. Although the Court of Appeals "adopt[ed] the Tax Court's
reasoning," it concluded that "the analysis requires further elaboration,"
because the Tax Court's focus "fail[ed] ... to squarely address Taproot's
alternative argument for eligibility as the legal owner of the individual shares
of stock comprising the IRA." The taxpayer argued that "both forms of IRAs
- trusts and custodial accounts - lack the essential attributes of a separate
tax-paying entity and consequently should be treated as legally
indistinguishable from their individual owners." But the Court of Appeals
concluded that the reasoning behind Revenue Ruling 92-73, 1992-2 C.B.
224, "unequivocally supports the opposite result." Furthermore, the
legislative history of subchapter S favors limited eligibility, and "[a]ccording
to the legislative history of the ESOP eligibility amendment, ... Congress did
not envision IRAs as permissible shareholders at the time of enactment." The
court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the language of Reg.
§ 1.1361-1 (e), which provides guidance regarding determining the number of
shareholders of a corporation statute, stating that "[t]he person for whom
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stock of a corporation is held by a nominee, guardian, custodian, or an agent
is considered to be the shareholder ... directly authorizes ownership of S
corporation stock by IRAs and Roth IRAs created as custodial accounts."
Rather, the court agreed with the IRS's argument that "the language of the
regulation requires consideration of who ultimately bears the tax
responsibility from its application," and concluded that "[a]pplying this
logic, custodial IRAs and Roth IRAs are different in kind and therefore
distinguishable from other custodial accounts, such as those involving
minors or disabled individuals." The court emphasized that "[t]o adopt the
position Taproot urges, this Court must conclude that Congress consciously
crafted a legislative scheme enabling shareholders to employ Roth IRAs to
perpetually avoid any taxation on S corporation profits. The legislative
history and regulatory record foreclose this conclusion."
4. S corporation shareholders aren't allowed to just
make up their own basis adjustment rules. Barnes v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-80 (3/21/12) The Tax Court (Judge Morrison) agreed with the
IRS in holding - unsurprisingly - that there is no upward stock basis
adjustment under § 1367 for amounts that are erroneously reported by the
shareholder as § 1366 pass through income but that do not correspond to, but
exceed, the shareholder's actual pro rata share of pass through income.
Likewise, § 1367(a)(2)(B) requires an S corporation shareholder to reduce
stock basis by any losses that the shareholder is required to take into account
under § 1366(a)(1)(A), even if the shareholder does not actually claim the
pass through losses on the shareholder's return. Because the taxpayer had
reported gain rather than loss in a prior year in which a very large loss had
been passed through, the shareholder had no basis to support passed-through
losses in the year in question.
5. An S corporation is not an individual, even if an
IRS employee said so. Trugman v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 22
(5/21/12). The taxpayers moved from California to Nevada to avoid state
income taxes. They acquired a principal residence in Henderson, Nevada
through their wholly owned S corporation, which held rental properties in
Missouri, Texas, and California. The taxpayers claimed the $8,000 first time
homebuyer's credit under now-expired § 36, which was available to an
"individual" who had no present ownership interest in a principal residence
during the three year period ending on the date of the purchase. The Tax
Court (Judge Kroupa), in a case of first impression, held that a corporation is
not an individual for purposes of § 36, and election of subchapter S status
does not change that characterization. The pass-through nature of the credit
did not alter the fact that the corporation purchased the property. The court
pointed out that individuals can have a principal residence, but a corporation
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has a principal place of business. The court also was unsympathetic to the
taxpayer's request for leniency on the grounds that an IRS representative
advised them that they could claim the credit if the residence was purchased
through an S corporation. The court pointed out that the Commissioner is not
bound by the erroneous legal advice of IRS employees.
0 Even though an S corporation is taxed
like an individual (with four enumerated exceptions) under § 1363(b), an S
corporation is still not an individual.
6. Paper is substance. Corporate resolutions and
ledger entries create an "economic outlay." - No kidding, they really
do, says Judge Ruwe. Maguire v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-160
(6/6/12). The taxpayers in these consolidated cases owned two S
corporations with related businesses - one was an auto dealership, and the
other a finance company that purchased customer notes from the auto
dealership. The finance company operated at a profit and the dealership
operated at a loss. Apart from the transactions at issue, the taxpayers did not
have sufficient basis in the dealership to deduct losses, but had substantial
basis in the finance company. The finance company owned substantial
accounts receivable due from the dealership. At the end of each year, through
journal entries, the finance company distributed accounts receivable to the
taxpayers, who in turn contributed them to the related dealership to increase
the basis in the dealership sufficiently to avoid the § 1366(d) limitation on
the deduction of passed through losses. The IRS disallowed the claimed loss
deductions on the grounds that the transactions did not increase the
taxpayers' basis in the dealership because the taxpayers had not made an "an
economic outlay." The IRS argued that the corporate "resolutions and
adjusting journal entries made to the books of the related companies were
devoid of any economic reality and did not alter the economic positions of
the parties." The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe) rejected the IRS's position and
held for the taxpayer, finding that the "distributions and contributions did
have real consequences that altered the positions of petitioners individually
and those of their businesses." Thus, the transactions did result in the
taxpayer making the required "economic outlay."
[T]he distributions and contributions created actual
economic consequences for the parties, because the accounts
receivable had real value in that they were legitimate debts
that Auto Acceptance owed to CNAC and thus were
legitimate assets of CNAC. Petitioners' contribution of the
accounts receivable resulted in their being poorer in a
material sense in that the accounts receivable were no longer
collectible by them individually.
& Judge Ruwe added that he saw "no
reason why shareholders in two related S corporations should be prohibited
2013]
Florida Tax Review
from taking distributions of assets from one of their S corporations and
investing those assets into another of their S corporations, in order to increase
their bases in the latter. The effect is to decrease the shareholders' bases in the S
corporation making the distribution, thereby reducing the shareholders'
potential future tax-free distributions from the distributing S corporation, while
increasing the shareholders' bases in the S corporation to which the contribution
is made." Furthermore, "[tihe fact that the two S corporations have a synergistic
business relationship and are owned by the same shareholders should make no
difference so long as the underlying distributions and contributions actually
occurred."
* But for the fact that the shareholders'
ownership of the two corporations was not congruent, this issue could have
been avoided by having the two operating corporations organized as subsidiary
QSubs of an S corporation holding company.
7. The Treasury Department proposes major
surgery on the rules for determining an S corporation shareholder's
basis limitation for passed-through losses under § 1366(d). REG-134042-
07, Basis of Indebtedness of S Corporations to Their Shareholders, 77 F.R.
34884 (6/12/12). The Treasury Department has proposed amendments to
Reg. § 1.1366-2 that would deal with determination of an S corporation
shareholder's basis in any debt of the S corporation, which principally affects
the limitation on the pass-through of losses under § 1366(d). The proposed
regulations expressly provide that the basis of any indebtedness of the S
corporation to the shareholder means the shareholder's adjusted basis (as
defined in Reg. § 1.1011-1 and as provided in § 1367(b)(2)) in any "bona
fide indebtedness of the S corporation that runs directly to the shareholder."
Whether indebtedness is "bona fide indebtedness" to a shareholder is
determined under general tax principles and depends on "all of the facts and
circumstances." Prop. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(i). Furthermore, the proposed
regulations expressly provide that:
A shareholder does not obtain basis of indebtedness in the S
corporation merely by guaranteeing a loan or acting as a
surety, accommodation party, or in any similar capacity
relating to a loan. When a shareholder makes a payment on
bona fide indebtedness for which the shareholder has acted
as guarantor or in a similar capacity, based on the facts and
circumstances, the shareholder may increase its basis of
indebtedness to the extent of that payment.
* The preamble states that "[u]nder these
proposed regulations, an incorporated pocketbook transaction [see, e.g., Yates v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-280; Culnen v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2000-139] increases basis of indebtedness only where the transaction creates a
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bona fide creditor-debtor relationship between the shareholder and the
borrowing S corporation."
0 Prop. Reg. § 1.1366-2(a)(2)(ii), Example
(3) in the proposed regulation blesses a basis increase resulting from a back-to-
back loan in which one S corporation lends money to the shareholder who in
turn lends the loan proceeds to a second S corporation, if the loan to the second
S corporation "constitutes bona fide indebtedness" from the borrower S
corporation to the shareholder. Example (4) in the proposed regulation blesses a
basis increase resulting from a distribution of a note from one S corporation
(S2) to another S corporation (S1) if after the distribution S2 is indebted to the
shareholder and "the note constitutes bona fide indebtedness" from S2 to the
shareholder.
* The proposed regulations do not attempt
to clarify the meaning of "bona fide indebtedness," or provide any examples of
relevant facts and circumstances, but rely on "general Federal tax principles."
This may portend -that the voluminous debt versus equity jurisprudence might
replace the "actual economic outlay" by the shareholder test for creating basis
of indebtedness, applied in cases such as Maloof v. Commissioner, 456 F.3d
645 (6th Cir. 2006); Spencer v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 62, 78-79 (1998), affid
without published opinion, 194 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 1999); Hitchins v.
Commissioner, 103 T.C. 711 (1994); and Perry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1293
(1970). The preamble refers to Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960)
(disallowing interest deductions for lack of actual indebtedness); Gefiman v.
Commissioner, 154 F.3d 61 (3d Cir. 1998); Estate of Mixon v. US., 464 F.2d
394 (5th Cir. 1972); and Litton Business Systems, Inc. v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
367 (1973), as relevant authorities.
• The proposed regulations do not address
how to determine the basis of the shareholder's stock in the S corporation. Rev.
Rul. 81-187, 1981-2 C.B. 167, provides that a shareholder of an S corporation
does not increase basis in stock for purposes of § 1366(d)(1)(A) by contributing
the shareholder's own unsecured demand promissory note to the corporation. In
the preamble, the Treasury Department and the IRS have requested comments
concerning the propriety of basis calculations in the S corporation and
partnership context, similar to the one currently in Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iv)(d)(2), which provides that a partner's capital account is increased
with respect to non-readily tradable partner notes only (i) when there is a
taxable disposition of such note by the partnership, or (ii)when the partner
makes principal payments on such note.
* The proposed regulations will apply to
loan transactions entered into on or after the date of publication of final
regulations.
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8. Shareholder consent to an S election constitutes
consideration paid to the S corporation for cash distributions. - Say
What! In re Kenrob Information Technology Solutions, Inc., 110 A.F.T.R.2d
2012-5190 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 7/10/12). Kenrob was an S corporation in
bankruptcy. Pursuant to a long-standing pre-existing agreement between the
corporation and the shareholders, the corporation had paid directly to the IRS
the personal income taxes attributable to the shareholders' passed-through
income. The trustee asserted that the payments were fraudulent conveyance
because they were made without consideration by the corporation. The
Bankruptcy court rejected the trustee's argument, holding that the
consideration received by the corporation was the shareholders' "election"
- the court should have said "consent" to have the corporation be taxed as
an S corporation - as long as the corporation paid the resulting personal
income tax liability. The benefit to the corporation was the § 11 taxes that it
would not have had to pay had it not made the S election.
9. The lifetime of built-in gain gets shorter every
year. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 shortened the holding period
under § 1374 for recognizing unrealized built-in gain on conversion from a C
corporation to an S corporation to five years preceding the corporation's tax
year beginning in 2011. Before the change the holding period was ten years
for sales or exchanges in tax years beginning before 2009, and seven years
for tax years beginning in 2009 or 2010.
a. And again. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act,
§ 326(a)(2), extends the Code § 1374 five-year holding period reduction to
five years for recognized built-in gain in 2012 and 2013.
10. S corporation charitable contributions favored
with reduced basis deductions. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act, § 325,
extended Code § 1367(a)(2), enacted in 2006, which provides that
shareholders of an S corporation reduce stock basis by the adjusted basis of
property contributed to a charity, even though the full fair market value of
the contributed property is passed through to the shareholder as a charitable
contribution. Prior law applied to contributions made in tax years beginning
before 1/1/12. The two-year extension applies to contributions made in tax
years beginning before 1/1/14.
E. Mergers, Acquisitions and Reorganizations
1. Corporate shareholders knew what MidCoast's
midco deal was all about. Transferee liability imposed. Feldman v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-297 (12/27/11). The Tax Court (Judge
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Swift) upheld transferee liability against the shareholders of a corporation
who sold the stock of the corporation engaged in a purported stock sale to a
midco (the infamous MidCoast) to avoid recognition of gain from earlier sale
of the corporation's assets. The transaction was structured as a stock
redemption for cash after the asset sale, with the remainder of the stock being
sold in the same taxable year of the corporation to a midco that purported to
shelter the gains with losses from purported distressed debt tax shelter
transactions. The purported stock sale "lack[ed] both business purpose and
economic substance" and was disregarded for federal income tax purposes.
"The substance of the transaction was a liquidation [of the corporation] and a
fee payment to MidCoast for its role in facilitating the sham." The court
specifically noted that the taxpayers took no actions to ensure that the
corporate income tax liability triggered by the asset sale would be paid, and
that it remained unpaid.
a. A different Tax Court judge sees a
somewhat differently structured MidCoast deal as immune from
transferee liability. Frank Sawyer Trust of May 1992 v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2011-298 (12/27/11). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) refused to
uphold transferee liability against the shareholders of a corporation who sold
the stock of the corporation engaged to a midco (Fortrend), which was
brought into the deal by the infamous MidCoast to provide financing) after
an asset sale. He found that the shareholders knew little about the mechanics
of the transaction and exercised due diligence.
The trust representatives believed Fortrend's
attorneys to be from prestigious and reputable law firms.
They assumed that Fortrend must have had some method of
offsetting the taxable gains within the corporations. They
performed due diligence with respect to Fortrend to ensure
that Fortrend was not a scam operation and that Fortrend had
the financial capacity to purchase the stock. The trust
representatives believed Fortrend assumed the risk of
overpaying for the Taxi corporations if they did not have a
legal way for offsetting or reducing the tax liabilities.
0 Judge Goeke applied state fraudulent
conveyance law to determine whether the transactions should be collapsed and
concluded that they should not, because the IRS, which has the burden of proof
in transferee liability cases, did not prove that "the purported transferee had
either actual or constructive knowledge of the entire scheme." Because in this
case the transaction was structured in such a manner that the corporation never
made any payments to the shareholders, there was no actual or constructive
fraudulent transfer to the shareholders. Finally, turning to federal tax law, Judge
Goeke held that "substance over form and its related doctrines [were] not
applicable," because the transaction was an arm's length stock sale between the
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shareholders and a purchaser in which the parties agreed that the purchaser
would be responsible for reporting and paying the corporation's income taxes.
"There was no preconceived plan to avoid taxation . . . ." Judge Goeke
distinguished Feldman v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2011-297 (12/27/11),
supra, because in that case "[i]t was 'absolutely clear' that the taxpayer was
aware the stock purchaser had no intention of ever paying the tax liabilities
[and] the taxpayer did not conduct thorough due diligence of the stock
purchaser...."
b. And yet another shareholder escapes
transferee liability after yet another MidCoast midco transaction. Slone
v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-57 (3/1/12). The taxpayer's family-
owned corporation sold all of its assets for cash, resulting in a gain of over
$38 million and an estimated combined federal and state income tax liability
of over $15 million. None of the proceeds had been distributed at the time
Fortrend and MidCoast made an unsolicited offer to purchase the stock of the
corporation, which ultimately was accepted, at a purchase price of
$35,753,000, plus assumption of the corporation's federal and state income
taxes owed as of the closing date. Not unsurprisingly, the taxes were never
paid and the IRS asserted transferee liability against the shareholders.
Because the asset sale and stock sale were independent of each other and the
shareholders "had no reason to believe that Fortrend's methods were illegal
or inappropriate, . . . [n]either the substance over form doctrine nor any
related doctrines appl[ied] to recast the stock sale as a liquidating
distribution." Thus, because the IRS's transferee liability theory was
grounded on recasting the stock sale as a liquidation, the IRS lost.
c. And the IRS loses yet again on similar
facts but with different "bad guys." Salus Mundi Foundation v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-61 (3/6/12). Judge Goeke found that the
case was similar to Frank Sawyer Trust and Sloane, supra, and unlike
Feldman, supra. Actually, the facts here were even better for the taxpayer -
the stock sale preceded the asset sale to the unrelated schemer, so there was
no corporate tax liability at the time the stock was sold.
d. And the IRS's batting average continues
to sag. Starnes v. Commissioner, 680 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 5/31/12), aff'g T.C.
Memo. 2011-63. The Fourth Circuit refused to apply transferee liability
under § 6901 against the shareholders of a corporation (Tarcon) who sold the
stock of a corporation to MidCoast after an asset sale, even though the
corporation had nothing but cash, which pursuant to the contractual
provisions was transferred to Midcoast by wire transfer contemporaneously
with the closing of the stock sale and purchase, even though the purchase
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price was substantially less than the cash holdings of the corporation. The
Court of Appeals held that under Commissioner v. Stern, 357 U.S. 39 (1958),
whether a "person is the 'transferee' of a taxpayer's assets, the 'existence and
extent' of that transferee's liability for unpaid taxes the taxpayer owed prior
to the transfer is determined by state law, not federal law." (It failed to
consider the impact of the Federal Debt Collection Act, which postdates
Stem.) The court also held that Stern forecloses the application of federal tax
law principles to recast of the actual transactions under federal law before
applying state law to the set of transactions: "An alleged transferee's
substantive liability for another taxpayer's unpaid taxes is purely a question
of state law, without an antecedent federal-law recasting of the disputed
transactions."
" A cogent dissent by Judge Wynn would
have imposed transferee liability.
* Judge Wynn would have followed BB&T
Corp. v. United States, 523 F.3d 461, 472 (4th Cir. 2008) - "[i]n applying the
doctrine of substance over form, we 'look to the objective economic realities of
a transaction rather than to the particular form the parties employed"' (quoting
Frank Lyon, 435 U.S. at 573 (alteration omitted)) to recast the transaction
because "the 'objective economic realities' establish that the former
shareholders effectively wound up Tarcon and received liquidating distributions
of its cash as a result of the stock sale to MidCoast." Judge Wynn reasoned that
the sale to MidCoast was not a true sale of stock. Rather, the "substance" of the
transaction was merely a cash-for-cash swap and because cash is fungible, the
transaction in substance was a receipt by the former shareholders of
distributions of Tarcon's cash. Finally, because the stock sales agreement did
not require that Tarcon get anything in return for its cash, this transfer was
clearly fraudulent under the relevant state law.
2. The Treasury proposes what is essentially
elective location of e&p following asset-acquisition reorganizations.
REG-141268-11, Allocation of Earnings and Profits in Tax-Free Transfers
From One Corporation to Another, 77 F.R. 22515 (4/16/12). The Treasury
Department has published proposed amendments to Reg. § 1.312-11 (a) that
would provide that in a transfer described in § 381 - which applies to tax-
free § 368 asset-acquisitions and § 332 liquidations - only the acquiring
corporation, as defined in Reg. § 1.381(a)-1(b)(2), succeeds to the earnings
and profits of the distributor or transferor corporation unless the second
transfer also is described in § 381(a). Thus, if following an asset-acquisition
reorganization all of the target's assets are dropped to a subsidiary of the
acquiring corporation, the earnings and profits move to the subsidiary; but if
the acquiring corporation retains any assets, then it retains all of the earnings
and profits. Amended Reg. § 1.312-11(a) will not apply if Reg. § 1.312-10
applies in the case of a § 355 distribution.
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3. This District Court decision, if followed, makes it
much much more difficult ever to have personal goodwill as an
employee-shareholder. Howard v. United States, 106 A.F.T.R.2d 2010-
5533 (E.D. Wash. 7/30/10). The taxpayer was a dentist who practiced
through a solely owned (before taking into account community property law)
professional corporation until the practice was sold to a third party. He had
an employment agreement with the corporation including a noncompetition
clause that survived for three years after the termination of his stock
ownership. The purchase and sale agreement allocated $47,100 to the
corporation's assets, $549,900 for the taxpayer-shareholder's personal
goodwill, and $16,000 in consideration of his covenant not to compete with
the purchaser. The corporation did not "dissolve" until the end of the year
following the sale. The taxpayer reported $320,358 as long-term capital gain
income resulting from the sale of goodwill (the opinion does not explain how
the remainder of the sales price was reported, but the IRS recharacterized the
goodwill as a corporate asset and treated the amount received by the taxpayer
from the sale to the third party as a dividend from the taxpayer's professional
service corporation. Because the sale occurred in 2002, when dividends were
taxed at higher rate than capital gains, a deficiency resulted. The
government's position was based on three main reasons: (1) the goodwill
was a corporate asset because the taxpayer was a corporate employee with a
covenant not to compete for three years after he no longer owned any stock;
(2) the corporation earned the income, and correspondingly earned the
goodwill; and (3) attributing the goodwill to the taxpayer-shareholder did not
comport with the economic reality of his relationship with the corporation.
After reviewing the principles of Norwalk v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
1998-279, and Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189 (1998),
the court held that because the taxpayer was the corporation's employee with
a covenant not to compete with it, any goodwill generated during that time
period was the corporation's goodwill. The court also rested its holding that
the goodwill was a corporate asset on its conclusions that the income
associated with the practice was earned by the corporation and the covenant
not to compete, which extended for three years after the taxpayer no longer
owned stock in the corporation, rendered any personal goodwill "likely [of]
little value."
* See Solomon v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2008-102, for an extended discussion of the issues underlying an
attempted sale of individual goodwill.
a. Affirmed - "Dr. Howard has offered no
compelling reason why he should be let out of the corporate structure he
chose for his dental practice." 448 Fed. Appx. 752 (9th Cir. 8/29/11). The
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Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion that contains an
elegantly concise summary of the current state of the law.
Goodwill "is the sum total of those imponderable
qualities which attract the custom of a business, - what
brings patronage to the business." Grace Brothers v.
Comm'r, 173 F.2d 170, 175-76 (9th Cir. 1949). For purposes
of federal income taxation, the goodwill of a professional
practice may attach to both the professional as well as the
practice. See, e.g., Schilbach v. Comm'r, 62 T.C.M. (CCH)
1201 (1991). Where the success of the venture depends
entirely upon the personal relationships of the practitioner,
the practice does not generally accumulate goodwill. See
Martin lce Cream Co. v. Comm'r, 110 T.C. 189 at 207-08
(1998). The professional may, however, transfer his or her
goodwill to the practice by entering into an employment
contract or covenant not to compete with the business. See,
e.g., Norwalk v. Comm'r, 76 T.C.M. (CCH) 208, *7 (1998)
(finding that there is no corporate goodwill where "the
business of a corporation is dependent upon its key
employees, unless they enter into a covenant not to compete
with the corporation or other agreement whereby their
personal relationships with clients become property of the
corporation") (emphasis added); Martin Ice Cream Co., 110
T.C. at 207-08 (finding that "personal relationships ... are
not corporate assets when the employee has no employment
contract [or covenant not to compete] with the corporation")
(emphasis added); Macdonald v. Comm 'r, 3 T.C. 720, 727
(1944) (finding "no authority which holds that an
individual's personal ability is part of the assets of a
corporation ... where ... the corporation does not have a right
by contract or otherwise to the future services of that
individual") (emphasis added). In determining whether
goodwill has been transferred to a professional practice, we
are especially mindful that "each case depends upon
particular facts. And in arriving at a particular conclusion ...
we ... take into consideration all the circumstances ... [of] the
case and draw from them such legitimate inferences as the
occasion warrants." Grace Brothers v. Comm'r, 173 F.2d
170, 176 (9th Cir. 1949).
0 Looking at the facts as found by the
District Court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "while the relationships that Dr.
Howard developed with his patients may be accurately described as personal,
the economic value of those relationships did not belong to him, because he had
conveyed control of them to the Howard Corporation." Furthermore, the court
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rejected the taxpayer's argument that the purchase and sale agreement impliedly
terminated both the employment contract and the non-competition agreement,
thereby transferring the accumulated goodwill of the practice back to Dr.
Howard, the court added that even if it accepted that argument, "such a release
would constitute a dividend payment, the value of which would be equivalent to
the price paid for the goodwill of the dental practice."
b. Has Judge Holmes breathed new vitality
into Martin Ice Cream? H&M, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
290 (10/15/12). H&M, Inc. conducted a small town insurance agency
business for many years. In the years before it sold its business it paid
Schmeets, its principal employee/sole shareholder, an annual salary of
approximately $29,000. In an integrated transaction, a bank bought H&M,
Inc.'s insurance business for $20,000 and entered into an employment
agreement with Schmeets pursuant to which he was paid total compensation
of over $600,000 over a six-year period for continuing to run the insurance
business on behalf of the bank that purchased the insurance agency.
Schmeets kept H&M, Inc. alive and converted its business to
(unsuccessfully) exploiting patents developed by its sole shareholder. The
IRS asserted a deficiency against H&M, Inc. based on the "substance over
form" theory that a significant portion of the compensation paid to Schmeets
by the bank under the employment agreement actually was a payment to
H&M, Inc. for the sale of the insurance business, and that H&M, Inc. thus
realized significant capital gains and interest income over the period the
compensation was paid to Schmeets. The IRS's argued that all of the
compensation that was fixed in amount actually was part of the purchase
price and that only the portion of the compensation that varied (the greater of
$50,000 or 45% of "net adjusted income" for the year) was actually
compensation. The Tax Court (Judge Holmes) rejected the IRS's argument
completely. Applying Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 189
(1998), and MacDonald v. Commissioner, 3 T.C. 720 (1944), Judge Holmes
concluded that payments by a purchaser of a corporate business to a
controlling shareholder for that shareholder's customer relationships were
not taxable to the corporation "where the business of a corporation depends
on the personal relationships of a key individual [i.e., the controlling
shareholder], unless he transfers his goodwill to the corporation by entering
into a covenant not to compete or other agreement so that his relationships
become property of the corporation." Judge Holmes found the instant case to
be like MacDonald and Martin Ice Cream Co. The insurance business was
"'extremely personal,' and the development of [the] business before the sale
was due to Schmeets's ability to form relationships with customers and keep
big insurance companies interested in a small insurance market."
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Furthermore, the compensation paid to Schmeets was reasonable, and there
were no other intangibles to be accounted for in the purchase price.
. The IRS won on a whole raft of run-of-
the-mill other issues, typically found in closely held corporations, none of
which are particularly interesting.
F. Corporate Divisions
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
G. Affiliated Corporations and Consolidated Returns
1. The ELA was triggered in a closed year.
LPCiminelli Interests, Inc. v. United States, 110 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-6631
(W.D.N.Y. 11/13/12). The IRS asserted a deficiency against the taxpayer's
consolidated group on the grounds that an inactive subsidiary realized COD
income in 2004. The taxpayer paid the deficiency and sought a refund. In the
refund proceedings, the government conceded that COD issue but asserted
that pursuant to Reg. § 1.1504-19, the taxpayer recognized gain from the
subsidiary's excess loss account (ELA) upon the worthlessness of the
subsidiary's stock in 2004. The taxpayer proved that between 1999 and the
end of 2003, the subsidiary's assets declined from more than $8.2 million to
$4,128, and that under the pre-2008 version of Reg. § 1.1504-19, the
subsidiary's stock was worthless by the end of 2003 - a year beyond the
statute of limitations - because the subsidiary had disposed of substantially
all of its assets. Accordingly, the court held that the income was not realized
in 2004. The government further asserted that even if the subsidiary had
disposed of substantially all of its assets prior to 2004, the ELA was properly
included in 2004 under the "anti-avoidance rule" of Reg. § 1.1502-19(e),
which provides: "If any person acts with a principal purpose contrary to the
purposes of this section, to avoid the effect of the rules of this section or
apply the rules of this section to avoid the effect of any other provision of the
consolidated return regulations, adjustments must be made as necessary to
carry out the purposes of this section." The government's theory was based
on the argument that the taxpayer "acted with the purpose of avoiding the
regulations by not reporting [the subsidiary] as an inactive subsidiary prior
filing its consolidated return for tax year 2004, and by failing to file an
amended return for the year (or years) during which the income from [the
subsidiary's] ELA was actually realized." The court rejected this argument
for two reasons. First, the taxpayer had fully disclosed the facts to the IRS
during the audit and had offered to extend the statute of limitations for 2001-
2003 on the issue, and while the limitations periods from 2001-2003 were
open, the IRS examined the matter and chose not to assess tax based on any
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realized ELA income. Second, there is no obligation to file an amended
return.
H. Miscellaneous Corporate Issues
1. Have you thought about the personal holding
company or accumulated earnings taxes recently? Bet not! The 2012
Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act permanently
increased from 15% and set at 20% the § 531 accumulated earnings tax and
the § 541 personal holding company tax.
VII. PARTNERSHIPS
A. Formation and Taxable Years
1. The Castle Harbour saga. Will it ever end? The
Second Circuit twice reverses a taxpayer victory in a self-liquidating
partnership note transaction, in which the lion's share of income was
allocated to a tax-indifferent party, on the ground that the tax-
indifferent Dutch banks were not really equity partners. TIFD III-E, Inc.
v. United States, 342 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D. Conn. 11/1/04), rev'd, 459 F.3d 220
(2d Cir. 8/3/06), on remand, 660 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 10/7/09), as
amended, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98884 (D. Conn. 10/23/09), rev'd, 666
F.3d 836 (2d Cir. 1/24/12).
a. Castle Harbour I: District Court holds for
the taxpayer. The court found that the creation of Castle Harbour, a Nevada
LLC, by General Electric Capital Corp. subsidiaries was not designed solely
to avoid taxes, but to spread the risk of their investment in fully-depreciated
commercial airplanes used in their leasing operations. GECC subsidiaries put
the following assets into Castle Harbour: $530 million worth of fully-
depreciated aircraft subject to a $258 million non-recourse debt; $22 million
of rents receivable; $296 million of cash; and all the stock of another GECC
subsidiary that had a value of $0. Two tax-indifferent Dutch Banks invested
$117.5 million in Castle Harbour. Under the LLC agreement, the tax-
indifferent partner was allocated 98 percent of the book income and 98
percent of the tax income.
9 The book income was net of depreciation,
and the tax income did not take depreciation into account (because the airplanes
were fully depreciated for tax purposes). Depreciation deductions for book
purposes were on the order of 60 percent of the rental income for any given
year.
[Vol. 13: 10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
0 Scheduled distributions in excess of book
income would have resulted in the liquidation of the investment of the Dutch
banks in eight years, with the Dutch banks receiving a return of approximately
nine percent, with some "economically substantial" upside and some downside
risk. Castle Harbour was terminated after five years because of a threatened
change in U.S. tax law, but during that period about $310 million of income
was shifted to the Dutch banks for a tax saving to the GECC subsidiaries of
about $62 million.
* Query whether § 704(b) was properly
applied to this transaction?
* This appears to be a lease-stripping
transaction in which the income from the lease was assigned to foreign entities
while the benefits of ownership were left with a domestic entity.
* The court (Judge Underhill) held that
satisfaction of the mechanical rules of the regulations under § 704(b)
transcended both an intent to avoid tax and the avoidance of significant tax
through agreed upon partnership allocations. In this partnership, 2 percent of
both operating and taxable income was allocated to GECC, a United States
partner, and 98 percent of both book and taxable income was allocated to
partners who were Dutch banks. The Dutch banks were foreign partners who
were not liable for United States taxes and thus were indifferent to the U.S. tax
consequences of their participation in the partnership. Because the partnership
had very large book depreciation deductions and no tax depreciation, most of
the partnership's taxable operating income, which was substantially in excess of
book taxable income, was allocated to the tax-indifferent foreign partners, even
though a large portion of the cash receipts reflected in that income was devoted
to repaying the principal of loans secured by property that GECC had
contributed to the partnership. The overall partnership transaction saved GECC
approximately $62 million in income taxes, and the court found that "it appears
likely that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into this transaction
- though certainly not its only motivation - was to avoid that substantial tax
burden." The court understood the effects of the allocations and concluded that
"by allocating 98% of the income from fully tax-depreciated aircraft to the
Dutch Banks, GECC avoided an enormous tax burden, while shifting very little
book income." Put another way, by allocating income less depreciation to tax-
neutral parties, GECC was able to "re-depreciate" the assets for tax purposes.
The tax-neutrals absorbed the tax consequences of all the income allocated to
them, but actually received only the income in excess of book depreciation.
Nevertheless, the court upheld the allocations. "The tax benefits of the . . .
transaction were the result of the allocation of large amounts of book income to
a tax-neutral entity, offset by a large depreciation expense, with a corresponding
allocation of a large amount of taxable income, but no corresponding allocation
2013]
Florida Tax Review
of depreciation deductions. This resulted in an enormous tax savings, but the
simple allocation of a large percentage of income violates no rule. The
government does not - and cannot - dispute that partners may allocate their
partnership's income as they choose. Neither does the government dispute that
the taxable income allocated to the Dutch Banks could not be offset by the
allocation of non-existent depreciation deductions to the banks. And . . .the
bare allocation of a large interest in income does not violate the overall tax
effect rule."
Judge Underhill concluded:
The government is understandably concerned that
the Castle Harbour transaction deprived the public fisc of
some $62 million in tax revenue. Moreover, it appears likely
that one of GECC's principal motivations in entering into
this transaction - though certainly not its only motivation
- was to avoid that substantial tax burden. Nevertheless, the
Castle Harbour transaction was an economically real
transaction, undertaken, at least in part, for a non-tax
business purpose; the transaction resulted in the creation of a
true partnership with all participants holding valid
partnership interests; and the income was allocated among
the partners in accordance with the Internal Revenue Code
and Treasury Regulations. In short, the transaction, though it
sheltered a great deal of income from taxes, was legally
permissible. Under such circumstances, the I.R.S. should
address its concerns to those who write the tax laws.
b. Castle Harbour II: Second Circuit
reverses. 459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 8/3/06). The Second Circuit, in an opinion
by Judge Leval, held that the Dutch banks were not partners because their
risks and rewards were closer to those of creditors than partners. He used the
facts-and-circumstances test of Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733
(1949), to determine whether the banks' interest was more in the nature of
debt or equity and found that their interest was overwhelmingly in the nature
of a secured lender's interest, "which would neither be harmed by poor
performance of the partnership nor significantly enhanced by extraordinary
profits."
* In ACM (Colgate), Judge Laro wrote a
100+ page analysis to find that there was no economic substance to the
arrangement. The next contingent payment installment sale case in the Tax
Court was ASA Investerings (Allied Signal), in which Judge Foley wrote a
much shorter opinion finding that the Dutch bank was not a partner; the D.C.
Circuit affirmed on Judge Foley's holding that the Dutch bank was not a
partner. The IRS began to pick up this lack-of-partnership argument and began
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to use it on examinations. Later, the Tax Court (Judge Nims) used the economic
substance argument in Saba (Brunswick), which the DC Circuit remanded
based on ASA Investerings to give taxpayer the opportunity to argue that there
was a valid partnership, which it could not do, as Judge Nims found on remand.
Even later, the D.C. Circuit reversed the District Court's Boca (Wyeth or
American Home Products) case based upon this lack-of-partnership argument -
even though Cravath planned Boca carefully so that if the Dutch bank was
knocked out, there would still be a partnership - based upon its ASA
Investerings and Saba findings on appeal that there was no partnership. Now
the Second Circuit has adopted the lack-of-partnership argument.
c. Castle Harbour III. Judge Underhill still
likes GE. On remand in Castle Harbour, the District Court found a valid
partnership to have existed under § 704(e) because the heading does not
alter the clear language of a statute. A valid family partnership is found
in the absence of a family. Additionally, in his contingent penalty
findings, Judge Underhill stated that his 2004 taxpayer-favorable
decision ipso facto means that the taxpayer's reporting position was
based upon substantial authority. 660 F. Supp. 2d 367 (D. Conn. 10/7/09),
as amended, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98884 (D. Conn. 10/23/09). In a
carefully-written 5 opinion, Judge Underhill held that, while the Second
Circuit opinion decided that the partnership did not meet the Culbertson
totality-of-the-circumstances test ("whether ... the parties in good faith and
acting with a business purpose intended to join together in the present
conduct of the enterprise"), it did not address the § 704(e)(1) issue. He held
that the Dutch banks did satisfy the requirements of that paragraph, which
reads:
(e) Family partnerships.
(1) Recognition of interest created by purchase or
gift. - A person shall be recognized as a partner for purposes
of this subtitle if he owns a capital interest in a partnership in
which capital is a material income-producing factor, whether
or not such interest was derived by purchase or gift from any
other person.
* In so holding, he relied upon well-settled
law that the title of a statute cannot limit the plain meaning of the text, and that
the title is of use only when it sheds light on some ambiguous word or phrase.
See also I.R.C. § 7806(b).
0 It is worth noting that although Evans v.Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971), affg 54 T.C. 40 (1970), which
5. We do not all share the opinion that the opinion is "carefully-written,"
but Ira thinks so. Ira's college classmate [Judge] Pierre Leval characterized the
District Court's analysis as "thorough and thoughtful."
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Judge Underhill relied upon extensively to reach his conclusion, held that the
application of § 704(e)(1) was not limited to the context of family partnerships,
Evans involved the question who, between two different persons - the original
partner or an assignee of the original partner's economic interest-was the
partner who should be taxed on a distributive share of the partnership's income.
Although in the family context § 704(e) frequently has been applied to
determine whether a partnership exists in the first place, Judge Underhill's
decision in Castle Harbour III is the first case to "discover" that § 704(e)(1)
applies to determine whether an arrangement between two (or more) otherwise
unrelated business entities or unrelated individuals constituted a partnership.
0 It has sometimes been adduced that the
fact that a court of applicable jurisdiction subsequently upholds the tax
treatment of a transaction should be a strong argument for the proposition that
such tax treatment was based upon substantial authority. With respect to
whether the applicability of penalties should he be reversed on appeal, Judge
Underhill stated:
To a large extent, my holding in Castle Harbour I in
favor of the taxpayer demonstrates the substantial authority
for the partnership's tax treatment of the Dutch Banks, as
does my discussion above of the Dutch Banks' interest in
Castle Harbour under section 704(e)(1). In addition, the
government's arguments against the substantial authority
defense are unavailing.
* Judge Underhill also sought to place the
application of the penalty provisions in a temporal context when he stated:
The government argues that Culbertson and Second
Circuit cases like Slifa and Dyer that interpreted Culbertson
cannot provide substantial authority for the partnership's tax
position because the Second Circuit held in Castle Harbour
II that the Dutch Banks were not partners under Culbertson.
The government, however, has not pointed to any Second
Circuit case or other authority, prior to 1997 and 1998 when
the Castle Harbour partners took the tax positions at issue,
where the parties' good faith intention or valid business
purpose in forming a partnership was not sufficient to
support a conclusion of partnership status for tax purposes.
0 In the context of the previous two bullet
points, it is worth noting that Judge Underhill's observations in the immediately
preceding bullet point appears to be consistent with Reg. § 1.6662-
4(d)(3)(iv)(C), which provides that whether a position was supported by
substantial authority must be determined with reference to authorities in
existence at the time. But Judge Underhill's observations in the second
preceding bullet point appear to be inconsistent with both Reg. § 1.6662-
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4(d)(3)(iv)(C) and observations in the immediately preceding bullet. However,
we are not all in agreement with what Judge Underhill intended the
observations in the second preceding bullet point to mean.
d. Castle Harbour IV: The Second Circuit
smacks down the District Court again in an opinion that leaves you
wondering why it ever remanded the case in the first place. 666 F.3d 836
(2d Cir. 1/24/12). In another opinion by Judge Leval, the Second Circuit
again reversed Judge Underhill and held that the enactment of § 704(e)(1),
which recognizes as a partner one who owns a "capital interest in a
partnership," did not "change[] the law so that a holding of debt (or of an
interest overwhelmingly in the nature of debt) could qualify as a partnership
interest."
Notwithstanding that they tend to favor the
government's position, the governing statute and regulation
leave some ambiguity as to whether the holder of partnership
debt (or an interest overwhelmingly in the nature of debt)
shall be recognized as a partner. Therefore, we may consult
the legislative history to see whether it sheds light on their
interpretation.... The reports of the House and the Senate
accompanying the passage of § 704(e) make clear that the
provision did not intend to broaden the character of interests
in partnerships that qualify for treatment as a partnership
interest to include partnership debt.
The purpose of the statute was to address an
altogether different question. The concern of § 704(e)(1) was
whether it matters, for the determination of whether a person
is a partner for tax purposes, that the person's purported
partnership interest arose through an intrafamily transfer.
The section was passed to reject court opinions that refused
to recognize for tax purposes transfers of partnership
interests because the transfers were effectuated by
intrafamilial gift, as opposed to arm's length purchase. Its
focus is not on the nature of the investment in a partnership,
but rather on who should be recognized for tax purposes as
the owner of the interest.
. The Second Circuit went on to describe
the District Court as having found that the banks incurred "real risk" that might
require them to restore negative capital accounts, and thus having concluded
"that the banks' interest was therefore an 'interest in the assets of the
partnership' distributable to them upon liquidation." The Second Circuit then
described the District Court's finding that the banks' interest qualified as a
capital interest as having been "premised entirely on the significance it
accorded to the possibility that the banks would be required to bear 1% of
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partnership losses exceeding $7 million, or 100% of partnership losses
exceeding $541 million." But the Second Circuit disagreed, holding that there
was a mere appearance of risk, rather than any real risk, which did not justify
treating the banks' interest as a capital, or equity, interest, noting that it had
reached the same conclusion in its earlier opinion. The Second Circuit then
suggested that "[t]he district court was perhaps reading § 704(e)(1) to mean that
the addition to a debt interest of any possibility that the holder's ultimate
entitlement will vary, based on the debtor's performance, from pure
reimbursement plus a previously fixed rate of return will qualify that interest as
a partnership interest, no matter how economically insignificant the potential
deviation and how improbable its occurrence." The Second Circuit "disagree[d]
with any such reading of the statute. No such interpretation is compelled by the
plain language of § 704(e)(1). And the fact that the statute was intended to serve
an altogether different purpose is confirmed by the legislative reports." The
Second Circuit continued:
In explaining our conclusion that the banks' interest
was not a genuine equity interest, we repeatedly emphasized
that, as a practical matter, the structure of the partnership
agreement confined the banks' return to the Applicable Rate
regardless of the performance of Castle Harbour....
The banks' interest was therefore necessarily not a
"capital interest" . ... Because the banks' interest was for all
practical purposes a fixed obligation, requiring
reimbursement of their investment at a set rate of return in
all but the most unlikely of scenarios, their interest rather
represented a liability of the partnership. . . .Accordingly,
for the same reasons that the evidence compels the
conclusion that the banks' interest was not bona fide equity
participation, it also compels the conclusion that their
interest was not a capital interest within the meaning of §
704(e)(1).
0 Turning to the § 6662 penalty issue, the
Second Circuit again trashed Judge Underhill's opinion and reversed,
reinstating the penalties, stating that Judge Underhill had "mistakenly
concluded that several of our decisions supported treatment of the banks as
partners in Castle Harbour."
2. Frack the corporate tax for this waste removal
partnership. Ltr. Rul. 201227002 (3/1/12, released 7/6/12). The IRS
concluded in this private letter ruling that income from the removal,
treatment, recycling and disposal of waste products from fracturing processes
in oil and gas production is qualifying gross income under § 7704(d)(1)(E),
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permitting a publicly traded partnership to avoid being taxed as an
association under § 7704.
3. Section 47 historic rehabilitation credits were
allowed to an LLC (taxed as a partnership) in which Pitney Bowes was a
99.9 percent member despite an IRS challenge under the anti-abuse
provisions of Reg. § 1.701-2, but it was too late to keep the Miss America
Pageant in Atlantic City. Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC v. Commissioner,
136 T.C. 1 (1/3/1 1). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held that the ownership
interest on the historic East Hall of the Atlantic City Boardwalk Hall under a
35-year lease belonging to the New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority
could be transferred to Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, in which Pitney
Bowes (through a subsidiary and an LLC) was the 99.9 percent member (and
the NJSEA was the 0.1 percent member). Along with ownership went the
§ 47 Federal tax credit of 20 percent of the qualified rehabilitation
expenditures incurred in transforming the run-down East Hall from a flat-
floor convention space to a "special events facility" that could host concerts,
sporting events, and other civic events. Pitney Bowes became the 99.9
percent member of Historic Boardwalk Hall, LLC, following an offering
memorandum sent to nineteen large corporations, which described the
transaction as a "sale" of tax credits (although that description was not
repeated in any of the subsequent documents relating to the transaction).
NJSEA lent about $57 million to Historic Boardwalk Hall, and Pitney Bowes
made capital contributions of more than $18 million to that LLC, as well as
an investor loan of about $1.2 million. In that offering memorandum, losses
were projected over the first decade of operation of East Hall. The IRS
argued that the bulk of the Pitney Bowes contributions were paid out to
NJSEA as a "development fee" and that the entire transaction was a sham
because NJSEA was going to develop East Hall regardless of whether Pitney
Bowes made its capital contributions and loan.
0 Judge Goeke held that one of the
purposes of § 47 was "to encourage taxpayers to participate in what would
otherwise be an unprofitable activity," and the rehabilitation of East Hall was a
success, leading to the conclusion that Historic Boardwalk had objective
economic substance. He also held that "Pitney Bowes and NJSEA, in good faith
and acting with a business purpose, intended to join together in the present
conduct of a business enterprise" and that while the offering memorandum used
the term "sale," "it was used in the context of describing an investment
transaction." Finally, Judge Goeke used Reg. § 1.701-2(d), Example (6),
involving two high-bracket taxpayers who joined with a corporation to form a
partnership to own and operate a building that qualifies for § 42 low-income
housing'credits, to conclude that Reg. § 1.701-2 did not apply to the Historic
Boardwalk transaction because that regulation "clearly contemplate[s] a
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situation in which a partnership is used to transfer valuable tax attributes from
an entity that cannot use them ... to [a taxpayer] who can. .. ."
0 Query whether "economic substance"
requirements are applicable when the tax benefits take the form of tax credits
enacted to encourage specific types of investments?
a. "'ITihe sharp eyes of the law' require
more from parties than just putting on the 'habiliments of a partnership
whenever it advantages them to be treated as partners underneath.' ...
Indeed, Culbertson requires that a partner 'really and truly intend[] to..
. sharlel in the profits and losses' of the enterprise. ... And, after looking
to the substance of the interests at play in this case, we conclude that,
because [Pitney Bowes] lacked a meaningful stake in either the success
or failure of [Historic Boardwalk Hall], it was not a bona fide partner."
Historic Boardwalk Hall LLC v. Commissioner, 694 F.3d 425 (3d Cir.
8/27/12) In a unanimous opinion by Judge Jordan, the Third Circuit reversed
the Tax Court and held that Pitney Bowes was not a bona fide partner in
Historic Boardwalk Hall LLC. The court's reasoning was based on the
Culbertson test [Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949)], as
applied by the Second Circuit in TIFD III-E, Inc. v. United States, 459 F.3d
220, 232 (2d Cir. 2006) (Castle Harbour 11), to find that the Dutch banks
were not partners, and the reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in Virginia
Historic Tax Credit Fund 2001 LP v. Commissioner, 639 F.3d 129 (4th Cir.
2011), to find that the investors who acquired the Virginia Historic
Rehabilitation credits through the partnership bore no "true entrepreneurial
risk," which the Third Circuit concluded was a characteristic of a true partner
under the Culbertson test. The Third Circuit concluded that Pitney Bowes
was not a partner because, based on an analysis of the facts, as the
transaction was structured, (1) Pitney Bowes "had no meaningful downside
risk because it was, for all intents and purposes, certain to recoup the
contributions it had made to HBH and to receive the primary benefit it
sought - the HRTCs or their cash equivalent," and (2) Pitney Bowes's
"avoidance of all meaningful downside risk in HBH was accompanied by a
dearth of any meaningful upside potential." The analysis was highly factual
and based on substance over form. As for downside risk, the Court of
Appeals reversed as clearly erroneous the Tax Court's finding that Pitney
Bowes bore a risk because it might not receive an agreed upon 3% preferred
return on its contributions to HBH. Referring to Virginia Historic Tax Credit
Fund, the Third Circuit treated the 3% preferred return as a "return on
investment" that was not a "share in partnership profits," which pointed to
the conclusion that Pitney Bowes did not face any true entrepreneurial risk.
As for upside potential, applying the substance over form doctrine, the court
concluded that "although in form PB had the potential to receive the fair
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market value of its interest ... in reality, PB could never expect to share in
any upside." The court noted that it was mindful "of Congress's goal of
encouraging rehabilitation of historic buildings," and that its holding might
"jeopardize the viability of future historic rehabilitation projects," but the
court observed that it was not the tax credit provision itself that was under
attack, but rather the particular transaction transferring the benefits of the
credit in the manner that it had.
0 The opinion makes it very clear that the
decision was based on applying the "substance over form" doctrine rather than
the "economic substance" doctrine to determine that Pitney Bowes was not a
partner.
4. Deathbed estate planning with intended
contributions creates a Texas style family limited partnership. Keller v.
United States, 637 F.3d 238 (5th Cir. 9/25/12). On May 10, the decedent met
in her hospital bed with advisors to structure estate planning AB trusts as
partners with an LLC in a family limited partnership. The decedent executed
partnership agreements and indicated that she intended to fund the
partnership with community property bonds. The decedent also wrote a
check to the partnership which was never cashed. The decedent died on May
15. After attending a CLE conference, the taxpayer's advisors re-thought the
estate's estate tax payment and claimed a $147 million refund of estate taxes
on the basis of a valuation discount attributable to the assets in the family
limited partnership. The IRS asserted that the partnership was never funded.
The court, affirming findings by the District Court, held that under "[w]ell-
established principles of Texas law" the decedent's intent to make an asset
partnership property caused the bonds to be equitably owned by the
partnership. Thus the estate was entitled to the valuation discount for the
partnership property.
B. Allocations of Distributive Share, Partnership Debt, and
Outside Basis
1. De minimis partners become substantial under
proposed regulations. REG-109564-10, Partner's Distributive Share, 76
F.R. 66012 (10/25/11). The economic effect of a partnership allocation is not
substantial under Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(a) if, at the time the allocation (or
allocations) becomes part of the partnership agreement: (1) the after-tax
economic consequences of at least one partner may, in present value terms,
be enhanced compared to such consequences if the allocation (or allocations)
were not contained in the partnership agreement, and (2) there is a strong
likelihood that the after-tax economic consequences of no partner will, in
present value terms, be substantially diminished compared to such
consequences if the allocation (or allocations) were not contained in the
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partnership agreement. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(e) provides that the tax
attributes of a de minimis partner (a partner who owns less than 10 percent of
partnership capital or profits) need not be taken into account in applying the
substantiality tests. The proposed regulation would remove the de minimis
partner rule "in order to prevent unintended tax consequences." The
preamble to the proposed regulation indicates that the de minimis partner
rule was "not intended to allow partnerships to entirely avoid the application
of the substantiality regulations if the partnership is owned by partners each
of whom owns less than 10 percent of the capital or profits, and who are
allocated less than 10 percent of each partnership item of income, gain, loss,
deduction, and credit." The regulations will be effective when finalized.
a. De minimis partners are still partners
under the substantiality test. T.D. 9607, Partner's Distributive Share, 77
F.R. 76380 (12/28/12). Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(e) is amended to remove the
de minimis rule that provided that in determining whether the economic
effect of a partnership allocation is substantial under Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)
the tax consequences to a less than 10 percent partner could be ignored. The
final regulation is applicable to allocations that become part of a partnership
agreement after 12/28/12, and is applicable for all partnership taxable years
beginning on or after 12/28/12, regardless of when an allocation became part
of the partnership agreement.
2. Only in tax law could insolvency result from
debts you don't really have to repay. Rev. Rul. 2012-14, 2012-24 I.R.B.
1012 (5/25/12). Section 108(a)(1)(B) excludes COD from gross income if the
cancellation occurs when the taxpayer is insolvent; § 108(a)(3) limits the
amount of COD income excluded by § 108 to the amount by which the
taxpayer is insolvent. Rev. Rul. 92-53, 1992-2 C.B. 48, provides that the
amount by which a nonrecourse debt exceeds the fair market value of the
property securing the debt ("excess nonrecourse debt") is treated as a liability
in determining insolvency for purposes of § 108 to the extent that the excess
nonrecourse debt is discharged. Revenue Ruling 2012-14 holds that for
purposes of measuring a partner's insolvency under § 108(d)(3), each partner
treats as a liability an amount of the partnership's discharged "excess
nonrecourse debt" that is based upon the allocation of COD income to such
partner under § 704(b) and the regulations thereunder.
3. Retention of an economic interest is not a
liquidation. Brennan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-209 (7/23/12).
Ashland and Brennan were members of the Cutler & Company LLC, which
managed asset portfolios for high-income individuals. (Another Cutler case
is discussed under the partnership audit rules at VII.F.7., below.) Ashland
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was the CEO of Cutler. Cutler was restructured in 2002 because of "turmoil"
among the members. Cutler sold certain institutional accounts under an
agreement entered into in 2002, with payments made in 2003 and 2004.
Sales proceeds were used to satisfy Cutler liabilities and obligations. At the
time of the sale Brennan ceased to be a member of Cutler, but continued to
hold "an economic interest" which conferred a continuing interest in income
and loss items. Ashland reported capital gain from the sale in 2003, but none
in 2004. Brennan reported no capital gain from the Cutler sale. The IRS
asserted inconsistent deficiencies against both Ashland and Brennan in order
to avoid a whipsaw, asserting that Ashland was responsible for reporting all
of the capital gains recognized in 2003 and 2004 and that Brennan was
responsible for reporting his 45 percent distributive share of the capital gains.
The Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) rejected Brennan's claim that his partnership
interest terminated in 2002, holding that a retiring partner remains a partner
for tax purposes until the partner's interest has been completely liquidated.
Thus, the court held that Brennan was responsible for reporting his share of
partnership capital gain derived in 2003 and 2004. Ashland was responsible
for reporting her share of the capital gain as set forth in the 2002
restructuring agreement.
4. Family farm is a partnership. Holdner v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2010-175 (8/4/10). When his son Randal
expressed little interest in going to college, William Holder, an accountant,
invested in developing a small family farm for his son to operate with an
agreement to divide the profits with an undefined equity interest in the
property. As the farming operation expanding, father and son took title to
property as tenants in common. On his returns, William reported one-half of
the income and claimed deductions for all operating expenses. The Tax
Court (Judge Marvel) held that the arrangement was a partnership, rejecting
the taxpayer's arguments that they each operated as independent sole
proprietors. Judge Marvel noted that both William and Randal contributed
properties and labor to the venture, which conducted business activities. She
also found that the taxpayers failed to rebut a presumption that the partners
shared equal capital interests in the partnership that applied to all items of
income and expenditure, and that differing capital contributions did not
justify an allocation of all expenditures to William. The court sustained an
accuracy related penalty under § 6662 finding that William failed to make a
reasonable attempt to ascertain the correctness of his reporting positions.
a. Not clearly erroneous says the Ninth
Circuit. Holdner v. Commissioner, 483 Fed. Appx. 383 (9th Cir. 10/12/12).
Affirming the Tax Court in an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit upheld
Judge Marvel's conclusion that the farming operation was a 50-50
partnership, as opposed to a mere co-ownership of property. It also rejected
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the taxpayer's argument that the Notice of Deficiency was not adequate
because it failed to inform the taxpayer of what would be relevant at trial.
C. Distributions and Transactions Between the Partnership
and Partners
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
D. Sales of Partnership Interests, Liquidations and Mergers
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
E. Inside Basis Adjustments
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
F. Partnership Audit Rules
1. Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter
partnership is a partner item. Napoliello v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2009-104 (5/18/09). The taxpayer invested in a Son-of-Boss transaction
involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FPAA to the
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding, it
was determined that the partnership was a sham that lacked economic
substance, that transactions entered into by the partnership should be treated
as transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses claimed on
disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be
disallowed. The IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the
partnership items. The Tax Court previously held in Petaluma FX Partners,
LLC v. Commissioner, 131 T.C. 84 (2008), that the determination of whether
a partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax purposes is
a partnership item. In the instant case, the court (Judge Kroupa) agreed with
the IRS that the partner's basis in distributed securities from the sham
partnership is an affected item subject to determination in the partnership
proceeding, and not subject to re-determination in the partner-level
deficiency proceeding. Because the amount of any loss with respect to the
partner's disposition of securities distributed from the partnership required a
factual determination at the partner level, the court held that it had
jurisdiction in the partner deficiency proceeding to proceed under normal
deficiency procedures. The court thus proceeded to determine that the
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taxpayer's claimed loss on the sale of the distributed securities was
disallowed, that the taxpayer's basis in the securities was their direct cost
rather than an exchange basis from the partnership interest, and that the
taxpayer was not allowed to deduct transaction costs attributable to the
investment. The Tax Court also held that the FPAA gave the taxpayer fair
notice of the IRS claims.
a. Part of the Tax Court's holding in
Petaluma FX Partners retains its vitality, but not the part the Tax Court
relied upon in Napoliello. Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner,
591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 1/12/10). The Tax Court in this Son-of-Boss tax
shelter case determined that it had jurisdiction in a TEFRA partnership
proceeding to determine that the partnership lacked economic substance and
was a sham. Since the partnership was disregarded, the Tax Court concluded
that it had jurisdiction to determine that the partners' outside basis in the
partnership was zero. The Tax Court reasoned that a partner could not have a
basis in a partnership interest that did not exist. (131 T.C. 84 (2008)) The
Court of Appeals agreed that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the
partnership proceeding to determine that the partnership was a sham. Temp.
Reg. § 301.6233-IT(a) expressly provides that "[any final partnership
administrative adjustment or judicial determination ... may include a
determination that the entity is not a partnership for such taxable year." The
Court of Appeals held that the regulation was explicitly authorized by
§ 6233. A partnership item is defined in § 623 1(a)(3) as an item required to
be taken into account in determining the partnership's income under Subtitle
A of the Code that is identified in regulations as an item more appropriately
taken into account at the partnership level. The court indicated that,
"[I]ogically, it makes perfect sense to determine whether a partnership is a
sham at the partnership level. A partnership cannot be a sham with respect to
one partner, but valid with respect to another." However, the Court of
Appeals concluded that the partners' bases were affected items, not
partnership items, and that the Tax Court did not have jurisdiction to
determine the partners' bases in the partnership proceeding. The court
rejected the IRS argument that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the
partnership proceeding to determine the partners' outside basis as an affected
item whose elements are mainly determined from partnership items. The
court held that resolution of the affected item requires a separate
determination at the partner level even though the affected item could easily
be determined in the partnership proceeding. Finally, the Court of Appeals
held that accuracy related penalties under § 6662(a) could not be determined
without a determination of the partners' outside basis in a partner level
proceeding and vacated and remanded the Tax Court's determination of
penalty issues.
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b. On remand, the Tax Court disavowed
jurisdiction over penalties in the partnership-level proceeding. Petaluma
FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 135 T.C. 581 (12/15/10). The court
(Judge Goeke) held that in light of the Court of Appeals holding that
determination of adjustments attributable to the partner's outside basis is an
affected item properly addressed in individual partner level proceedings, any
§ 6662 penalties must also be determined at the partner-level proceeding and
that the Tax Court had no jurisdiction to assess the penalties. The court
rejected the IRS argument that the penalties proceeded from the partner-level
determination that the partnership was a sham, thereby providing jurisdiction
for the Tax Court to determine the negligence penalty. The Tax Court held
that if a penalty "does not relate directly to a numerical adjustment to a
partnership item, it is beyond our jurisdiction. In this case there are no such
adjustments to which a penalty can apply." Judge Halpern dissented,
asserting that the Tax Court could reconsider the penalty on grounds other
than the partners' outside bases under the court's initial findings that the
partnership was a sham and did not provide the basis increase claimed by the
partners. A dissent by Judge Marvel (joined by three others) argued that the
Tax Court has jurisdiction to determine the imposition of a penalty for
negligence related to adjustment of a partnership item in the partnership level
proceeding, but the amount of the individual penalty depends upon a
computation at the partner level.
c. Partner's outside basis in a tax-shelter
partnership is a partner item. Napoliello v. Commissioner, 655 F.3d 1060
(9th Cir. 8/23/11). The taxpayer invested in a Son-of-Boss transaction
involving digital foreign currency items. The IRS issued an FPAA to the
taxpayer as a notice partner. In the uncontested partnership proceeding it was
determined that the partnership was a sham that lacked economic substance,
that transactions entered into by the partnership should be treated as
transacted directly by the partners, and that purported losses claimed on
disposition of distributed property with an enhanced basis should be
disallowed. The IRS assessed a deficiency against the taxpayer based on the
partnership items. Upholding the Tax Court, the Ninth Circuit joined the D.C
and Eighth Circuits, in Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 591
F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir. 2010), and RJT Invs. Xv. Commissioner, 491 F.3d 732
(8th Cir. 2007), respectively, holding that the determination of whether a
partnership was a sham that will be disregarded for Federal tax purposes is a
partnership item. The Ninth Circuit also agreed with the Tax Court that the
partner's basis in distributed securities from the sham partnership is an
affected item subject to determination in the partnership proceeding, and not
subject to re-determination in the partner-level deficiency proceeding.
Because the amount of any loss with respect to the partner's disposition of
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securities distributed from the partnership required a factual determination at
the partner level, the court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction in the
partner deficiency proceeding to proceed under normal deficiency
procedures. Thus, the Tax Court could determine that the taxpayer's claimed
loss on the sale of the distributed securities was disallowed, that the
taxpayer's basis in the securities was their direct cost rather than an exchange
basis from the partnership interest, and that the taxpayer was not allowed to
deduct transaction costs attributable to the investment.
d. Disregarded tax-shelter partnership is
still a partnership for purposes of the TEFRA audit rules. Tigers Eye
Trading LLC v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 67 (2/13/12) (reviewed, court
opinion joined by fiver judges, three judges concurred and four dissented). In
this Son-of-BOSS tax shelter matter, the parties stipulated that the tax shelter
partnership should be disregarded, the basis of distributed property should be
reduced to zero, and upheld accuracy related penalties. The partnership filed
a motion to revise the stipulated decision after the D.C. Circuit's decision in
Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 591 F.3d 649 (D.C. Cir.
2010), which held that a partner's outside basis is not a partnership item
subject to the court's jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding and thus
not subject to a penalty determination in the partnership proceeding. In an
opinion joined by only Judges Colvin, Halpern (who also wrote a separate
concurring opinion), Cohen, and Goeke, the Tax Court (Judge Beghe) held
that it has jurisdiction in a partnership-level proceeding against an entity that
filed a partnership return to determine whether the entity should be
disregarded as a partnership and to determine all items of the entity that
would be partnership items if the entity had been a partnership, citing
§§ 6233 and 6226() and Temp. Reg. § 301.6226(f)-iT. Under § 6233, if a
partnership return is filed for a taxable year but it is determined that no
partnership exists, the TEFRA procedures apply to the partnership,
partnership items, and to persons holding an interest in the entity. The court
specifically noted that a holding that an entity does not exist under Temp.
Reg. § 301.6233-1T(a) "will serve as a basis for a computational adjustment
reflecting the disallowance of any loss or credit claimed by a purported
partner with respect to that entity." The court indicated that Petaluma FX
Partners was decided on the basis of a government concession that outside
basis was not a partnership item. The court held that under Mayo Foundation
for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011), decided
after Petaluma FX Partners, it was required to defer to the regulations. The
court then interpreted the basis rules of subchapter K and Reg.
§ 301.6231(a)(3)-l(a) to require that determination of outside basis is a
partnership item:
Determination of the partners' outside bases in their
interests in a partnership that is recognized for Federal
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income tax purposes requires complex determinations of not
only the amounts of partnership items that are elements of
outside basis but also the partners' shares of those amounts,
which are also partnership items. Those complex
determinations must be made in the partnership proceeding,
and most often there are no other factors to be determined at
the partner level.
* With respect to its jurisdiction to assess
penalties, unlike the D.C. Circuit in Petaluma FXPartners, the court indicated
that, based on its holding that the partners' outside bases were subject to
determination in the partnership-level proceeding, the court had jurisdiction to
impose the 40-percent basis misstatement penalty at the partnership level.
0 Judge Wherry wrote a concurring
opinion. Judges Gale and Paris concurred in the result only, without opinions.
Judge Marvel wrote a dissent, which was joined in part by Judges Thornton and
Kroupa. Judge Foley dissented without opinion, and Judges Vasquez,
Gustafson, and Morrison did not participate.
* Since this case is appealable to the D.C.
Circuit, the Tax Court's lengthy opinion is not likely to be the last word.
e. Partnership items are in the eye of the
beholder. Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
142 (5/17/12). On its own motion, the D.C. Circuit again remanded this case
back to the Tax Court to reassess the Tax Court's holding in Petaluma III
(135 T.C. 581) that it lacked jurisdiction to determine the partner's outside
basis in the partnership proceeding because it is an affected item in light of
the court's majority decision in Tigers Eye Trading LLC v. Commissioner,
138 T.C. 67 (2/13/12), that it had jurisdiction in the partnership level
proceeding to determine the partner's outside bases and assess penalties.
Petaluma FX Partners, LLC v. Commissioner, 109 A.F.T.R. 2d 2012-2238
(D.C. Cir. 2/27/12). The Court of Appeals cited the lone dissent by Judge
Holmes where he stated that "[o]ur decision today overrules Petaluma IIr'.
In its supplemental memorandum decision, the Tax Court (Judge Goeke)
indicated that the decision on remand in Petaluma was based on the
"narrow" instruction on remand from the D.C. Circuit which established the
law of the case and further stated that its decision on remand was
"thoroughly imbued with the legal reasoning and logic provided by the D.C.
Circuit in its earlier decision." The court also stated that the language from
Judge Holmes's dissent in Tigers Eye that was cited in the D.C. Circuit's
remand does not represent the position of the court and indicated that no part
of the opinion in Tigers Eye "purported to explicitly alter or overrule the
decision in this case or to revise the language of the Court's Opinion in
Petaluma IL."
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2. Who settled with whom and when? Mathia v.
Commissioner, 669 F.3d 1080 (10th Cir. 1/5/12). The taxpayer's deceased
husband was a partner in a Swanton Coal partnership that the IRS challenged
with an FPAA. In 1991 the law firm representing the tax matters partner
entered into a settlement agreement in principle, but which required further
negotiation with the IRS to determine the settlement amount. In 1995 the IRS
sent a stipulation of settlement agreement to the partnership that was signed
by the partnership but not by the IRS. An identical agreement was signed by
both parties in 2001 and entered as a final judgment by the Tax Court.
Within the one year allowed from the date of final judgment under § 6225(a),
the IRS issued a deficiency assessment against the taxpayer, who asserted
that the earlier settlements represented a settlement with individual partners
that reclassified the claimed partnership losses as nonpartnership items under
§ 623 1(b)(1)(C), which then required an assessment within one year of the
settlement. The court held that even if the 1991 agreement in principle and
the subsequent settlement were binding agreements, the agreements dealt
only with partnership items and not settlement agreements with individual
partners. Thus, the taxpayer was not dismissed from the partnership level
proceeding, and the assessment within one year of the final Tax Court
judgment was timely.
3. Keep those addresses up to date. International
Strategic Partners, LLC v. Commissioner 455 Fed. Appx. 91 (2d Cir.
1/19/12). By summary order, the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's
dismissal of a petition filed more than 150 days after the IRS mailed an
FPAA. The court held that the IRS met the § 6223(a) notice requirements by
mailing the notices to the LLC at the address shown on its tax return and to
the partners at the addresses shown on accompanying Schedules K-1. The
IRS was not required to do more when the LLC failed to provide the IRS
with additional information. The taxpayer is responsible for updating contact
information under § 6223(c)(2) and Reg. § 301-6223(c)-i.
4. The TEFRA audit rules create a mess with tiered
partnerships. Rawls Trading, L.P. v. Commissioner, 138 T.C No. 12
(3/26/12). The ultimate taxpayer, Jerry Rawls, entered into Son-o-BOSS
transactions using a tiered partnership structure. The proceeds of short sales
of Treasury notes were contributed to lower-tier partnerships by various trust
entities (referred to by the court as source partnerships). In turn, the
partnership interests in the lower-tier partnerships with inflated basis were
contributed to middle partnerships (referred to by the court as interim
partnerships). The interim partnership passed through losses generated by
transactions using the inflated basis of the source partnerships. The
"contrived losses" eventually inured to the tax benefit of Rawls. The IRS
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issued FPAA's to both the source and interim partnerships. The court (Judge
Vasquez) ultimately concluded that since any determination of a deficiency
in the interim partnership required resolution of the FPAA issued to the
source partnership, such a deficiency was based on a computational
adjustment to the interim partnership as a partner, or on resolution of an
affected item. In either case, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider the FPAA issued to the interim partnership and dismissed the
FPAA. The court rejected the IRS request to stay the proceeding with respect
to the interim partnership as premature until the issues in the source
partnership proceeding were resolved. The court indicated that since it had
no jurisdiction to consider the FPAA issued to the interim partnership, it had
no jurisdiction to stay the proceeding. The court also addressed the IRS's
assertion that it would be barred from issuing a second FPAA to the interim
partnership by the no-second-notice rule of § 6223(f) by pointing out that the
court's jurisdiction is conferred by statute and that it had no option to grant
the stay. The court suggested, however, that to the extent that adjudication of
the shelter issues in the FPAA issued to the source partnership results in a
computational adjustment, the IRS could make a direct assessment against
Rawls as an indirect partner (§ 6231 (a)(2)) without the need for an FPAA
against the interim partnership.
5. TEFRA audit rules bar Tax Court consideration
of a guaranteed payment of a small partnership with a pass-through
member. Brennan v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-187 (7/9/12). In
consolidated cases, the Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) determined that it lacked
jurisdiction under the TEFRA audit rules to determine whether the taxpayers
were entitled to flow-through losses attributable to guaranteed payments. The
involved parties were members of the Cutler & Company LLC, which
managed asset portfolios for high-income individuals. Ashland was the CEO
of Cutler. Ashland and Brennan transferred their Cutler interests to a general
partnership, Airport Plaza (AP), which was to dissolve under its own terms at
the end of 2001. The Cutler operating agreement in 2002 identifies AP as a
Cutler member. Cutler was restructured in 2002 because of "turmoil" among
the members. AP's 2002 partnership return claimed a partnership loss for
2002 attributable to a guaranteed payments to Brennan of $4,785,616 and
Joseph Furey, a former Cutler member, of $485,000. Ashland claimed her
share of the loss from AP on her 2002 return. In a petition contesting the IRS
disallowance of the loss, Ashland asserted in an amended petition to the
court that the guaranteed payments were in fact made by Cutler and that
Ashland was entitled to a pass-through loss from Cutler for the payments.
The Cutler 2002 partnership return, signed by Ashland as CEO, reported the
payments as guaranteed payments to Brennan and Furey. The court agreed
with the IRS that Cutler was a TEFRA partnership so that the status of
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guaranteed payments by Cutler was a partnership item, determinable only in
a TEFRA proceeding. A petition for administrative adjustment of Cutler's
2002 return was barred by the statute of limitations. The court rejected the
taxpayer's assertion that Cutler was a small partnership (fewer than ten
members) because the small partnership exception does not apply under
§ 6231 (a)(9) to a partnership that has a pass-through entity as a member. The
court did not allow Ashland to disregard her chosen form of operating AP as
a partnership and reporting partnership returns. In addition the court found
that AP was treated a member of Cutler in spite of Ashland's argument that
Cutler membership interests were never formally transferred to AP because
of stipulations by Ashland to the contrary and the Cutler operating agreement
unambiguously including AP as a member.
6. A Notice of Deficiency relating to the partner
level loss limitation rules need not wait for an FPAA. Meruelo v.
Commissioner, 691 F.3d 1108 (9th Cir. 8/16/12, as amend3ed 11/14/12). The
taxpayer reported losses from a single-member LLC (disregarded entity) that
was a partner in Intervest, which reported losses from foreign currency
transactions. Neither the Intervest returns nor the taxpayer's individual
returns identified the status of the disregarded LLC. Although the IRS was
investigating Intervest for fraud, and there was a related grand jury
proceeding, the IRS did not notify Intervest that it would begin an audit, nor
did it issue an FPAA for the year at issue. The IRS issued a notice of
deficiency to the taxpayers shortly before the three-year statute of limitations
would have expired with respect to their individual returns. Affirming the
Tax Court, 132 T.C. 355 (2009), the Court of Appeals (Judge N.R. Smith)
held that even though application to a partner of the loss limitation rules of
§§ 704(d) and 465 are affected items that require a partner-level
determination, a notice of deficiency to a partner based on the application of
the loss limitation rules of §§ 704(d) and 465 was not issued prematurely and
was valid. The Tax Court had jurisdiction over the petition. While the
TEFRA audit rules require completion of partnership proceedings when a
partnership item or a related item is involved before issuing a notice of
deficiency to partners, the court held that TEFRA does not limit the issuance
of a notice of deficiency when no partnership proceeding is pending and no
notice of deficiency has been sent. The court also stated that although
§ 6225(a) provides that "'no assessment of a deficiency attributable to any
partnership item may be made... before' 150 days after the date a notice of
FPAA is mailed or a proceeding in Tax Court has been finalized[,]"
[a]ssessment of a deficiency is not equivalent to providing notice of a
deficiency." The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that the notice
of deficiency was improper when issued because the IRS was considering a
criminal investigation that might have found fraud. The court held that the
IRS's contemplation of initiating future proceedings is irrelevant and that
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requiring the IRS to prove that it had no interest in future partnership-level
proceedings would serve no purpose.
7. Asset management joint venture is not a
partnership, so take that ordinary income. Rigas v United States, 107
A.F.T.R.2d 2011-2046 (S.D. Tex. 5/2/11). Hydrocarbon Capital, LLC, which
held a number of oil and gas industry financial assets, entered into a loan
management and servicing agreement (specifically stating the arrangement
was not a partnership) with Odyssey Energy Capital I, LP, formed by five
individual limited partners with an LLC general partner. The management
agreement provided for a performance fee representing 20 percent of profits
after provisions for disposition of income realized on the asset portfolio
designed to recoup Hydrocarbon's expenses, the capital value of the
portfolio, and a 10 percent preferred return. In a claim for refund, the
taxpayer, one of Odyssey's limited partners, claimed pass-through capital
gain treatment on gains from disposition of the managed assets. The District
Court (Judge Ellison) agreed with the IRS determination that the income to
the Odyssey partners was ordinary income as a service fee rather than pass-
through partnership income from a joint venture with Hydrocarbon. The
court indicated that notwithstanding the unambiguous text of the
management agreement eschewing partnership status, it may still look to the
conduct of the parties to determine whether the arrangement was a
partnership. The court indicated that the Odyssey partners contributed both
capital and services to the relationship with Hydrocarbon, and the
arrangement provided for a profit sharing and some risk of loss for the
Odyssey partners, which supported treating the arrangement as a partnership.
Odyssey maintained significant management responsibility for the
Hydrocarbon assets, but it did not have authority to withdraw funds from
Hydrocarbon bank accounts, it could not increase Hydrocarbon's capital
commitment to a particular asset, it could not enter into binding agreements
in Hydrocarbon's name, and it could not dispose of an asset without
Hydrocarbon's written approval. Odyssey did not share control over bank
accounts that corresponded to companies in the asset portfolio, nor could it
disburse funds from the accounts, and thus lacked control over the assets and
income of the venture. Finally, the court pointed to the fact that neither
Hydrocarbon nor Odyssey filed tax returns treating the arrangement as a
partnership. Thus, the court found that the IRS established by a
preponderance of the evidence that a partnership did not exist.
0 The court also held that it had jurisdiction
to consider the taxpayer's refund claim under TEFRA as a partner item based
on its holding that the taxpayers' amended returns qualified as a partner
Administrative Adjustment Request as being in substantial compliance with the
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requirements of Reg. § 301.6227(d)-i, notwithstanding the absence of a timely
filed form 8802 as required by the regulations.
a. The Fifth Circuit reverses the District
Court but the taxpayer still loses. This case proves that the TEFRA
audit rules are ridiculously complicated and result in a Catch-22. Rigas
v. United States, 486 Fed. Appx. 491 (5th Cir. 8/21/12). The taxpayer was
one of five limited partners in Odyssey Energy Capital I, LP (Odyssey),
which entered into a loan management and servicing agreement with
Hydrocarbon Capital, LLC. The agreement provided for a performance fee
representing 20 percent of profits after provisions for disposition of income
realized on the asset portfolio designed to recoup Hydrocarbon's expenses,
the capital value of the portfolio and a 10 percent preferred return. The
agreement specifically stated that the arrangement was not a partnership. In
2004 Hydrocarbon recognized approximately $110 million of gain on
disposition of assets and paid a performance fee to Odyssey of approximately
$20 million. Odyssey originally reported the $20 million as a management
fee constituting ordinary income, and the Odyssey partners reported their
share of the ordinary income on individual returns. Subsequently Odyssey
filed an amended return claiming it was in a partnership with Hydrocarbon
and its $20 million share of proceeds was capital gain. The partners filed
amended individual returns claiming refunds. Apparently the IRS allowed
refunds to four partners, but denied Rigas's claim. In Rigas's refund suit, the
District Court held that there was no partnership between Odyssey and
Hydrocarbon and the fees paid to Odyssey were properly treated as ordinary
income. Rigas v United States, 107 A.F.T.R.2d 2011-2046 (S.D. Tex.
5/2/11). The District Court also held that it had jurisdiction to consider the
taxpayers' refund claims under TEFRA as a partner item based on its holding
that the taxpayers' amended returns qualified as a partner Administrative
Adjustment Request as being in substantial compliance with the
requirements of Reg. § 301.6227(d)-I, notwithstanding the absence of a
timely filed Form 8802 as required by the regulations. With a complicated
meander through the limitations on filing refund actions by partners under
TEFRA, the Fifth Circuit in a lengthy per curiam opinion reversed the
District Court's holding that it had jurisdiction to hear the refund action,
denied the taxpayer's claim that he was entitled to consideration of whether
the partnership item was capital gain, held that the District Court had
jurisdiction to determine whether the taxpayer was given inconsistent
settlement treatment, but alas concluded that there was no settlement.
* Section 7422(h) bars jurisdiction to
consider a refund claim by a partner attributable to partnership items except as
provided in §§ 6228(b) or 6230(c). Section 6228(b) allows a refund suit
attributable to partnership items if the IRS responds to a partner's
Administrative Adjustment Request (AAR), filed as provided in § 6227(d), by
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mailing a notice indicating that partnership items will be treated as non-
partnership items, or if the IRS fails to allow the AAR and no notice is mailed.
Section 6230(c) provides for claims arising from erroneous computations and
was not at issue in the case. The Court of Appeals rejected the District Court
holding that the taxpayer's filing an amended return was substantial compliance
with the AAR requirement. The court held that the requirement of Reg.
§ 301.6627(d)-i that the taxpayer file a specific form (Form 8082) is a
procedural requirement that may be met with substantial compliance, but that
the requirement that the taxpayer provide a detailed explanation of the claim is
a substantive requirement that must be satisfied so that the IRS can properly
decide whether to allow the AAR. The court held that Rigas' amended return
failed to meet the substantive requirements because it had not been filed in the
Service Center where the partnership return had been filed, and it did not
provide a detailed explanation of the claim for refund.
* The court held that a partner's claim to
settlement terms consistent with the terms of a settlement between the IRS and
another partner under § 6224(c)(2) is an item that depends upon whether the
particular partner has been properly offered consistent settlement terms and is,
therefore, not a partnership item. Thus, the court has jurisdiction to consider a
refund claim on that basis. However, the court concluded that as a matter of law
the IRS's payments of refunds to the other Odyssey partners were not
settlement agreements under § 6224 because there was no partnership-level
administrative proceeding.
* Finally, the court rejected the taxpayers
alternate claim that since the character of the income was adjusted at the
partnership level in the partnership amended return, the taxpayer is entitled to
tax treatment consistent with the treatment of the partnership item. The court
held that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to consider a refund claim on this
basis under § 7422(h) because when the taxpayer "claim that the Performance
Fee was recharacterized as capital gains instead of ordinary income at the
partnership level and that they are entitled to a refund based on a similar
characterization at the partner level, their claim is attributable to a partnership
item." The court noted in support of its finding that the item is a partnership
item that characterization of the performance fee at the partnership level affects
both the partnership's reporting and the reporting of the other partners.
G. Miscellaneous
1. Electronic K-is. Rev. Proc. 2012-17, 2012-10 I.RB.
453 (2/13/12). The IRS has provided procedures for furnishing Schedule K-
Is to persons to whom a partnership is required to provide the form in an
electronic format. The Rev. Proc. notes that the recipient entitled to a K-1
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must affirmatively consent to receive the form in electronically, and that the
consent may be conveyed electronically.
2. Hiding abusive shelter transactions behind
disregarded entities makes the indirect partner an unidentified partner
for statute of limitations purposes. Gaughf Properties, L.P. v.
Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 7 (9/10/12). The taxpayers invested in
KPMG/Jenkens & Gilchrist currency options tax shelters through a
partnership consisting of two disregarded LLCs and a wholly owned
corporation. After the IRS caught up with the taxpayers from information
obtained through John Doe summons issued to Jenkens & Gilchrist, the IRS
asserted that the statute of limitations remained open with respect to the
taxpayers under § 6229(e), which extends the limitation period for one year
after the name and address of a partner is furnished to the IRS where (1) the
name, address, and TIN of the partner is not "furnished" on the partnership
return, and the IRS has sent notice of an FPAA within the statute of
limitations, or (2) the taxpayer has taken an inconsistent position and fails to
provide the notice required by § 6222(b). The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) held
that the statute remained open under both provisions. Following the holding
in Costello v. United States, 765 F. Supp. 1003 (C.D. Cal. 1991), the court
held that, although Schedule K-Is are required only for direct partners, an
indirect partner who is not identified on a partnership return remains an
"unidentified partner" for purposes of § 6229(e)(1). The court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that because the IRS was in possession of identifying
information from applications for taxpayer identification numbers for the
disregarded entities (Forms SS-4) and information from Jenkens & Gilchrist
and KPMG's John Doe summons more than one year before issuing
assessment notices. The court upheld the validity of requirements in Temp.
Reg. § 301.6223(c)-iT that information be "filed" with the IRS at the
Service Center where the taxpayer's returns are filed and that the identifying
information be specific. The court interpreted § 6229(e)'s use of term
"furnished" as sufficiently close to the filing requirement of the temporary
regulations to indicate that the regulation was a valid exercise of
administrative authority under Chevron, US.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and § 7805(a).
* The court also held that the taxpayer took
an inconsistent position on returns reporting the partnership transactions
because of the way the partnership netted contributions of long and short
options which the taxpayer reported separately in claiming basis increases. As a
result, the taxpayer was found to have failed to provide the statement required
by § 6222(b), thereby extending the statute of limitations under § 6229(e)(2).
D The court also rejected the taxpayer's
arguments that the IRS was estopped from assessing a deficiency (1) because of
IRS delays in issuing Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255 (notifying taxpayers of
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the issues raised by the shelter transaction); (2) because of the long period
before the IRS issued an FPAA to the taxpayer's partnership; or (3) because the
IRS had withheld and destroyed evidence or placed witnesses beyond the reach
of the taxpayer because of criminal investigations.
VII. TAX SHELTERS
A. Tax Shelter Cases and Rulings
1. Yet another investor in a KPMG OPIS tax
shelter gets devoured by the economic substance doctrine. Blum v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-16 (1/17/12).The taxpayer's bogus $45
million loss claimed from a KPMG OPIS tax shelter was disallowed. The
taxpayers did not contest that their loss was "fictional." Section 6662
accuracy-related penalties for gross valuation misstatements and negligence
were upheld.
2. Had this opinion been issued on October 25th,
the taxpayer might have had a chance. However, the opinion was issued
on March 14th, so success was not in the cards. Crispin v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2012-70 (3/14/12), on appeal to the Third Circuit. The taxpayer,
an experienced CPA, entered into a CARDS transaction in 2001 to shield
about $7 million of shared fees (ordinary) income from his wholly owned S
corporation that engaged in a business related to a pool of collateralized
mortgage obligations. The promoter was a longtime friend who did not
charge the taxpayer any fee to participate in the CARDS transaction. The
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held that the transaction lacked economic
substance because it lacked business purpose and profit expectation, stating,
"[w]e have consistently held that CARDS transactions lack economic
substance," and noting that an appeal in this case lies in the Third Circuit,
which decided ACMP'ship v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998).
. Judge Kroupa also upheld the 40 percent
gross valuation misstatement accuracy-related penalty. The tax opinion the
taxpayer received from his advisors relied on "false representations [the
taxpayer] made," including that he had a business purpose for entering into the
CARDS transaction and that he anticipated earning a profit, absent tax benefits,
from the CARDS transaction, which were "material to the conclusions reached
in the tax opinion." Furthermore, the taxpayer had not actually relied on the
opinion.
3. Just another generic tax shelter that lacks
economic substance - Taxpayer, "you lose." Reddam v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo. 2012-106 (4/11/12). The taxpayer invested in an OPIS tax
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shelter peddled by KPMG. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke) found that the
"'pretax profit' potential of the transaction was so remote as to render
disingenuous any suggestion that the transaction was economically viable."
[The taxpayer] knew little to nothing about the
details of the OPIS transaction. The extent of his knowledge
was limited to an understanding that the OPIS transaction
was a "formula or a recipe" that would provide him with a
substantial capital loss. Despite the fact that petitioner and
his closest advisers were ignorant as to the function and
design of the investment, petitioner never investigated the
transaction further, relying instead on the opinion letters
provided by or on behalf of KPMG. Petitioner's lack of due
diligence in researching the OPIS transaction indicates that
he knew he was purchasing a tax loss rather than entering
into a legitimate investment.
0 Accordingly, the losses claimed by the
taxpayer were denied on the grounds that the transaction lacked economic
substance. Amazingly, the opinion makes no reference to accuracy related
penalties - did the IRS forget to assess penalties?
4. You better hope that your H-P computer works
better than H-P's tax planning strategies. Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-135 (5/14/12). In a complicated
transaction designed by AIG-Financial Products to generate foreign tax
credits, Hewlett-Packard purchased a preferred stock interest in a foreign
entity called Foppingadreef (FOP) that was to engage in a U.S.-dollar linked
Netherlands guilder stepped coupon contingent note transaction which took
advantage of asymmetric treatment of contingent interest in the U.S. and the
Netherlands. The common stock of FOP was held by the Dutch bank, ABN,
which also provided capital to FOP through transactions structured as a loan
to an AIG subsidiary which in turn transferred the Dutch guilder proceeds to
FOP along with an obligation on the part of FOP to pay contingent interest
back to ABN. Hewlett Packard treated FOP as a controlled foreign
corporation through its ownership of the preferred stock and warrants to
acquire additional stock and claimed foreign tax credits for Dutch taxes. The
transaction was structured to terminate in 2003 through the exercise of put
options to transfer Hewlett-Packard's stock interest back to ABN for a price
that resulted in a loss to Hewlett-Packard. The Tax Court (Judge Goeke),
applying the multiple factors used to distinguish debt from equity, found that
the structure of the transaction resulted in a fixed repayment of Hewlett-
Packard's investment on a fixed date and treated the investment as a loan
rather than an equity interest in FOP, thereby disallowing claimed foreign tax
credits. The court also disallowed Hewlett-Packard's claimed § 165 loss on
the difference between its initial investment and the price it received on the
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termination date. The court agreed with the IRS's assertion that Hewlett-
Packard's claimed $15.5 million loss on termination of the transaction was in
effect a fee paid to AIG in order to participate in a tax shelter. The court held
that fees spent for the generation of artificial tax losses are not deductible as
payments incurred in a transaction that lacked economic substance citing
Enrici v. Commissioner, 813 F.2d 293, 296 (9th Cir. 1987), and New Phoenix
Sunrise Corp. v. Commissioner, 132 T.C. 161, 186 (2009), aff'd 408 Fed.
Appx. 908 (6th Cir. 2010). The court also noted that Hewlett-Packard failed
to meet its burden of proof regarding the proper timing of the deduction.
5. "A [contingent liability section 3511 transaction
that would let [the taxpayer] deduct an approximately $38 million tax
loss on the sale of $11,000 in securities which had just recently been
purchased for the same amount ... would clearly appear to be too good
to be true," said Judge Marvel in a decision rendered nine years after
the trial. At long last, this is the first case to apply § 351(g). Gerdau
MacSteel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 5 (8/30/12). To shelter capital
gains of over $41 million recognized on the sale of two subsidiary
corporations in 1997, the taxpayer (Quanex), which was the parent in a
consolidated group, entered into a tax shelter transaction devised and
recommended by Deloitte & Touche that was intended to create an artificial
short-term capital loss of approximately $38 million to offset the capital
gains, called the "Double Deducting Environmental and Other Contingent
Liabilities" (DDCL). The loss was to be created in a series of transactions
involving Quanex's liabilities under for its medical plan benefits (MPBs). In
simplified form, the transaction involved the following steps using two of
Quanex's inactive subsidiaries (QS and QHMC): (1) Quanex caused QHMC
to be recapitalized to have multiple classes of stock, including Class B and
Class C voting preferred stock, (a) each with "an assumed $100 issue price,"
(b) cumulative dividends of 9.5%, payable quarterly, providing Quanex or
QHMC with rights to call the preferred stock after five years and providing
the Class C shareholders with rights to put the preferred stock after seven
years, and (c) providing for a liquidation value for the Class C stock in
amount equal to the greater of $125 or an amount equal to the lesser of a
percent of any cumulative cost savings in MPBs or of QHMC's book net
equity; (2) Quanex transferred $38,000,000 to QS, which assumed Quanex's
contingent liability to pay MPBs under Quanex's benefits plan which were
treated as being in the amount of $37,989,000; (3) QS transferred $38
million to QHMC, which in turn assumed the liability to pay Quanex's
MPBs, in exchange for newly issued Class C stock; and (4) QS sold its Class
C preferred stock to a former employee of a Q subsidiary for $11,000. The
taxpayer took the position that the transfers of $38 million and the
assumptions of liability were § 351 nonrecognition transactions and that
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pursuant to § 358(a)(2) and Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, QS's basis in
the QHIMC stock was $38 million unreduced by the $37,989,000 of MPBs
that were not deductible until paid. The taxpayer claimed a $37,989,000 loss
recognized on the sale of the Class C stock that was used to offset the capital
gains on the sales of the other subsidiaries. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel)
found as facts that the transactions were structured in such a way that it was
highly likely when the Class C stock was issued that the Class C stock would
be redeemed within the five- and seven-year periods and that the redemption
payment would be $125 per share. Judge Marvel further found that after the
transactions, Quanex continued to process claims for MPBs, and its handling
of the claims transferred to QHMC was the same as the handling of claims
with respect to individuals whose MPBs were not transferred to QHMC.
QHMC's reimbursements to Quanex for claims were made through
intercompany entries recorded on Quanex's books as a receivable due from
QHMC and on QHMC's books as a payable. QHMC lent the $38 million to
an affiliated corporation, and QHMC eventually reimbursed Quanex for the
MPBs when QHMC received payments on the loan. Based on the fact
finding, Judge Marvel disallowed the loss deduction on two grounds.
* First, she held that because the Class C
stock "'does not participate in corporate growth to any significant extent' within
the meaning of I.R.C. sec. 351(g)(3)(A)," it was nonqualifed preferred stock
(NQPS) as defined in § 351(g). The taxpayer and IRS had stipulated that if the
Class C stock was found to be NQPS the claimed loss was not allowable. (The
opinion does not explain the reason that the claimed loss was not allowable if
the Class C stock was NQPS; however, § 351(g)(1)(A) provides that when
NQPS is the only stock received, § 351(a) [and § 358] shall not apply to the
transaction, and pursuant to § § 1001 and 1012, the basis of the stock is equal to
its fair market value.)
* The loss also was also disallowed under
the economic substance doctrine, as was a § 162 deduction for $352,251 of fees
incurred to effect the transactions. Judge Marvel found no business reason for
assumption by QHMC of the MPB liabilities, the sale of the Class C stock, or
any other aspect of the transactions; the transactions were all entirely tax
motivated, for the purpose of generating an artificial loss. The court also upheld
a § 6662(a) 20 percent accuracy penalty (and alternatively a substantial
understatement penalty).
[A] transaction that would let petitioners deduct an
approximately $38 million tax loss on the sale of $11,000 in
securities which had just recently been purchased for the
same amount, and that this result, to a savvy, experienced
businessman ... would clearly appear to be too good to be
true.
* Thus, the reasonable cause exception of
§ 6664(c) was not available despite subsequent trial court decisions (later
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reversed on appeal) upholding tax plans similar to this one. But applying the
Golsen rule, the court followed the Fifth Circuit's precedents in Heasly v.
Commissioner, 902 F.2d 380 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'g T.C. Memo. 1988-408, and
Todd v. Commissioner, 862 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 1988), affg 89 T.C. 912 (1987),
in declining to sustain a 40 percent penalty asserted by the IRS, because the
grounds underlying the court's disallowance of the capital loss deduction were
not directly related to the taxpayer's valuation of the Class C stock or to the
reporting of the proper basis therein.
6. Even though this D&T DDCL worked for a few
years, double deductions are a "No No!" Thrifty Oil Co. v. Commissioner,
139 T.C. No. 6 (8/30/12). Thrifty was the common parent of a consolidated
group for the relevant years (fiscal years ending 9/30/96 through 9/30/02),
but only the years ending in 2000 through 2002 were at issue. During the
fiscal year ending in 1996, Thrifty had generated and claimed a capital loss
by causing a subsidiary (GW) to transfer a $29,100,000 note from another
subsidiary (B) to yet another preexisting subsidiary (EM), which had
assumed contingent environmental liabilities in transaction in exchange for
90 shares EM stock; this was done upon the advice of Deloitte & Touche.
The taxpayer took the position that the transfer of the $29,100,000 note and
the assumption of the $29,070,000 of contingent environmental remediation
liabilities was a § 351 nonrecognition transaction and that pursuant to
§ 358(a)(2) and Rev. Rul. 95-74, 1995-2 C.B. 36, GW's basis in the EM
stock was the $29,100,000 face value of the B note, without reducing the
stock basis by the $29,070,000 of contingent environmental remediation
liabilities EM assumed, which were not deductible until paid. Three days
later (9/30/96), GW sold its EM stock for $25,200 and claimed a capital loss
of $29,074,800. The taxpayer deducted a total of $18,347,205 of the capital
loss on its 1996 through 1999 tax returns, years which were beyond the
statute of limitations at the time the dispute in the case arose. The taxpayer
claimed deductions for the remaining $10,727,595 of the capital loss on its
2000 through 2002 income tax returns, and those carryforwards were
disallowed by the IRS. The sale of the 90 shares of EM stock had not broken
EM's affiliation with the consolidated group, and in the years 2000 through
2002, the Thrifty group claimed § 162 deductions for $11,109,962 of
environmental remediation expenses that were accruable in those years. The
IRS disallowed the deductions. After stipulations - the taxpayer conceded
the capital loss issue and the IRS conceded the deduction for environmental
remediation expenses that had not previously been deducted in closed years
as capital losses, as well as any penalties - the only issue for the court was
the deductibility of the $11,109,962 of environmental remediation expenses
from 2000 through 2002. The Tax Court (Judge Wherry) applied Charles
Ilfeld Co. v. Hernandez, 292 U.S. 62 (1934), and its progeny to disallow the
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deductions as "double deductions" that had been previously claimed as
capital losses in the closed years 1996 through 1999. The court reasoned that
under its applicable precedents and the applicable precedents in the Ninth
Circuit, to which the case was appealable, "[i]f the deductions represent the
same economic loss to [the taxpayer] and [the taxpayer] cannot point to a
specific provision demonstrating Congress' [sic] intent to allow the double
deductions, then the claimed environmental remediation expense deductions
must be disallowed." Factually, there was a "double deduction" because "the
capital loss arose not as a result of how basis was calculated but as a result of
the contingent environmental remediation liabilities being taken into account
in calculating the amount realized (or fair market value) but not in
calculating basis." Furthermore, § 162, a general deduction provision, does
not reflect a "clear declaration of intent" to allow a double deduction.
Moreover, under Ninth Circuit precedent in Stewart v. United States, 739
F.2d 411 (9th Cir. 1984), as well as cases from other courts, it was
immaterial to the application of Charles Ilfeld Co. whether the earlier
deduction was proper or erroneous but not timely challenged by the IRS.
7. District Court upholds BLIPS tax shelter on
taxpayer's partial summary judgment motion. Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 440 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. Tex.
7/20/06). The court (Judge Ward) held that the premium portion of the loans
received from the bank in connection with the funding of the instruments
contributed to a partnership was a contingent obligation, and not a fixed and
determined liability for purposes of § 752. The transaction was entered into
prior to the release of Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 255, which related to
Son-of-BOSS transactions. Judge Ward held that a regulation to the contrary,
Reg. § 1.752-6 (see T.D. 9062), was not effective retroactively, and was
therefore invalid as applied to these transactions. Judge Ward held that there
was clear authority existing at the time of the transaction that the premium
portion of the loan did not reduce taxpayer's basis in the partnership.
a. Klamath on the merits: It does not work
because it lacks economic substance, but no penalties. The authorities
discussed in the Holland & Hart and Olson Lemons opinions provide
"substantial authority." Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United
States, 472 F. Supp. 2d 885 (E.D. Tex. 1/31/07). The transactions lacked
economic substance because the loans would not be used to provide leverage
for foreign currency transactions, but no penalties were applicable because
taxpayers passed on a 1999 investment, they thought they were investing in
foreign currencies, and the tax opinions they received that relied on relevant
authorities set forth in the court's earlier opinion provided "substantial
authority" for the taxpayers' treatment of their basis in their partnerships.
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b. On government motions, Judge Ward
refuses to vacate partial summary judgment decision on the retroactivity
of the regulations under § 752, and he permits the deduction of
operational expenses - despite his earlier finding that the transactions
lacked economic substance - because the taxpayers had profit motives.
Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 99 A.F.T.R.2d
2007-2001 (E.D. Tex. 4/3/07). First, Judge Ward held that even though the
loans lacked economic substance, they still existed, and thus the partial
summary judgment on the non-retroactivity of the regulations under § 752
was not premised on invalid factual assumptions. Second, he held that the
existence of profit motive for deduction of operational expenses was based
on the purposes of Nix and Patterson - and not on the motives of Presidio,
the managing partner of the partnership.
c. Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded, Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 568
F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 5/21/09). In ruling unfavorably on the taxpayers' cross-
appeal of the holding that the transaction lacked economic substance, the
Fifth Circuit (Judge Garza) followed the majority rule, which "is that a lack
of economic substance is sufficient to invalidate the transaction regardless of
whether the taxpayer has motives other than tax avoidance." He stated,
"[t]hus, if a transaction lacks economic substance compelled by business or
regulatory realities, the transaction must be disregarded even if the taxpayers
profess a genuine business purpose without tax-avoidance motivations."
0 In ruling unfavorably on the
government's appeal of the non-imposition of penalties, Judge Garza stated:
The district court found that Patterson and Nix sought legal
advice from qualified accountants and tax attorneys
concerning the legal implications of their investments and
the resulting tax deductions. They hired attorneys to write a
detailed tax opinion, providing the attorneys with access to
all relevant transactional documents. This tax opinion
concluded that the tax treatment at issue complied with
reasonable interpretations of the tax laws. At trial, the
Partnerships' tax expert [Stuart Smith] concluded that the
opinion complied with standards established by Treasury
Circular 230, which addresses conduct of practitioners who
provide tax opinions. Overall, the district court found that
the Partnerships proved by a preponderance of the evidence
that they relied in good faith on the advice of qualified
accountants and tax lawyers.
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d. A small lagniappe to the taxpayers in a
tax shelter. Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. United States, 110
A.F.T.R.2d 2012-6021 (E.D. Tex. 9/24/12). On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals disallowed losses generated by a BLIPS tax shelter
investment which was held to lack economic substance. Klamath Strategic
Investment Fund v. United States, 568 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009). The Court of
Appeals remanded the case to the District Court to determine whether
partnership operational expenses of $903,000 and fees for investment advice
to the partner investors were deductible under § 212. Based on findings by
the trial court, the Court of Appeals indicated that although the transaction
lacked economic substance, the profit motive of the individual investors
would permit the deduction of their economic outlays if the investors
effectively controlled the partnership activities so that their profit motive
would be attributable to the partnership. (The managing partners were held to
have lacked the necessary profit motive to support the deductions.) The
District Court (Judge Gilstrap) found that the partnerships were formed to
effect an investment strategy selected by the investors, the managing partners
were the managing partners "only because [the investors] made it so," the
managing partners were confined to the investment strategy directed by the
investors "who could shut down the whole process by withdrawing from the
partnerships they had created." The court thus held that the investors were
the parties having effective control over the partnerships. The court also held
that $250,000 of investment fees paid to investment advisors who provided
guidance with respect to the partnerships' foreign currency investments were
deductible. The court concluded from its reading of the Court of Appeals
remand that it had jurisdiction to order the refund in the partnership
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that the expenses were not paid or
incurred by the partnerships.
B. Identified "tax avoidance transactions"
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
C. Disclosure and Settlement
1. Not all losses are tax shelter losses. Rev. Proc.
2013-11, 2013-2 I.R.B. 269 (12/06/12). This revenue procedure provides that
certain losses are not taken into account in determining whether a transaction
is a reportable transaction for purposes of the disclosure rules under Reg.
§ 1.6011-4(b)(5). However, these transactions may be reportable transactions
for purposes of the disclosure rules under Reg. § 1.6011-4(b)(2), (b)(3),
(b)(4), (b)(6), or (b)(7). Among the losses not subject to § 6011 are losses
(1) with respect to the sale or exchange of property where the basis was
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determined with respect to cash paid by the taxpayer, or under §§ 358, 1014,
1015, or 1031 (d); (2) from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other casualty, or from
theft, as those terms are defined for purposes of § 165(c)(3); (3) from
compulsory or involuntary conversions as described in § 1231(a)(3)(A)(ii)
and (a)(4)(B); (4) to which § 475(a) or § 1256(a) applies; (5) arising from
hedging transactions described in § 1221(b), if the taxpayer properly
identifies the transaction as a hedging transaction, or from a mixed straddle
account under Reg. § 1.1092(b)-4T; (6) attributable to the abandonment of
depreciable tangible property that was used by the taxpayer in a trade or
business and that has a basis determined in clause (1), supra; (7) arising from
the bulk sale of inventory if the basis of the inventory is determined under
§ 263A; and (8) that are equal to, and determined solely by reference to, a
payment of cash by the taxpayer.
D. Tax Shelter Penalties, etc.
There were no significant developments regarding this topic
during 2012.
IX. EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND CHARITABLE GIVING
A. Exempt Organizations
1. The exclusivity of a gated parking lot for the
neighborhood beach club has a tax price. Ocean Pines Association, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 135 T.C. 276 (8/30/10). The taxpayer was a homeowners
association that was tax-exempt under § 501(c)(4) as a not-for-profit
organized to promote community welfare. In addition to enforcing zoning
and providing roads and recreational facilities within Ocean Pines, funded by
members' dues (but which were open to both members and nonmembers), it
operated a beach club and parking lots eight miles from the area (Ocean
Pines) in which its members lived. The primary beach club facilities (e.g.,
pool, locker room, etc.) and parking lots were accessible only to the
association's members and their guests, but the snack bar, restaurant, and
beach itself were open to the public. The taxpayer charged its members a
separate fee for parking permits, and maintained a parking permit system and
guards. It also leased the parking lots to third-party businesses at night and in
the off season. The taxpayer did not report any of the income as subject to
the unrelated business income tax (UJBIT). The IRS issued a deficiency
notice determining that the net income from the parking lots and beach club
facilities was subject to UBIT, because their operation was not substantially
related to the promotion of community welfare. The Tax Court (Judge
Morrison) upheld the deficiency. The court concluded that the operation of
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the beach club and the parking lots did not promote community welfare
because they were not accessible to nonmembers, i.e., the general public.
Therefore, unless an exception applied, the income was subject to UBIT.
Finally, the court held that the § 512(b)(3)(A)(i) exception for rents from real
property did not apply because Reg. § 1.512(b)-1(c)(5) provides that income
from the operation of a parking lot is not rent from real property.
a. Affirmed - Parking lots and a beach
club that benefit only those who own property in a private community
and their guests that provide "a private refuge for those who would live
apart," do not promote social welfare. Ocean Pines Association, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 672 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 3/2/12). The Fourth Circuit (in an
opinion by Judge Motz) affirmed the Tax Court's decision in favor of the
government. The Court of Appeals made three key points. First, "facilities
that do not permit access to the general public - like the parking lots and
beach club - simply do not promote 'social welfare."' Second, the court
rejected the taxpayer's argument that "'social welfare' must be interpreted
through the lens of the Association's charter, which aims to promote the
community welfare of the Association's members rather than that of the
general public," holding that "[n]otwithstanding the Association's charter,
the purpose that constitutes the basis of the Association's exemption under
§ 501(c)(4) is its promotion of 'social welfare' as defined by the statute and
regulations." (emphasis added by the court) Third, the court rejected the
taxpayer's argument that "Congress's purpose in enacting the unrelated
business income tax was to avoid unfair competition with private enterprise,
and that a rule requiring a business operated by a 501(c)(4) organization to
be open to the general public in order to avoid taxation would frustrate that
purpose." Rather, the court held that "[t]he plain language of the statute and
regulations speak with... clarity ... . [T]he only question. . . is whether the
parking lots and beach club are 'substantially related' to the Association's
tax-exempt purpose," which they were not. Thus, the income was subject to
UBIT.
2. Proposed regulations on program-related
investments. REG-144267-11, Examples of Program-Related Investments,
77 F.R. 23429 (4/19/12). The proposed regulations add nine examples
depicting a wider range of investments that qualify as program-related
investments. The new examples demonstrate that a program-related
investment may accomplish a variety of charitable purposes, such as
advancing science, combating environmental deterioration, and promoting
the arts. Several examples also show that an investment funding activities in
one or more foreign countries, including investments that alleviate the impact
of a natural disaster or that fund educational programs for poor individuals,
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may further the accomplishment of charitable purposes and qualify as a
program-related investment.
B. Charitable Giving
1. Conditionally revocable conservation easements
are no-good. Carpenter v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1 (1/3/12).
Conservation easements that could be extinguished by the mutual consent of
the donor taxpayer and the donee organization failed as a matter of law to
comply with the enforceability in perpetuity requirements under Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g). The easements were not protected in perpetuity and thus
were not qualified conservation contributions under § 170(h)(1).
2. Both their house and their claimed charitable
contribution deduction went up in smoke. Rolfs v. Commissioner, 135
T.C. 471 (11/4/10). The taxpayers donated a home, but not the underlying
land, to the local volunteer fire department to be burned down in a training
exercise. The fire department could not use the house for any purpose other
than destruction by fire in training exercises. The taxpayers claimed a
charitable contribution deduction of $76,000 based on a "before and after"
valuation, comparing the value of the parcel with the building intact and the
value of the parcel after demolition of the building; they complied with all
record keeping and substantiation requirements. The Tax Court (Judge Gale)
upheld the IRS's denial of the deduction. First, based on expert testimony, he
found that the taxpayers received a quid-pro-quo in the amount of $10,000,
which was the value of the demolition services provided to them by the
donee fire department. Second, he found that the building, with ownership
severed from the land and burdened by the condition that it be removed, i.e.,
in this case demolished, had no value. The lack of value was established by
the expert testimony of home movers, who testified that considering the costs
of removal to another site, the modest nature of the home, and the value of
nearby land, no one would purchase the home for more than a nominal
amount, between $100 and $1,000, sufficient to render the contract
enforceable. Applying the principles of Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490
U.S. 680 (1989), and United States v. American Bar Endowment, 477 U.S.
105 (1986), Judge Gale held that because the consideration received by the
taxpayers exceeded the value of the transferred property, there was no
charitable contribution. He rejected application of the "before and after"
valuation method, because that method did not take into account the
restrictions that would have affected the marketability of the structure
severed from the land.
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a. While the Tax Court opinion is very fact specific,
the Court of Appeals affirmance looks to establish a broader principle.
Rolfs v. Commissioner, 668 F.3d 888 (7th Cir. 2/8/12). In an opinion by
Judge Hamilton, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision. The
Seventh Circuit concluded that "proper consideration of the economic effect
of the condition that the house be destroyed reduces the fair market value of
the gift so much that no net value is ever likely to be available for a
deduction, and certainly not here." The appellate court reasoned that "the fair
market valuation of donated property must take into account conditions on
the donation that affect the market value of the donated property," and that
the Tax Court properly rejected the before-and-after method for valuing a
donation of property conditioned on the destruction of the property. The
valuation must take into account any reduction in fair market value that
results from the condition. Moving and salvage, under which the house had
no actual value, were analogous situations reasonably approximated the
actual facts. The before-and-after valuation method proffered by the taxpayer
was not appropriate, because the facts were not analogous to conservation
easements, where that method typically is used; in this case the donation
destroyed the residential value rather than transferring it.
b. Another burning house charitable
contribution deduction goes up in smoke. Patel v. Commissioner, 138 T.C.
No. 23 (6/27/12). In 2006 the taxpayers purchased residential property with
the intention to demolish the house and construct a new one on the site.
Shortly after purchasing the property, the taxpayers obtained a demolition
permit and executed documents granting the local fire department the right to
conduct training exercises on the property and to destroy the house by
burning during the exercises. Soon thereafter live fire training exercises were
conducted, and the house was destroyed. The taxpayers claimed a noncash
charitable contribution of $339,504 for the donation of the house to the fire
department, but the IRS disallowed the deduction on the ground that the
donation was a contribution of a partial interest in property, a deduction for
which is denied by § 170(0(3). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Dawson, the
Tax Court granted summary judgment for the IRS and upheld the denial of
the deduction. The court reasoned that under the controlling (Virginia) state
law, the taxpayers had merely granted the fire department a license to
conduct training exercises on the property and to destroy the building, which
did not convey any interest in the building to the fire department. In doing
so, they conveyed only a partial interest in the land. Section 170(f)(3) thus
denies any charitable contribution deduction for the donation of the use of
the property regardless of the value of that use. However, the taxpayers acted
with reasonable cause and in good faith and were not liable for any accuracy-
related penalty under §§ 6662(a) or (h), because at the time they filed their
return, Scharf v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1973-265, which held that a
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charitable contribution deduction was available for the donation of a building
to a volunteer fire department for demolition in firefighter training exercises,
was the only relevant case law.
0 An appendix explained that a license does
not convey an interest in the property under the common law in any state or the
District of Columbia.
* Judges Colvin, Cohen, Vasquez,
Thornton, Marvel, Gustafson, and Morrison joined in the opinion of the court.
Judge Paris concurred in the result only.
* Judge Gale, in an opinion joined by
Judges Halpern, Foley, Goeke, Wherry, Kroupa, and Holmes, dissented. The
dissent reasoned that the taxpayers had not merely granted a license, but "by
virtue of the fire department's severance and destruction of the house,
petitioners in substance ceded all substantial property interests they held in the
structure to the department." Citing Rolfs v. Commissioner, 668 F.3d at 888 (7th
Cir. 2012), affg 135 T.C. 471 (2010), in which Judge Gale wrote the Tax Court
opinion, the dissent noted that to be entitled to a charitable contribution
deduction, the taxpayers "must show that the value of the house, taking into
account the conditions on its donation, exceeded the value of the benefit they
received from the fire department in the form of demolition services." Thus the
dissenters would have denied the motion for summary judgment and proceeded
to trial on that fact question.
* Judge Kerrigan dissented but did not join
in Judge Gale's dissent or write separately.
3. Mining is not the highest and best use for land
that no one actually wants to mine. Esgar Corp. v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-35 (2/6/12). The taxpayers granted conservation easements in
certain land that was zoned irrigated, agricultural, and which had historically
been used as irrigated and unirrigated farmland. The land was not permitted
for any mining, but absent the donations it was likely that the necessary
permits to mine (gravel) could have been obtained. The terms of the
conservation easements provided the donee organization perpetual rights to
preserve the natural and open space conditions and protect the wildlife,
ecological, and environmental values and water quality characteristics of the
property. The conservation easements specifically prohibited the mining or
extraction of sand, gravel, rock, or any other mineral. The taxpayers valued
the easement donation under the "before and after method," treating the
highest and best use before the donation as gravel mining. The Tax Court
(Judge Wherry) held that the before highest and best use was agricultural, not
mining.
Where . . . an asserted highest and best use differs
from current use, the use must be reasonably probable and
[Vol. 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
have real market value .... "Any suggested use higher than
current use requires both 'closeness in time' and 'reasonable
probability"'. Hilborn v. Commissioner, [85 T.C. 677, 689
(1985)]. Any proposed uses that "depend upon events or
combinations of occurrences which, while within the realm
of possibility, are not fairly shown to be reasonably
probable" are to be excluded from consideration. Olson v.
United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257 (1934).
Where the asserted highest and best use of property
is the extraction of minerals, the presence of the mineral in a
commercially exploitable amount and the existence of a
market "that would justify its extraction in the reasonably
foreseeable future" must be shown. United States v. 69.1
Acres of Land, [942 F.2d 290, 292 (4th Cir. 1991)]. "There
must be some objective support for the future demand,
including volume and duration. Mere physical adaptability
to a use does not establish a market."
0 Based on detailed examination of the
facts and expert witness reports, the evidence did not prove that a hypothetical
willing buyer in the year of the donation would have considered the land as the
site for construction of a gravel mine. "While it would have been physically
possible to mine the properties in 2004 (or in the future), there was no unfilled
demand and there was no unmet market." Instead, Judge Wherry found that
there were comparable sales upon which a before valuation of the contribution
could be based. However, Judge Wherry declined to uphold the § 6662(b)(3)
substantial valuation penalty asserted by the IRS because he found that the
taxpayers relied in good faith on the appraisers and the accounting firm they
hired as advisors.
4. Judge Wells analyzed in detail the expert
testimony concerning four donated conservation easements in the
Columbus, Georgia area. Butler v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-72
(3/19/12). Taxpayers claimed about $10 million of charitable contribution
deductions for four donated easements on large tracts of rural land located in
the direction of the expansion of the city of Columbus, Georgia. The Tax
Court (Judge Wells) allowed deductions totaling about $6.5 million. He
analyzed in detail the reports and testimony of the appraisers for both
taxpayers and the IRS in a lengthy opinion, including a consideration of the
various appraisal methods used, particularly the discounted cash flow
method, the comparable sales method and the so-called "comparable
easements" method. It also deals with the difference between the last two
methods, the latter of which arrives at a percentage diminution in value
caused by the donated easement.
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* As an initial matter, the Tax Court (Judge
Wells) concluded that the taxpayer had produced credible evidence as required
by § 7491(a) with respect to the factual issues regarding whether their
conservation easements satisfied the requirements of § 170(h), thus shifting the
burden of prdof to the IRS. The purposes of the easements were to provide a
significant wildlife resource for the region and enhance the natural aesthetics of
the area; the site offered forage, nesting habitat, and shelter; the public would be
benefitted by cleaner air and water, plentiful game for hunting, and natural
beauty in the area. Among the uses prohibited by the conservation easements
were mineral exploitation, "commercial or industrial facilities (other than those
necessary in the operation or uses of the Property expressly permitted by the
Easement), dumping, billboards, commercial towers, and mobile homes or
recreational vehicles." The conservation deeds did not permit the general public
to access the properties. The conservation deeds reserved numerous rights for
the taxpayer. The taxpayer (or future owners) could partition one of the
properties into smaller tracts averaging 36 acres, each of which would include a
2-acre building site on which a home and a garage could be constructed and
could build on one two-acre building site on the other property. Roads or
driveways could be constructed to access the buildings. The taxpayer (or future
landowners) could operate small-scale farms and could use agrichemicals to
eliminate "noxious weeds" subject only to the exhortation that they "minimiz[e]
the impact upon non-noxious foliage and vegetation." They could construct
dams to create ponds for recreation or irrigation, and they could construct
docks, gazebos, and "related recreational structures." They could clear timber
for agricultural uses, clear brush and remove trees for "aesthetic" purposes, and
plant nonnative species of trees or other plants. The conservation deeds also
permitted a wide variety of other uses provided that those uses do not result in
"demonstrable degradation to the Conservation Values," including the
construction of fences, the construction of other roads besides those that access
the building sites, the construction of an unlimited number of barns and sheds
for agricultural or recreational use on any portion of the property (not just the
two-acre building sites), and commercial timber harvesting pursuant to an
approved timber management plan. The donee had the right to determine
whether such uses would result in degradation to the conservation values. Judge
Wells held that these reserved rights were not inconsistent with the conservation
purpose and allowed the deduction. Even if fully exercised, the rights would not
destroy the habitats and high-quality ecosystems on the property.
& Judge Wells refused to uphold substantial
understatement penalties because taxpayers throughout the process had had
"reasonable cause and acted in good faith" by relying on their long-term
attorney and accountant. The attorney also helped taxpayers in selecting
Conservation Advisors, L.L.C., a real estate firm specializing in conservation
conveyances, which in turn helped them select qualified and experienced
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appraisers who "had access to sufficient information to value the conservation
easements."
5. The old adage "better late than never" didn't
save the taxpayer's deduction for a conservation easement on mortgaged
property. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 16 (4/3/12). In 2003, the
taxpayer contributed a conservation easement over 180 acres of unimproved
land to a qualified organization. The property was subject to a mortgage, but
the mortgagee did not subordinate the mortgage to the conservation easement
deed until 2005. The taxpayer claimed a charitable contribution deduction on
her 2003 Federal income tax return, which the IRS disallowed. The taxpayer
argued that she had met the requirement of Reg. § 1.1 70A-14(g)(2) requiring
subordination of a mortgage to the conservation easement because Reg.
§ 1.170A-14(g)(3) should apply to determine whether the requirements of
Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2) had been satisfied. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3) provides
that a deduction will not be disallowed merely because on the date of the gift
there is the possibility that the interest will be defeated so long as on that date
the possibility of defeat is so remote as to be negligible. The taxpayer argued
that the probability of her defaulting on the mortgage was so remote as to be
negligible, and that the possibility should be disregarded under the so-
remote-as-to-be-negligible standard in determining whether the conservation
easement is enforceable in perpetuity. The Tax Court (Judge Haines) held
that the so-remote-as-to-be-negligible standard of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(3)
does not apply to determine whether the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-
14(g)(2), requiring subordination of a mortgage to the conservation easement
have been satisfied, citing Kaufman v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (2011),
Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (2010), Carpenter v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-1, and distinguishing Simmons v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-208, af'd, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
Thus, the taxpayer did not meet the requirements of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2),
and the deduction was denied. However, the taxpayer was not liable for a
§ 6662 accuracy related penalty. She "attempted to comply with the
requirements for making a charitable contribution of a conservation
easement," she hired an accountant and an appraiser, but she "inadvertently
failed to obtain a subordination agreement" and "upon being made aware of
the need for a subordination agreement she promptly obtained one." She
acted with reasonable cause and in good faith.
6. A "gotcha" for the IRS! The Tax Court just says
"no" to deductions for contributions of conservation easements on
mortgaged properties. Kaufman v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 182 (4/26/10).
The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that as a matter of law no charitable
contribution deduction is allowable for the conveyance of an otherwise
qualifying conveyance of a facade conservation easement if the property is
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subject to a mortgage and the mortgagee has a prior claim to condemnation
and insurance proceeds. Because the mortgage has priority over the
easement, the easement is not protected in perpetuity - which is required by
§ 170(h)(5)(A). The deduction cannot be salvaged by proof that the taxpayer
likely would satisfy the debt secured by the mortgage.
a. Plea for a mulligan is rejected! Kaufman
v. Commissioner, 136 T.C. 294 (4/4/11). On the taxpayers' motion for
reconsideration, the Tax Court (Judge Halpern) in a lengthy and thorough
opinion reaffirmed its earlier decision that the conservation easement failed
the perpetuity requirement in Reg. § 1.170A- 1 4(g)(6), because under the loan
documents, the bank that held the mortgage on the property expressly
retained a 'prior claim' to all insurance proceeds as a result of any casualty,
hazard, or accident occurring to or about the property and all proceeds of
condemnation," and agreement also provided that "the bank was entitled to
those proceeds 'in preference' to [the donee organization] until the mortgage
was satisfied and discharged." The court also disallowed a deduction in
2003, but allowed the deduction in 2004, for a cash contribution to the donee
of the conservation easement in 2003 because the amount of the cash
payment was subject to refund if the appraised value of the easement was
zero, and the appraisal was not determined until 2004. The court also
rejected the IRS's argument that the taxpayers received a quidpro quo for
the cash contribution in the form of the donee organization accepting and
processing their application, providing them with a form preservation
restriction agreement, undertaking to obtain approvals from the necessary
government authorities, securing the lender agreement from the bank, giving
the taxpayers basic tax advice, and providing them with a list of approved
appraisers. The facts in evidence did not demonstrate a quid pro quo,
because, among other things, many of the tasks had been undertaken by the
organization before the check was received.
. Finally, the court declined to uphold the
§ 6662 accuracy related penalties asserted by the IRS for the taxpayers'
overstatement of the amount of the contribution for the conservation easement,
but sustained the negligence penalty for the 2003 deduction for the cash
payment. Because the issue of whether any deduction was allowed for the
easement, regardless of its value, was a matter of law decided in the case as a
matter of first impression, the taxpayers were not negligent, had reasonable
cause, and acted in good faith.
b. The taxpayer wins the battle in the Court
of Appeals with an excellent discussion of charitable contributions of
easements on mortgaged property, but still might lose the war. Kaufman
v. Commissioner, 687 F.3d 21 (1st Cir. 7/19/12). The First Circuit, however,
[Vol 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
in an opinion by Judge Boudin, disagreed with the Tax Court, holding that a
mortgagee's right to satisfy the mortgage lien before the donee of the
conservation easement is entitled to any amount from the sales or
condemnation proceeds from the property does not necessarily defeat the
charitable contribution deduction. Judge Boudin's opinion noted that "the
Kaufmans had no power to make the mortgage-holding bank give up its own
protection against fire or condemnation and, more striking, no power to
defeat tax liens that the city might use to reach the same insurance proceeds
- tax liens being superior to most prior claims, 1 Powell on Real Property
§ 10B.06[6] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., Matthew Bender & Co. 2012),
including in Massachusetts the claims of the mortgage holder.",6 The opinion
continued by observing that
[G]iven the ubiquity of super-priority for tax liens, the IRS's
reading of its regulation would appear to doom practically
all donations of easements, which is surely contrary to the
purpose of Congress. We normally defer to an agency's
reasonable reading of its own regulations, e.g., United States
v. Cleveland Indians Baseball Co., 532 U.S. 200, 220
(2001), but cannot find reasonable an impromptu reading
that is not compelled and would defeat the purpose of the
statute, as we think is the case here.
Thus, the First Circuit rejected the Tax Court's requirement that the donee of
the conservation easement have "an absolute right" (136 T.C. at 313),
holding that a "grant that is absolute against the owner-donor" is sufficient
"and almost the same as an absolute one where third-party claims (here, the
bank's or the city's) are contingent and unlikely."
0 The First Circuit went on to reject the
IRS's argument that contribution also failed to qualify for a charitable
contribution deduction because a provision in the agreement between the
Kaufmans and the donee trust stated that "nothing herein contained shall be
construed to limit the [Trust's] right to give its consent (e.g., to changes in the
Fagade) or to abandon some or all of its rights hereunder," citing Commissioner
v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011), which reasoned that such clauses
permitting consent and abandonment 'have no discrete effect upon the
perpetuity of the easements: Any donee might fail to enforce a conservation
easement, with or without a clause stating it may consent to a change or
abandon its rights, and a tax-exempt organization would do so at its peril.'
(quoting 646 F.3d at 10).
* The court also rejected various scattershot
IRS arguments that the substantiation rules had not been met.
6. We include the citation to Powell on Real Property in the quotation
because Michael Allan Wolf is a colleague of Professor McMahon's, and the UF
Dean rewards faculty members based, in part, on their citation count.
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* However, the Court of Appeals did not
necessarily hand the taxpayers a final victory. It remanded the case to the Tax
Court on the valuation issue.
When the Kaufmans donated the easement, their
home was already subject to South End Landmark District
rules that severely restrict the alterations that property
owners can make to the exteriors of historic buildings in the
neighborhood. These rules provide that "[a]ll proposed
changes or alterations" to "all elements of [the] facade, ...
the front yard ... and the portions of roofs that are visible
from public streets" will be "subject to review" by the local
landmark district commission.
Under the Standards and Criteria, property owners
of South End buildings have an obligation to retain and
repair the original steps, stairs, railings, balustrades,
balconies, entryways, transoms, sidelights, exterior walls,
windows, roofs, and front-yard fences (along with certain
"other features"); and, when the damaged elements are
beyond repair, property owners may only replace them with
elements that look like the originals. Given these pre-
existing legal obligations the Tax Court might well find on
remand that the Kaufmans' easement was worth little or
nothing.
* The court took note of the fact that in
persuading the Kaufmans to grant the easement, "a Trust representative told the
Kaufmans that experience showed that such easements did not reduce resale
value, and this could easily be the IRS's opening argument in a valuation trial."
7. But the Tax Court sticks by its guns on the
mortgaged property conservation easement issue. Minnick v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-345 (12/17/12). Once again, the Tax Court
(Judge Morrison) has held that pursuant to Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(2), no
charitable contribution deduction is allowable for the donation of a
conservation easement where a mortgage encumbering the property has not
been subordinated to the interest of the donee of the easement. The court
emphasized its holding in Mitchell v Commissioner, 138 T.C. 324 (2012),
that the unlikelihood of default is irrelevant.
8. If the donee messes up on the written
acknowledgement, your only recourse is to have the chaplain punch
your Tare Sugar chit [Tango Sierra chit, if you were in the military after
the 1950s] because Judge Cohen won't help you. Durden v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-140 (5/17/12). A letter from taxpayers'
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church, dated 1/10/08, acknowledged numerous contributions during 2007,
mostly in amounts of $250 or more, totaling $22,517; however the letter
lacked a statement that no goods or services were provided to taxpayers in
exchange for their contributions. A second letter from the church contained
that statement but was dated 6/21/09 - after the IRS sent a notice of
deficiency disallowing most of the claimed charitable contribution
deductions. The Tax Court (Judge Cohen) held that the second letter was
untimely and the first letter was insufficient, so the taxpayers' charitable
contributions of $250 or more were disallowed under § 170(f)(8).
* Unless there are damning facts not
reflected in the opinion, shouldn't there have been a better way for the IRS to
have handled this matter?
9. You can't be your own appraiser, even if you
might be qualified! "A taxpayer relies on his private interpretation of a
tax form at his own risk." Mohamed v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-
152 (5/29/12). The taxpayer, a real-estate broker and certified real-estate
appraiser, donated five real estate properties worth millions of dollars to a
charitable trust. The taxpayer prepared his own tax return, including the
Form 8283, Noncash Charitable Contributions, claiming charitable
contribution deductions of over $3,000,000, even though the properties were
worth over $15,000,000. The taxpayer left blank the Declaration of
Appraiser because it stated, "I declare that I am not the donor, the donee, a
party to the transaction," and he recognized that he was the donor (and the
donee, since he was trustee of the Trust), but he did sign the Donee
Acknowledgment saying that the Trust was a qualified organization under
§ 170(c) and that the Trust had actually received the claimed donations. The
taxpayer also attached two statements to the tax return. The first was
captioned "Statement of Explanation for Entry on Line 6 of Schedule A,"
and gave the addresses of the properties, more detailed descriptions of their
size and improvements, and values for the properties. The second one, titled
"Appraised Market Values," elaborated on the appraisal. He signed the
second document, and under his signature indicated that his title was "Real
Estate Broker/Appraiser." In the course of an audit over valuation, the
taxpayer hired an independent appraiser whose valuations were relatively
consistent with the taxpayer's valuations, but the IRS thereupon asserted that
no deduction was allowable for failure to comply with the Reg. § 1.170A-
13(c) substantiation requirements, which among other things require a
"qualified appraisal," which under the regulations cannot be the donor or
taxpayer claiming the deduction or the donee of the property. The taxpayer
thus was not a qualified appraiser, and his attachments to the tax return did
not qualify as the required appraisal summary that must be attached to the
return because they failed to include information about several of the
required categories on Forms 8283 and the attached statements. The Tax
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Court (Judge Holmes) granted summary judgment to the IRS, upholding the
validity of the regulations - no surprise - and finding that the taxpayer had
failed to satisfy the "substantial compliance" doctrine, because "[t]he cases
make clear that substantial compliance requires a qualified appraisal," but
excuses certain other minor deviations from the regulations requirements.
Lastly, Judge Holmes rejected the taxpayer's "last-ditch effort" to save the
deductions by arguing that Form 8283 for the years in question did not
indicate that a taxpayer had to get an independent appraisal for contributions
worth more than $5,000 and presented conflicting messages about what
could be filled out by the taxpayer and what required an appraiser's
signature. "We can't hold the form's failings against the Commissioner here,
because 'the authoritative sources of Federal tax law are in the statutes,
regulations, and judicial decisions and not in such informal publications."'
10. According to Judge Wells, you can write your
own acknowledgment of the donee's receipt of your charitable
contribution. Averyt v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-198 (7/16/12).
The Tax Court (Judge Wells) held that a conservation easement deed reciting
that the easement had been conveyed for "no consideration" satisfied the
requirements of § 170(f)(8), even though the letter from the donee
organization acknowledging the contribution did not satisfy § 170(f)(8)
because it failed to state that no goods or services were received in exchange
for the contribution. The letter recited that the taxpayer's sons had received
"pens and pencils," which it was stipulated never had been received, but the
letter nevertheless did not qualify, even though the pens and pencils would
have had only nominal value, because the letters did not comply with the
requirements of Rev. Proc. 90-12, § 2.05, 1990-1 C.B. 471, 472 (because the
contribution was not pursuant to a fund-raising campaign).
. Section 170(t)(8)(B) provides that the
contemporaneous written acknowledgment must include the following
information: (i) The amount of cash and a description (but not value) of any
property other than cash contributed; (ii) Whether the donee organization
provided any goods or services in consideration, in whole or in part, for any
property described in clause (i); (iii) A description and good faith estimate of
the value of any goods or services referred to in clause (ii). Section 170(f)(8)(C)
defines a "contemporaneous" acknowledgment as one received on or before the
earlier of: (i) the date on which the taxpayer files a return for the year when the
contribution was made; or (ii) the due date for that return, including any
extensions.
11. Another case allowing the taxpayer to write the
receipt. You just have to remember to get it countersigned by the donee.
RP Golf, LLC v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-282 (10/3/12). The Tax
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Court (Judge Paris) held that a conservation deed signed by donee trust's
representative, as well as by donor, satisfied the § 170(f)(8) written
acknowledgment requirement. The deed provided detailed description of
property and easement, and was contemporaneous with donation. The deed
"stated that the conservation easement was an unconditional gift, recited no
consideration received in exchange for it, and stipulated that it constituted
the entire agreement between the parties with respect to the contribution of
the conservation easement." Accordingly, the "deed, taken as a whole, stated
that no goods or services were received in exchange for the contribution."
12. Maybe it's time for the IRS to stop trying to deny
conservation easement deductions due to imaginary foot faults. Irby v.
Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 14 (10/25/12). The Tax Court (Judge Jacobs)
allowed a charitable contribution deduction for the contribution to a qualified
organization, via a bargain sale, of conservation easements that placed on the
use of property a variety of limitations that served to protect the relatively
natural habitat for fish, wildlife, and plants and to preserve open space and
agricultural resources. Although the donee was required to reimburse the
government agencies that funded the bargain purchase price in the event it
received proceeds if the land to which the easements related was condemned
and the easements were extinguished, the conservation purpose for the
easements was protected in perpetuity. The donee would have received its
full share of the condemnation proceeds vis-a-vis the donor taxpayers, and
there was no risk that the donors would reap a windfall in the event of
condemnation. While the donee was required to reimburse the funding
governments, the requirement of Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)(6)(i) that all of the
extinguishment proceeds would be used by donee in a manner consistent
with the conservation purposes of the original contribution was met because
the reimbursement under the terms of the conservation deeds would enhance
the ability of the funding governmental agencies to conserve and protect
more land, since the reimbursed funds would be used for that purpose. Judge
Jacobs rejected the IRS's argument that the deduction should be denied on
the ground that the taxpayer's appraisal report was not a "qualified appraisal"
because the report did not include explicit statements that the appraisal was
prepared for income tax purposes.
[T]he appraisal report in this case included all of the
required information either in the appraisal or in the
appraisal summaries attached to petitioners' respective
returns-it included a discussion of the purpose of the
transaction (i.e., that the purpose of the appraisal was to
value the donation of a conservation easement pursuant to
the terms of section 170(h)) . . . ; it stated that fair market
valuation was to be used in determining the value of the
property; and Form 8283 was properly filed with petitioners'
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respective returns. The IRS has not provided to the public a
specific form for the tax purpose statement, and respondent
has not proffered any instance where a suboptimal tax
purpose statement, by itself, invalidated an otherwise
qualified appraisal.
0 Finally, Judge Jacobs rebuffed the IRS's
argument that the deduction should be disallowed on the ground that the
taxpayers did not obtain contemporaneous written acknowledgments from the
donee indicating the amount of goods or services that received for the
contribution. He concluded that collectively (1) the option agreement between
the donors and the donee, (2) the Forms 8283 attached to the taxpayers' tax
returns, (3) letters from the donee to the donors states that it was a qualified
§ 170(h) organization and would receive and hold the conservation deeds with
respect to the parcels, (4) the settlement statements prepared by the title
company in the transaction, which list the amounts paid as part of the bargain
sale, and (5) the conservation deeds, which stated the source of funding for the
bargain purchase, described the donated property, and listed the responsibilities
and rights that the donors and donees had regarding the enforcement of the
easement - all of which were prepared before the taxpayers income tax returns
were filed - contained sufficient information to constitute a contemporaneous
written acknowledgment despite the absence of any statement that no services
were received by the donors (because goods were received by the donors in
their bargain sales).
13. Contributions to a disregarded entity owned by a
charity. Notice 2012-52, 2012-35 I.R.B. 317 (7/31/12). This Notice holds
that the IRS will treat a contribution to a disregarded single member LLC
that is wholly owned and controlled by a U.S. charity as a charitable
contribution to a branch or division of the U.S. charity.
14. No Mardi Gras beads from the Tax Court for
this taxpayer. Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 131
T.C. 112 (10/30/08). The Tax Court (Judge Halpern) held that, as a
precondition to using the replacement cost approach to valuing real estate,
the taxpayer must show that the property is unusual in nature and other
methods of valuation, such as comparable sales or income capitalization, are
not applicable. The income approach to valuation is favored only where
comparable market sales are absent. On the facts, the value of the
contribution of a conservation facade easement for an historic structure on
the edge of the French Quarter in New Orleans was overstated. The
accuracy-related penalty for gross overvaluation was proper because there
was no good faith investigation into the value.
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a. Regardless of which valuation method is
used, it still must relate to the property's "highest and best use."
Whitehouse Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 615 F.3d 321 (5th
Cir. 8/10/10). In an opinion by Judge Barksdale, the Fifth Circuit vacated the
Tax Court's decision and remanded the case for a determination of the
easement's value, although it rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the
IRS's expert was unqualified and that his report was unreliable and should
not have been admitted. But the Court of Appeals agreed with the taxpayers'
argument that the Tax Court "miscomprehended the highest and best use" of
the building subjected to the conservation easement, and thereby
undervalued the easement.
In sum, the tax court erred in declining to consider
the Maison Blanche and Kress buildings' highest and best
use in the light of both the reasonable and probable
condominium regime and the reasonable and probable
combination of those buildings into a single functional unit,
both of which foreclosed the realistic possibility, for
valuation purposes, that the Kress and Maison Blanche
buildings could come under separate ownership. This
combination affected the buildings' fair market value.
0 As result the court did not reach the Tax
Court's holding that the income and replacement-cost methods of valuation
were inapplicable and directed the tax court to consider those methods, in
addition to comparable sales method on remand. Because the holding on the
valuation was vacated, the Tax Court's holding that the gross overvaluation
penalty also was vacated.
b. Judge Halpern reconsiders the whole case
in light of the Fifth Circuit decision and increases the allowable
deduction by only $65,415, from $1,792,301 to $1,857,716. Whitehouse
Hotel Limited Partnership v. Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 13 (10/23/12). On
remand, Judge Halpem elaborated at length on the proper valuation method
to be used to value the building under the "before and after" method, and
once again accepted the IRS's argument that the value of the property should
be determined using a comparable-sales method. The comparable-sales
method applied by Judge Halpem was based on the sales of buildings
suitable for conversion into hotels based primarily on local sales data,
rejecting the taxpayer's argument that non-local sales data should be taken
into account. He again rejected both the taxpayer's reproduction-cost method
and income method to valuation. Judge Halpem explained that "[tjhe
reproduction cost of an historic building usually bears little relationship to its
present economic value. Such cost is usually far in excess of the cost of
construction of a similarly sized modem structure, and may reflect the price
of materials and workmanship that are no longer readily available." Because
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reconstruction of the Maison Blanche Building, if destroyed, would not have
been a reasonable business venture, there was no probative correlation
between the taxpayer's expert's estimate of the reproduction cost of the
Maison Blanche Building and the fair market value of the property. Judge
Halpern rejected the income valuation method because in this case, where
there was no ongoing business, it was based on too many contingencies, was
inadequately developed, and thus was too speculative, particularly where the
value could be established by comparable sales. He did not reject the income
method of valuation as a matter of law. He stated: "We have no difficulty
with the process. Where we have difficulty is with petitioner's call to trust on
their face [the taxpayer's expert's] judgments as to values to be input to his
model." Judge Halpern also again found that the easement conveyance did
not deprive the partnership or any subsequent owner of the ability to add
stories to the top of the Kress Building or blocking views of the Maison
Blanche facade. However, in light of the Fifth Circuit's directive, Judge
Halpern determined the value of the facade conservation easement based on
the before- and after-restriction values of the combined Maison Blanche and
Kress Building property. He concluded that the value of the easement was
approximately $1.86 million, rather than $1.79 million as determined in his
first opinion. Responding to the Fifth Circuit's determination that he had
misapprehended the properties highest and best use, Judge Halpern reasoned
that "although the highest and best use of property may determine a ceiling
on how much a willing buyer would pay for the property, it does not
necessarily determine a floor on how little a willing seller would accept. ...
[T]he hypothetical willing buyer and the hypothetical willing seller who
populate our standard definition of fair market value will not invariably
conclude their negotiation over price at a price reflecting the value of the
property at its highest and best use." He turned to auction price theory to
conclude that in determining the fair market value of the property, which is
the relevant benchmark, "the equilibrium price at which the willing buyer
and the willing seller would meet would be somewhere between the value of
the property taking into account its most productive use (i.e., its highest and
best use) and the value of the property taking into account its second most
profitable use." Accordingly, he rejected the taxpayer's argument that the
valuation should be based on the use of the buildings as the shell of a luxury
hotel, there being no scarcity of buildings in New Orleans suitable for
development as luxury hotels. "Only if there were sufficient scarcity would
the partnership . . . capture a piece of the economic return to luxury hotel
development of the building's shell." Finally, based on the $1.86 million
value, the claimed value of the exceeded 400 percent of the actual value and
the § 6662(h) gross valuation misstatement penalty applied. The § 6664(c)
reasonable cause and good-faith exceptions did not apply, because
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Whitehouse failed to make a good-faith investigation of the value of the
easement and did not reasonably rely on an appraisal.
15. Congress wants old folks to give their IRAs to
charity. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and not so grand compromise) Tax Act,
§ 208(b)(2), retroactively extends the allowance of Code § 408(d)(8) that
permits taxpayers 702 years or older to take a $100,000 IRA distribution and
contribute it to charity without recognizing income and without affecting the
charitable contribution limitation of § 170 to contributed distributions made
in tax years before 1/1/14. In addition, taxpayers may elect to treat
distributions made in January 2013 as made on 12/31/12. Taxpayers are also
allowed to elect to treat any distribution in December 2012 as a qualified
charitable distribution if the distribution was transferred in cash to a
charitable organization by 1/31/13.
16. Let's go green for a few more years;
contributions of conservation easements. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and
not so grand compromise) Tax Act, § 206, extended through 2013 the
provisions of Code § 170 allowing a deduction for a qualified conservation
contribution made by an individual or corporate farmer or rancher in tax
years beginning after 12/31/05 of up to 100% of the taxpayer's taxable
income. The limits under Code § 170(e) are 50% of the taxpayer's charitable
conservation base over other allowable charitable contributions, 100% for
farmers and ranchers, with a fifteen year carryforward.
X. TAx PROCEDURE
A. Interest, Penalties, and Prosecutions
1. The instructions for the new FBAR are FUBAR.
IR-2009-58 and Announcement 2009-51, 2009-1 C.B. 1105 (6/5/09). The
IRS announced that for the Reports of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts
(FBARs) due on 6/30/09, filers of Form TD F 90-22.1 (Rev. 10-2008) need
not comply with the new instruction relating to the definition of a United
States Person, i.e.:
United States Person. The term "United States person"
means a citizen or resident of the United States, or a person
in and doing business in the United States. See 31 C.F.R.
103.11 (z) for a complete definition of 'person.' The United
States includes the states, territories and possessions of the
United States. See the definition of United States at 31
C.F.R. 103.1 l(nn) for a complete definition of United States.
A foreign subsidiary of a United States person is not
required to file this report, although its United States parent
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corporation may be required to do so. A branch of a foreign
entity that is doing business in the United States is required
to file this report even if not separately incorporated under
U.S. law.
Instead, for this year, taxpayers and
others can rely on the definition of a United States person included in the
instruction to the prior form (7-2000):
United States Person. The term "United States person"
means: (1) a citizen or resident of the United States; (2) a
domestic partnership; (3) a domestic corporation; or (4) a
domestic estate or trust.
a. Notice 2009-62, 2009-2 C.B. 260 (8/7/09).
By this notice, the IRS extended the filing deadline until 6/30/10 to report
foreign financial accounts on Form TD F 90-22.1 for persons with signature
authority over (but no financial interest in) a foreign financial account and
persons with signature authority over, or financial interests in, a foreign
commingled fund.
b. Still clear as mud: New definitions and
instructions. RIN 1506-ABO8, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network;
Amendment to the Bank Secrecy Act Regulations - Reports of Foreign
Financial Accounts, 75 F.R. 8844 (2/26/10). This proposed rule would
include a definition of "United States person" and definitions of "bank
account," "securities account," and "other financial account," as well as of
"foreign country." It also includes draft instructions to Form TD F 90-22.1
(FBAR).
(1) Notice 2010-23, 2010-1 C.B. 441
(2/26/10). Provided administrative relief to certain person who may be
required to file an FBAR for the 2009 and earlier calendar years by
extending the filing deadline until 6/30/11 for persons with signature
authority, but no financial interest in, a foreign financial account for which
an FBAR would have otherwise been due on 6/30/10. It also provides relief
with respect to mutual funds.
(2) Announcement 2010-16, 2010-
1C.B. 450 (2/26/10). The IRS suspended, for persons who are not U.S.
citizens, U.S. residents, or domestic entities, the requirement to file an FBAR
for the 2009 and earlier calendar years.
C. Second (or, is it the third?) special
voluntary disclosure initiative available through 8/31/11. IR-2011-14
(2/8/11). The 2011 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Initiative is similar to the
2009 Offshore Voluntary Disclosure Program with a 25-percent penalty and
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an 8-year look-back requirement (both slightly-increased from 2009). There
are lower penalties in some limited situations (5 percent), and where offshore
accounts do not surpass $75,000 (12.5 percent). All original and amended tax
returns must be filed and payment of all taxes, interest, and penalties must be
made by the 8/31/11 deadline.
Subsequent Q&As offer the possibility of
a 90-day extension to complete the voluntary disclosure where total compliance
had not been made by the deadline despite good faith attempts. See Q&A 25.1.
d. Additional relief for persons with
signature authority. Notice 2011-54, 2011-29 I.R.B. 53 (6/16/11). Provides
additional relief to persons whose requirement to file Form TD-F 90-22.1,
Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (FBAR), for calendar year
2009 or earlier calendar years was based solely upon signature authority.
Their deadline is now 11/1/11. The deadline for reporting signature authority
over, or a financial interest in, foreign financial accounts for the 2010
calendar year was 6/30/11.
* Reporting problems occur for former
employees, as well as with respect to foreign accounts that give signature
authority to "all officers."
e. Complying with FATCA may cause tax
return preparers to become confused. IR-2011-117 (12/14/11). An
information return on Form 8938 must be filed by individuals with more than
the threshold amount for foreign financial assets. It will serve as a check on
foreign financial institutions providing Form 1099 with respect to income
from such assets.
f. And the proposed FATCA regulations
place an unwanted burden on foreign financial institutions to the point
that many of them refuse to open accounts for U.S. citizens. REG-
121647-10, Regulations Relating to Information Reporting by Foreign
Financial Institutions and Withholding on Certain Payments to Foreign
Financial Institutions and Other Foreign Entities, 77 F.R. 9022 (2/15/12).
The Treasury Department has published proposed regulations under §§ 1471
through 1474, regarding information reporting by foreign financial
institutions (FFIs) with respect to U.S. accounts and withholding on certain
payments to FFIs and other foreign entities. These regulations affect persons
making certain U.S.-related payments to FFIs and other foreign entities and
payments by FFIs to other persons.
g. r.a "This is a song that doesn't end. / It
goes on and on, my friend .... " ,r Third (or fourth) voluntary
disclosure program is announced. IR-2012-5 (1/9/12). The IRS has
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announced the reopening of the offshore voluntary disclosure program
(OVDP) following the closure of the 2011 and 2009 programs. There is no
set deadline within which to apply, but the program could be changed or
terminated at any time. The penalty structure for the program will be similar
to the 2011 program except the highest penalty will be 27.5 percent instead
of 25 percent. Details are available on the IRS website.
2. A careful reading of this criminal tax fraud case
should put the fear of God, or at least of the CID and DOJ, in the hearts
of many tax shelter investors. United States v. Rozin, 664 F.3d 1052 (6th
Cir. 1/6/12). The Sixth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Rogers, upheld the
defendant's conviction for criminal tax fraud. The defendant had claimed
business and individual tax deductions for the cost of so-called "loss of
income" (LOI) insurance policies, although the insurance aspect of the
policies was questionable, and the policies allegedly permitted the defendant
to reclaim or maintain control of the amount paid as premiums. The LOI
policies insured against loss of income due to certain circumstances,
including corporate downsizing, changes in technology, or employee layoffs
arising within one year from the date the policy was issued, but did not cover
the following: death; disability; voluntary termination; self-inflicted injuries;
proven criminal acts; negligent or willful misconduct; substance abuse;
dishonesty or fraud; insubordination, incompetence, or inefficiency; conflict
of interest; or breach of employment contract. In conjunction with the LOI
insurance policy, the defendant also purchased from the same "return of
premium" (ROP) riders. If no claim was filed on the LOI policy, under the
rider the LOI premium would be invested for the policy owner and would be
distributed to the owner after ten years or at age sixty-five. According to the
promotional materials, the LOI premium payments (but not the rider) were
deductible. In convicting the defendant of tax evasion and conspiracy to
defraud the IRS, the District Court noted:
(1) the lack of a "true business purpose for purchasing the
various LOI policies," (2) the "dubious nature" of the
policies, including the high premium to coverage ratio, as
well as the practice of backdating, (3) Rozin's access to and
control over the funds, (4) Rozin's descriptions of the
policies to [friends to whom he recommended the scheme]
as "tax-savings product[s]," and (5) the differences between
the policies Rozin bought and those that were advertised in
[the insurance broker's] promotional materials.
The District Court held that "Rozin did not have a good faith reliance
defense because he withheld relevant information and had reason to suspect
the motives of the individuals on whom he supposedly relied." In upholding
the conviction, the Court of Appeals made the following points:
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(1) "Though peddled as 'insurance,' . . . the covered risks -
corporate downsizing, employee layoffs, and technological obsolescence -
were unlikely to happen to Rozin because he was an owner of a carpet
company. Many of the most obvious causes of loss of income, such as death,
disability, voluntary termination, and breach of contract, were not covered,
and Rozin, Inc. was not under any immediate threat of bankruptcy." In
addition, unlike other legitimate insurance policies, Rozin maintained control
of the funds; when pitching the LOI policies to potential buyers, Rozin
described them as "a way to lower your taxes" while also receiving "a large
percentage of that money back."
(2) "[B]ackdating the LOI policies showed willfulness, because
there was no reason for such backdating other than to claim the improper tax
deductions."
(3) "When selling the LOI policies to friends, Rozin stated
outright that about eighty-five percent of the money would 'come back and
be held in a trust' that the individual would 'have control over.' Evidence
that Rozin knew that he would have access to most of his money, while
reaping the benefits of a large tax deduction, would permit a rational trier of
fact to find that he willfully utilized the LOI policies in order to evade taxes."
(4) "Because Rozin either did not provide full information to
those he supposedly relied upon, or he had reason to believe that the advice
provided by these individuals was incorrect, the district court correctly held
that Rozin could not mount a credible good faith reliance defense."
(5) "Because [the CPA who prepared the tax returns] was not
aware of the full facts regarding the LOI policies, Rozin cannot claim that he
relied on [his] advice in good faith."
(6) "Rozin did not rely on Cohen, let alone rely on Cohen in
good faith. . . . Cohen also told Rozin that if the IRS did 'challenge the
deduction,' the worst thing that Rozin would have to do would be to pay the
taxes owed plus interest. Noting the possibility that the IRS could challenge
the deduction should have raised a red flag for Rozin, giving him reason to
suspect that the information Cohen provided him was incorrect. In addition.
Cohen's motivations were at least suspect because he received
commissions from the sale of the LOI policies."
. If those "factors" don't describe a lot of
tax shelter investors to a "T," we don't know what does!
3. Hiding funds to try to cheat creditors isn't the
same as hiding them to try to cheat the IRS, even if the effect is the
same. Avenell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-32 (2/2/12). The
taxpayer diverted funds from the corporation (Tacon) of which he was the
president and a 96 percent shareholder. The primary issue in the case was not
whether he was liable for income taxes on the diverted funds, but whether he
was liable for the civil tax fraud penalty. The taxpayer, represented by Larry
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Sherlock of the Chamberlain Hrdlicka firm, argued that he did not divert the
funds with intent to evade tax but rather to hide the funds from a judgment
creditor of the corporation. Even though part of the taxpayer's behavior
included the use of a Cayman Island bank account, Judge Kroupa held that
the IRS had failed to prove fraud by clear and convincing evidence. She
reasoned that "he did not understand that Tacon was a separate entity and
that Tacon's funds were different and separate from his own .... [S]pending
company funds for personal use is not per se fraudulent .... [P]etitioner's
actions stemmed from an intent to avoid judgment collection coupled with a
lack of sophistication about and attention to legal obligations and financial
details."
4. Inconsistent Forms 1099 from year to year for
the same payment give rise to a "reasonable cause" defense to accuracy
related penalties. Sewards v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 15 (4/2/12). The
taxpayer, who had been a policeman until he retired following a service
related injury, was eligible for two types of retirement plans: (1) a service
retirement based on his length of service (service retirement) and (2) a
service-connected disability retirement based on his service-connected
injuries (SCD retirement). Under the SCD plan, a policeman was eligible for
a benefit equal to the greater of(1) one-half of final salary, or (2) the service
retirement benefit. One-half of the taxpayer's salary was $7,046 annually
while the service benefit was $12,861. The taxpayer originally received 2001
and 2002 Forms 1099-R indicating that his service retirement payments were
fully taxable. After his SCD retirement became effective, he received
amended 2001 and 2002 Forms 1099-R indicating that the taxable amount
was not determined. He subsequently received 2003, 2004, and 2005 Forms
1099-R also indicating that the taxable amount was not determined. A letter
dated December 20, 2006, notified the taxpayer that beginning in 2006
benefits equal to 50 percent of his final compensation would be reported as
taxable, and he received a 2006 Form 1099-R indicating a portion of his
SCD retirement payments was taxable, but the taxpayer did not report any of
his benefits as taxable income. The Tax Court (Judge Foley) held that an
amount equal to the minimum payment under the SCD retirement plan -
one-half of final salary - was excludable under § 104(a)(1) as an amount
received pursuant to a workmen's compensation act or a statute in the nature
of a workmen's compensation act. But the remaining benefit was not
excludable because it was determined by reference to the employee's age or
length of service, citing Reg. § 1.104-1 (b). However, Judge Foley declined to
uphold the § 6662 accuracy-related penalties imposed by the IRS. He held
that the taxpayer had reasonable cause because over the course of several
years the Forms 1099 varied.
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5. Filing a false return or aiding and abetting the
filing of a false return by a lawful permanent resident alien carries a
really stiff penalty. Bye-bye America! Kawashima v. Holder, 132 S. Ct.
1166 (2/21/12). In a 6-3 decision written by Justice Thomas, the Supreme
Court held that a lawful permanent resident alien could be deported as a
result of conviction of willfully making and subscribing a false (not
necessarily fraudulent) tax return, which is a criminal offense under§ 7206(1), or a conviction for aiding and assisting in the preparation of a
false tax return, which is a criminal offense under § 7206(2). The convictions
qualified as crimes involving fraud or deceit under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1 101 (a)(43)(M)(i) (Clause (i)) and thus were aggravated felonies for which
the taxpayers could be deported under 8 U.S.C.§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
0 Justice Ginsburg's dissenting opinion
makes a great deal of sense.
6. The Steve Martin excuse7 doesn't work in the
Seventh Circuit. Failure to file for nearly twenty years isn't mere
negligence. United States v. Collins, 685 F.3d 651 (7th Cir. 7/6/12). The
defendant, who failed to file income tax returns for almost twenty years, was
convicted of tax evasion. On appeal, he argued that the use of the Seventh
Circuit pattern jury instructions for tax evasion was erroneous because they
did not distinguish the crime of tax evasion from a "mere negligent failure to
file a tax return." The Court of Appeals (Judge Sykes) affirmed, stating that
"it's not remotely plausible to attribute a tax delinquency of almost two
decades to mere negligence." A jury does not need to "be specifically
instructed that 'willful' tax evasion requires more than a mere negligent
failure to file a return."
7. The IRS tells you how to apologize for filing a
frivolous return and get the penalty reduced, but only once. Rev. Proc.
2012-43, 2012-49 I.R.B. 643 (11/5/12). This revenue procedure describes the
limited circumstances in which a person may be eligible for a one-time
reduction of any unpaid § 6702 frivolous return penalty. If a person satisfies
all eligibility criteria, including filing all tax returns and paying all
outstanding taxes, penalties (other than under § 6702), and related interest,
the IRS will reduce all unpaid § 6702 penalties assessed against that person
to $500.
8. Instructions on how to rat yourself out. Rev. Proc.
2012-51, 2012-51 I.R.B. 719 (11/26/12). This revenue procedure updates
Rev. Proc. 2012-15, 2012-7 I.R.B. 369 and identifies circumstances under
which the disclosure on a taxpayer's income tax return with respect to an
7. "1 forgot."
2013]
Florida Tax Review
item or a position is adequate for the purpose of reducing the understatement
of income tax under § 6662(d), relating to the substantial understatement
aspect of the accuracy-related penalty, and for the purpose of avoiding the
tax return preparer penalty under § 6694(a), relating to understatements due
to unreasonable positions). There have been no substantive changes. The
revenue procedure does not apply with respect to any other penalty
provisions, including § 6662(b)(1) accuracy-related penalties. If this revenue
procedure does not include an item, disclosure is adequate with respect to
that item only if made on a properly completed Form 8275 or 8275-R, as
appropriate, attached to the return for the year or to a qualified amended
return.
9. Freedom for preparers to use taxpayer return
information to increase their own profitability. T.D. 9608, Disclosure or
Use of Information by Preparers of Returns, 77 F.R. 76400 (12/28/12). The
Treasury has finalized Prop. Reg. §§ 301.7216-2(n) through 301. 72 16-2 (p)
(REG-131028-09, Amendments to the Section 7216 Regulations -
Disclosure or Use of Information by Preparers of Returns), replacing Temp.
Reg. §§ 301.7216-2T(n) through 301.7216-2T(p). 75 F.R. 94 (1/04/10). Reg.
§ 301.7216-2(n) allows preparers to compile, maintain, and use a list
containing solely the names, addresses, e-mail addresses, phone numbers,
taxpayer entity classification, and income tax return form numbers of
taxpayers whose tax returns the tax return preparer has prepared, if the list is
used only to contact the taxpayers on the list either (1) to provide tax, general
business, or economic information for educational purposes, or (2) for
soliciting additional tax return preparation services. Reg. § 301.7216-2(o)
allows return preparers to use tax return information, subject to limitations to
produce a statistical compilation of data described in Reg. § 301.7216-
l(b)(3)(i)(B) for a purpose relating directly to the internal management or
support of the tax return preparer's tax return preparation business, or to
bona fide research or public policy discussions concerning state or federal
taxation; disclosure of the statistical compilation must be anonymous as to
taxpayer identity, and may not disclose an aggregate figure containing data
from fewer than ten tax returns. Reg. § 301.7216-2(p) allows return preparers
to disclose return information without penalty for the purpose of a quality or
peer review, but only to the extent necessary to accomplish the review. The
information also may be used to perform a conflict of interest check.
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B. Discovery: Summonses and FOIA
1. You can't hide your foreign bank account
records behind the Fifth Amendment. In re M.H., 648 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir.
8/19/11), cert. denied, 133 S.Ct. 26 (6/25/12). M.H. was the target of a grand
jury investigation seeking to determine whether he used secret Swiss bank
accounts to evade paying federal taxes. The District Court granted a motion
to compel his compliance with a grand jury subpoena duces tecum
demanding that he produce certain records related to his foreign bank
accounts. The District Court declined to condition its order compelling
production upon a grant of limited immunity and, pursuant to the recalcitrant
witness statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1826, held him in contempt for refusing to
comply. The Ninth Circuit upheld the District Court order. The Court of
Appeals held that "[b]ecause the records sought through the subpoena fall
under the Required Records Doctrine, the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is inapplicable, and M.H. may not invoke it to resist
compliance with the subpoena's command." The records were required to be
kept pursuant to the predecessor of 31 C.F.R. § 1010.420.
a. When the government asks, ya gotta pony
up the name(s) on your foreign bank accounts, the account numbers, the
name and address of the banks, the type of account, and the maximum
value of each such account during each year. In re Special February 2011-
1 Grand Jury Subpoena Dated September 12, 2011, 691 F.3d 903 (7th Cir.
8/27/12). In an opinion by Judge Bauer, the Seventh Circuit held that the
compulsory production of foreign bank account records required to be
maintained under the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 does not violate a taxpayer's
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The required records
doctrine overrode any act of production privilege. A grand jury subpoena
seeking his bank records issued in connection with an investigation into
whether he used secret offshore bank accounts to evade his federal income
taxes was enforced.
b. A third decision going the same way. In re
Grand Jury Subpoena, 696 F.3d 428 (5th Cir. 9/21/12). The Fifth Circuit
(Judge Dennis), in reversing a district court, declined to create a circuit split
and held that the required records doctrine applied; the individual was
required to produce foreign bank records subpoenaed in the IRS's
investigation into whether he used secret Swiss bank accounts [with UBS] to
evade his federal income taxes. The court's reasoning was that the Bank
Secrecy Act's record-keeping requirement is "essentially regulatory," the
records sought are of a kind "customarily kept" by account holders, and the
records have assumed "public aspects"; this is so even though one purpose of
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the BSA was to aid law enforcement officials in pursuing criminal
investigations.
C. Litigation Costs
1. Shades of the nineteenth century. A written
opinion in a case with $71 dollars at stake. Dale v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-146 (5/22/12). In a case in which the IRS conceded that the
taxpayer was entitled to attorney's fees under § 7430, Judge Kroupa held that
a taxpayer may not recover "costs for secretarial and clerical work performed
by a secretary ($37.50), an assistant ($23) and a 'staff member ($10.50)
(collectively, fees at issue)" that were not subsumed in the attorney's hourly
rate.
D. Statutory Notice of Deficiency
1. The Eleventh Circuit reverses the Tax Court by
reading WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY.
Shockley v. Commissioner, 686 F.3d 1228 (1 1th Cir. 7/11/12). The Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (Judge Hull) reversed a Tax Court decision,
T.C. Memo. 2011-96, in which the Tax Court held that if it determines that
the deficiency notice with respect to which the petition was filed is invalid,
then the period of limitations is not suspended. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that the proposition that limiting this holding to only petitions filed
in response to a valid deficiency notice "cannot be found on the face of the
suspension statute, nor can it be squared with the plain language of the
statute."
Here, the breadth of § 6503(a)(1)'s plain language
indicates the 2005 petition qualifies as a "proceeding in
respect of the [SCC] deficiency." First, the proceeding need
only be "in respect of' the deficiency, not seeking "a
redetermination of" the deficiency. The phrase "in respect
of' is particularly comprehensive, with one dictionary
ascribing a definition of "as to; as regards; insofar as
concerns; [or] with respect to." Webster's Third New
International Dictionary 1934 (1993); cf Kosak v. United
States, 465 U.S. 848, 854, 104 S. Ct. 1519, 1523 (1984)
(describing the phrase "arising in respect of' in a section of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), as
"encompassing"). This choice of phrase is in contrast to a
closely related statute, § 6213(a), where Congress selected
the more specific phrase "redetermination of' the deficiency.
In our view, the phrase "in respect of' in § 6503(a)(1)
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requires only that the substance of the proceeding concern
the deficiency.
0 Presumably, the Tax Court will continue
to follow its own precedent in future cases that are not appealable to the
Eleventh Circuit.
E. Statute of Limitations
1. The courts hold that overstating basis is not the
same as understating gross income, but the Treasury Department
ultimately plays its trump card by promulgating regulations. Section
6501 (e)(1) extends the normal three-year period of limitations to six years if
the taxpayer omits from gross income an amount in excess of 25 percent of
the gross income stated in the return. Section 6229(c)(2) provides a similar
extension of the statute of limitations under § 6229(a) for assessments arising
out of TEFRA partnership proceedings. A critical question is whether the six
year statute of limitations applies if the taxpayer overstates basis and as a
consequence understates gross income.
a. The Tax Court says overstating basis is
not the same as understating gross income. Bakersfield Energy Partners,
LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (6/14/07). The taxpayer overstated basis,
resulting in an understatement of § 1231 gain. Looking to Supreme Court
precedent under the statutory predecessor of § 6501(e) in the 1939 Code
(Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958)), from which the six-year
statute of limitations in § 6229(c)(2) is derived and to which it is analogous,
the Tax Court concluded that this understated gain was not an omission of
"gross income" that would invoke the six-year statute of limitations under
§ 6229(c)(2) applicable to partnership audits.
b. The Ninth Circuit likes the way the Tax
Court thinks: Bakersfield Energy Partners is affirmed. Bakersfield Energy
Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6/17/09). The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the Tax Court on the grounds that the language at issue in
the instant case was the same as the statutory language interpreted in Colony.
The court noted, however, that "[t]he IRS's interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A)
is reasonable."
c. And a judge of the Court of Federal
Claims agrees. Grapevine Imports, Ltd v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 505
(7/17/07), rev'd, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 3/11/11). In a TEFRA partnership
tax shelter case, the Court of Federal Claims (Judge Allegra) held that the
§ 6501(e) six-year statute of limitations does not apply to basis
overstatements, citing Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958).
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Section 650 1(e), rather than § 6229(c)(2) as in Bakersfield Energy Partners,
LP, applied because in earlier proceedings in the instant case (71 Fed. Cl.
324 (2006)), the court had held that § 6229 did not create an independent
statute of limitations, but instead only provides a minimum period for
assessment for partnership items that could extend the § 6501 statute of
limitations, and because the FPAA was sent within this six-year statute of
limitations under § 6229(d) the statute of limitations with respect to the
partners was suspended.
d. But a District Court in Florida disagrees.
Brandon Ridge Partners v. United States, 100 A.F.T.R.2d 2007-5347 (M.D.
Fla. 7/30/07). The court refused to follow Bakersfield Energy Partners and
Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) 6-year statute of limitations
does apply to basis overstatements. The court reasoned that as a result of
subsequent amendments to the relevant Code sections, the application of
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), is limited to situations
described in § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of
goods or services. ["In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross
income' means the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of
goods or services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return)
prior to diminution by the cost of such sales or services."] The court
reasoned that to conclude otherwise would render § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)
superfluous. Because the transaction at issue was the partnership's sale of
stock, which was not a business sale of goods or services, the gross receipts
test did not apply. On the facts, the partners and partnership returns (and
statements attached thereto), taken together "failed to adequately apprise the
IRS of the true amount of gain on the sale of the ... stock." Thus, the
partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable.
e. And a different judge of the Court of
Federal Claims agrees with the District Court in Florida and disagrees
with the prior Court of Federal Claims opinion by a different judge in
Grapevine Imports. Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 189
(11/9/07). The court (Judge Miller) refused to follow Bakersfield Energy
Partners and Grapevine Imports and held that the § 6501(e) six-year statute
of limitations does apply to basis overstatements. Judge Miller reasoned that
an understatement of "gain" is an omission of gross income, and that
omission can result from a basis overstatement as well as from an
understatement of the amount realized. Like the Brandon Ridge Partners
court, Judge Miller concluded that the application of Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), is limited to situations described in
§ 6501(e)(1)(A)(i), which applies to trade or business sales of goods or
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services. ("In the case of a trade or business, the term 'gross income' means
the total of the amounts received or accrued from the sale of goods or
services (if such amounts are required to be shown on the return) prior to
diminution by the cost of such sales or services.") Because the transaction at
issue was the partnership's sale of a ranch, which was not a business sale of
goods or services, the gross receipts test did not apply. On the facts, the
partners' and partnership returns failed to adequately apprise the IRS of the
amount of gain in a variant of the Son-of-Boss tax shelter. Accordingly, the
partnership did not show that the extended limitations period was
inapplicable. The amended order certified an interlocutory appeal and stayed
the case pending further court order, because of the split of opinion between
Salman Ranch, on the one hand, and Bakersfield Energy Partners and
Brandon Ridge Partners, on the other hand.
f. And the pro-government opinion by
Judge Miller is slapped down by the Federal Circuit. Salman Ranch Ltd.
v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 7/30/09). Following Colony, Inc.
v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), the Federal Circuit (Judge Schall, 2-1)
held that "omits from gross income an amount properly includible therein" in
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) does not include an overstatement of basis. Accordingly, the
six-year statute of limitations on assessment did not apply - the normal
three-year period of limitations applied. Judge Newman dissented.
g. But a second District Court sees it the
government's way. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 599 F.
Supp. 2d 678 (E.D.N.C. 10/21/08), rev'd, 634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2/7/11),
aff'd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (4/25/12). The court held that §6501(e) extends the
statute of limitations for deficiencies attributable to basis overstatements that
result in omitted gross income exceeding 25 percent of the gross income
reported on the return. The court refused to follow the Tax Court's decisions
in Bakersfield Energy Partners and Grapevine Imports, because it concluded
that those cases were erroneously decided.
h. A hiccup from Judge Goeke in the Tax
Court: Overstated basis in an abusive tax shelter is a substantial
omission from gross income that extends the statute of limitations.
Highwood Partners v. Commissioner, 133 T.C. 1 (8/13/09). The taxpayers
invested through partnerships in foreign currency digital options contracts
designed to increase partnership basis and generate losses marketed by
Jenkens & Gilchrist (Son-of-Boss and miscellaneous other names). After
expiration of the three-year statute of limitations, the IRS issued an FPAA to
the partnership based on the six-year statute of §6501(e)(1) applicable if
there was a greater than 25 percent omission of gross income on each
partner's or the partnership's return. The court (Judge Goeke) held that the
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digital options contracts produced § 988 exchange gain on foreign currency
transactions, which, under the regulations, are required to be separately
stated. The long and short positions of the options contracts were treated as
separate transactions. Thus, failure to report the gain on the short position,
not offset by losses on the accompanying stock sale, represented an omission
of gross income. The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that
because the IRS asserted that the options transactions should be disregarded
in full, there can be no omission of gross income from the disregarded short
position. Finally, the court refused to apply the adequate disclosure safe
harbor of § 6501(e)(1)(A)(ii) because the taxpayer's netting of the gain and
loss from the long and short positions was intended to mislead and hide the
existence of the gain and did not apprise the IRS of the existence of the gain.
i. But Judge Haines follows the Tax Court
orthodoxy. Beard v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-184 (8/11/09), rev'd,
633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1/26/11). In a basis offset deal involving contributions
of long and short positions in Treasury notes contributed to S corporations,
the court (Judge Haines) granted summary judgment to the taxpayer holding
that the basis overstatement attributable to the short sale was not a substantial
omission of gross income. Because the transaction involved Treasury notes,
there were no § 988 issues involved. This holding is consistent with
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
6/17/09), and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir.
7/30/09).
j. And the IRS loses again in the Tax Court.
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2009-195 (9/1/09). The court (Judge Wherry), again following Bakersfield
Energy Partners LP v. Commissioner, 128 T.C. 207 (2007), granted
summary judgment to the taxpayer holding that a basis overstatement is not a
substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six-year extended
statute of limitations under § 6229.
k. Finally, the IRS gets the upper hand with
temporary regulations. T.D. 9466, Definition of Omission from Gross
Income, 74 F.R. 49321 (9/28/09). Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and
301.6501(e)- 1T both provide that for purposes of determining whether there
is a substantial omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to a trade
or business includes the total amount received from the sale of goods or
services, without reduction for the cost of goods sold; gross income
otherwise has the same meaning as under § 61(a). The regulations add that,
"[i]n the case of amounts received or accrued that relate to the disposition of
property, and except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, gross
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income means the excess of the amount realized from the disposition of the
property over the unrecovered cost or other basis of the property.
Consequently, except as provided in paragraph (a)(1)(ii) of this section, an
understated amount of gross income resulting from an overstatement of
unrecovered cost or other basis constitutes an omission from gross income
for purposes of section 6229(c)(2)."
1. But the IRS still suffers from a hangover
in cases on which the extended statute had run before the effective date
of the regulations. UTAM, Ltd v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2009-253
(11/9/09), rev'd, 645 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 6/21/11). Judge Kroupa followed
Bakersfield Energy Partners to hold that the statute of limitations is not
extended to six years pursuant to § 6229(c)(2) or § 6501(e)(1)(A) as a result
of a basis overstatement that causes gross income to be understated by more
than 25 percent.
Although the date of the decision was
after the effective date of Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and 301.6501(e)-
IT, the result was dictated by prior law effective when the FPAA was issued in
1999.
m. Judge Wherry shoves it up the
Commissioner all the way to his "Colon(-y)" in a reviewed Tax Court
decision that holds the Temporary Regulations invalid. Intermountain
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211 (5/6/10) (reviewed,
7-0-6), supplementing T.C. Memo. 2009-195 (9/1/09) (granting summary
judgment to the taxpayer, holding that a basis overstatement is not a
substantial omission from gross income that triggers the six year extended
statute of limitations under § 6229), rev'd, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 6/21/11).
On the IRS's motions to reconsider and vacate in light of Temp. Reg.
§§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1T and 301.6501(e)-iT, the Tax Court (Judge Wherry)
held that the Supreme Court's opinion in Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357
U.S. 28 (1958), "'unambiguously forecloses the [IRS's] interpretation' ...
and displaces [the] temporary regulations." The first ground was that the
temporary regulations were specifically limited their application to "taxable
years with respect to which the applicable period for assessing tax did not
expire before September 24, 2009," and in this case that period was not open
as of that date. The second ground was that the Supreme Court had held in
Colony that the statute was unambiguous in light of its legislative history and
foreclosed temporary regulations to the contrary.
0 Judges Halpem and Holmes concurred in
the result. They stated that they were not persuaded by either of the majority's
analyses, but that the temporary regulations should be invalidated on procedural
grounds for failure to comply with the Administrative Procedure Act's notice-
and-comment requirement.
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n. "Tax Court, we'll see ya at high noon in
front of the courts of appeals," says the IRS. T.D. 9511, Definition of
Omission From Gross Income, 75 F.R. 78897 (12/17/10). The IRS and
Treasury have finalized amendments to Regs. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-1 and
301.6501(e)-i, replacing Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6229(c)(2)-lT and 301.6501(e)-
IT, T.D. 9466, Definition of Omission from Gross Income, 74 F.R. 49321
(9/28/09). The final regulations are identical to the Temporary Regulations in
providing that for purposes of determining whether there is a substantial
omission of gross income, gross income as it relates to a trade or business
includes the total amount received from the sale of goods or services, without
reduction for the cost of goods sold; gross income otherwise has the same
meaning as under § 6 1(a).
0 The IRS and Treasury declared in the
preamble that they believed that the Tax Court's decision in Intermountain
Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211 (5/6/10), invalidating
the Temporary Regulations, was erroneous:
The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
disagree with Intermountain. The Supreme Court stated in
Colony that the statutory phrase "omits from gross income"
is ambiguous, meaning that it is susceptible to more than one
reasonable interpretation. The interpretation adopted by the
Supreme Court in Colony represented that court's
interpretation of the phrase but not the only permissible
interpretation of it. Under the authority of Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967,
982-83 (2005), the Treasury Department and the Internal
Revenue Service are permitted to adopt another reasonable
interpretation of "omits from gross income," particularly as
it is used in a new statutory setting.
* According to the preamble, the final
regulations have been clarified to emphasize that they only apply to open tax
years and do not reopen closed tax years. However, the preamble states:
The Tax Court's majority in Intermountain erroneously
interpreted the applicability provisions of the temporary and
proposed regulations, which provided that the regulations
applied to taxable years with respect to which "the
applicable period for assessing tax did not expire before
September 24, 2009." The Internal Revenue Service will
continue to adhere to the position that "the applicable
period" of limitations is not the "general" three-year
limitations period .... Consistent with that position, the final
regulations apply to taxable years with respect to which the
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six-year period for assessing tax under section 6229(c)(2) or
650 1(e)(1) was open on or after September 24, 2009.
o. And the government wins in the Seventh
Circuit, without any help from the Temporary Regulations. Beard v.
Commissioner, 633 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 1/26/11), rev'g T.C. Memo 2009-184
(8/11/09). The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Evans, reversed the
Tax Court's decision that an overstatement of basis results in an omission of
gross income that triggers the six year statute of limitations under
§ 6501(e)(1)(A). In a very carefully reasoned opinion, (but see the Burks
case, below) the court concluded that the Supreme Court's decision in
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958) was not controlling. The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that Colony was both factually different - Colony
involved an overstatement of the basis of lots held by a real estate developer
for sale to customers in the ordinary course of business, while the instant
case involved an overstatement of basis in a partnership interest in a Son-of-
BOSS tax shelter transaction - and legally different because of changes
between the 1939 Code § 275(c), which was interpreted in Colony and 1954
Code § 6501(e). The court held that "Colony's holding is inherently qualified
by the facts of the case before the Court, facts which differ from our case,
where the Beards' omission was not in the course of trade or business." From
the perspective of statutory interpretation, the court focused on the impact of
the addition of § 6501 (e)(1)(B)(ii) in the 1954 Code, which provides that "in
determining the amount omitted from gross income, there shall not be taken
into account any amount which is omitted from gross income stated in the
return if such amount is disclosed in the return, or in a statement attached to
the return, in a manner adequate to apprise the Secretary of the nature and
amount of such item." Quoting Phinney v. Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1968), the court stated "[w]e conclude that the enactment of subsection (ii)..
of section 6501(e)(1)[(B)] makes it apparent that the six year statute is
intended to apply where there is either a complete omission of an item of
income of the requisite amount or misstating of the nature of an item of
income which places the "commissioner ... at a special disadvantage in
detecting errors." (emphasis supplied in original). Even though it
distinguished Colony and concluded that it was "left without precedential
authority," the court nevertheless concluded that because the language of
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) at issue in the case was identical to the language of § 275(c)
interpreted in Colony, it was required to interpret § 6501(e)(1)(A) in light of
Colony. However, it also reasoned that it must "bear in mind" that Congress
did add subsections (i) and (ii) to § 6501(e)(1)(B) and that "the section as a
whole should be read as a gestalt." In analyzing Colony, the court noted that
the Supreme Court had found § 275(c) to be ambiguous, but was more
persuaded by the taxpayer's argument that focused on the word "omits." The
Seventh Circuit noted that what Colony "does not address in depth is 'gross
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income' which is defined generally in Section 61 of the Code as 'all income
from whatever source derived,"' but which is not defined in § 6501(e) except
for the special definition in § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i) that applies to trade or
business income. The court then went on to hold:
Using these definitions and applying standard rules
of statutory construction to give equal weight to each term
and avoid rendering parts of the language superfluous, we
find that a plain reading of Section 6501(e)(1)(A) would
include an inflation of basis as an omission of gross income
in non-trade or business situations .... It seems to us that an
improper inflation of basis is definitively a "leav[ing]out"
from "any income from whatever source derived" of a
quantitative "amount" properly includible. There is an
amount - the difference between the inflated and actual
basis - which has been left unmentioned on the face of the
tax return as a candidate for inclusion in gross income.
. The court was reinforced in its conclusion
by the existence of § 6501(e)(1)(B)(i), reasoning that "[i]f the omissions from
gross income contemplated Section 6501(e)(1)(A) were only specific items
such as receipts and accruals, then the special definition in subsection (i) would
be, if not superfluous, certainly diminished. The addition of this subsection
suggests that the definition of gross income for the purposes of Section
6501(e)(1)(A) is meant to encompass more than the types of specific items
contemplated by the Colony holding." The Seventh Circuit considered
Bakersfield Energy Partners v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir. 6/17/09),
and Salman Ranch Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 7/30/09), to
have been erroneously decided. Finally, the court addressed the parties'
arguments regarding the impact of Temp. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-IT(a)(1)(a).
Rather than ruling on the validity of the regulation, however, the court stated
that because it did not find Colony controlling and reached its decision that the
six-year statute of limitations applied on the face of the Code section, it would
not reach the validity of the regulation. However, in dictum, the court stated that
it would be inclined to grant deference to Temp. Reg. § 301.6501(e)-
1T(a)(1)(a), even though it was issued without notice and comment, citing
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002), for the proposition that "the absence
of notice-and-comment procedures is not dispositive to the finding of Chevron
deference."
p. But the Fourth Circuit relied on Colony
to find for the taxpayer. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States,
634 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2/7/11), affd, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (4/25/12). The Fourth
Circuit (Judge Wynn) held that Colony decided that 1954 Code
§ 6501(e)(1)(A) was unambiguous and that an overstated basis in property is
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not an omission from gross income that extends the limitations period. It
further held that Reg. § 301.6501(e)-l(e) by its plain terms did not apply to
the tax year in this case because the six-year limitations period had expired
before the regulation was issued. Judge Wynn stated:
Like the Ninth and Federal Circuits, we hold that the
Supreme Court in Colony straightforwardly construed the
phrase "omits from gross income," unhinged from any
dependency on the taxpayer's identity as a trade or business
selling goods or services. There is, therefore, no ground to
conclude that the holding in Colony is limited to cases
involving a trade or business selling goods or services....
Further, the Supreme Court's discussion of the
legislative history behind former § 275(c) is equally
compelling with regard to current § 6501(e)(1)(A). The
language the Court construed in former § 275(c) - "omits
from gross income an amount properly includable therein"
- is identical to the language at issue in § 6501(e)(1)(A).
Because there has been no material change between former
§ 275(c) and current § 6501(e)(1)(A), and no change at all to
the most pertinent language, we are not free to construe an
omission from gross income as something other than a
failure to report "some income receipt or accrual." . . . Thus,
we join the Ninth and Federal Circuits and conclude that
Colony forecloses the argument that Home Concrete's
overstated basis in its reporting of the short sale proceeds
resulted in an omission from its reported gross income.
0 Judge Wynn concluded that the
regulation was "not entitled to deference."
q. As did the Fifth Circuit, which chided the
Seventh Circuit for misinterpreting a Fifth Circuit case on which it
relied in Beard. Burks v. United States, 633 F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2/9/11). The
Fifth Circuit (Judge DeMoss) also held that an overstatement of basis is not
an omission from gross income for purposes of § 6501(e)(1)(A). Judge
DeMoss disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of Phinney v.
Chambers, 392 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1968), as limiting Colony, stating that "the
Seventh Circuit failed to note the distinct factual pattern presented in
Phinney, where the taxpayers had misstated the very nature of the item so
that the IRS would not have had any reasonable way of detecting the error on
the tax return. That is not the case here."
0 In its final footnote, the court stated:
Although we hold that § 6501(e)(1)(A) is
unambiguous and its meaning is controlled by the Supreme
Court's decision in Colony, we note that even if the statute
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was ambiguous and Colony was inapplicable, it is unclear
whether the Regulations would be entitled to Chevron
deference under Mayo Foundation for Medical Research v.
United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (2011). See, e.g., Home
Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, [634 F.3d 249]
(4th Cir. Feb. 7, 2011) (declining to afford the Regulations
Chevron deference because the statute is unambiguous as
recognized by the Supreme Court in Colony). In Mayo, the
Court held that the principles underlying its decision in
Chevron "apply with full force in the tax context" and
applied Chevron to treasury regulations issued pursuant to
26 U.S.C. § 7805(a). Id. at 707. Significantly, in Mayo the
Supreme Court was not faced with a situation where, during
the pendency of the suit, the treasury promulgated
determinative, retroactive regulations following prior
adverse judicial decisions on the identical legal issue.
"Deference to what appears to be nothing more than an
agency's convenient litigating position" is "entirely
inappropriate." Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 213 (1988). The Commissioner "may not take
advantage of his power to promulgate retroactive regulations
during the course of a litigation for the purpose of providing
himself with a defense based on the presumption of validity
accorded to such regulations." Chock Full O' Nuts Corp. v.
United States, 453 F.2d 300, 303 (2d Cir. 1971).
Moreover, Mayo emphasized that the regulations at
issue had been promulgated following notice and comment
procedures, "a consideration identified ... as a significant
sign that a rule merits Chevron deference." 131 S. Ct. at 714.
Legislative regulations are generally subject to notice and
comment procedure pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A). Here, the
government issued the Temporary Regulations without
subjecting them to notice and comment procedures. This is a
practice that the Treasury apparently employs regularly. See
Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to
Treasury's (Lack oJ) Compliance with Administrative
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1153, 1158-60 (2008) (noting that the treasury
frequently issues purportedly binding temporary regulations
open to notice and comment only after promulgation and
often denies the applicability of the notice and comment
procedure when issuing its regulations because that
[Vol 13: 10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
requirement does not apply to regulations that are not a
significant regulatory action, while continuing to assert that
the regulations are entitled to legislative regulation level
deference before the courts). That the government allowed
for notice and comment after the final Regulations were
enacted is not an acceptable substitute for prepromulgation
notice and comment. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 595
F.2d 207, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1979).
r. Finally, a court that read Colony very
very carefully and understands what Colony really said and what it
really did not say. Grapevine Imports. Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 3/11/11), rev'g 77 Fed. Cl. 505 (2007). The Federal Circuit, in a
unanimous panel opinion by Judge Prost, reversed the Court of Federal
Claims holding that the six-year statute of limitations does not apply to an
understatement of gross income attributable to a basis overstatement. The
Court of Federal Claims had relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958). However, the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit applied Reg. § 301.6229(c)(2)-l and Reg.
§ 301.6501(e)-i, after first concluding that the Supreme Court's opinion in
Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and Research v. United States, 131
S. Ct. 704 (2011), unambiguously held that a subsequently promulgated
Treasury Regulation could overrule a prior judicial decision (including a
Supreme Court decision), as long as the regulation was valid under the
standards of Chevron, USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). Preliminarily the court found that the regulations, "state
that Colony did not conclusively resolve the statutory interpretation issue,
and that overstatement of basis (outside the trade or business context) can
trigger the extended limitations period." A critical point in the court's
reasoning was that the decision in Colony did not hold that the language in
question, which is the language that § 6501(e)(1) has in common with
§ 275(c) of the 1939 Code that was at issue in Colony, was unambiguous.
[T]he Supreme Court expressly found the predecessor statute
ambiguous, and turned to the legislative history to resolve
the question. [Colony, Inc., 357 U.S. at 33] ("[I]t cannot be
said that the language [of the statute] is unambiguous.").
And while it is true that the Court later referred to the
updated § 6501 (e)(1)(A) as "unambiguous," it did not rely or
elaborate on that statement, nor was the updated statute at
issue in that case.... Further, in Colony the taxpayer was in
the business of land sales, so § 6501(e)(1)(A)(i)'s test for
income "in the case of a trade or business" expressly
applied. That is not the case here. The ambiguity concerns
what to do outside the trade and business context, and the
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only language in § 6501(e)(1)(A) applicable outside the
trade or business context is the same language from the
predecessor statute, "omits from gross income an amount."
The Supreme Court previously noted that this term was
ambiguous as to whether it encompassed an overstated basis.
We therefore find Colony no bar to our finding that the text
of the relevant statutes, standing alone, is ambiguous as to
the disposition of this issue.
0 Turning to Chevron step one analysis, the
Court of Appeals concluded that § § 6229(c)(2) and 6501(e) are ambiguous, and
that the Treasury thus "is entitled to promulgate its own interpretation of these
statutes, and to have that interpretation given deference by the courts so long as
it is within the bounds of reason."
[T]he Tax Code's use of the term "omits" suggests that the
section is primarily addressed to the return where the
taxpayer has "fail[ed] to include or mention" or "le[ft] out"
some item rather than misrepresenting it (as by an
overstatement of basis). . . . But without looking beyond the
text itself, we cannot say that the statute forecloses the
possibility that a taxpayer's overstated basis might constitute
an omission from gross income.
* Turning to the second step of the Chevron
analysis, which asks whether the regulations constitute "a reasonable policy
choice for the agency to make," the court concluded that the regulations are
reasonable, even though they depart from the judicial interpretation of Colony
and Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. United States, 573 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2009). Next,
the court rejected the taxpayer's arguments that the regulations were invalid
because they were "retroactive," noting that in Automobile Club of Michigan v.
Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180 (1957), the Supreme Court confirmed that
§ 7805(b) authorizes retroactive regulations. The court also rejected an
argument by the taxpayer - one which we confess not to understand - that the
statute of limitation expired upon the entry of judgment by the Court of Federal
Claims, notwithstanding rules tolling the period of limitations during a pending
appeal. Finally, based on Supreme Court precedent, the court rejected the
taxpayer's claim that the Treasury did not have the power to affect the outcome
of the appeal by promulgating regulations after the trial court decision and
before the appeal was heard.
s. Did anyone really expect the Tax Court to
roll over and play dead just because the IRS promulgates regulations
that say it wins? Carpenter Family Investments, LLC v. Commissioner, 136
T.C. 373 (4/25/11). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Wherry, in which only
four other judges joined, but with a number of concurrences and no dissents,
[Vol. 13:10
Recent Developments in Federal Income Taxation
the Tax Court once again held that the six year statute of limitations under
§§ 6501(e) and 6229(c)(2) do not apply to understatements of gross income
attributable to basis overstatements. In doing so the court held that final Reg.
§§ 301.6501(e)-iT and 301.6229(c)(2)-1T are invalid, just as it had held in
Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 134 T.C. 211
(5/6/10), that Temp. Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-iT and 301.6229(c)(2)-1T were
invalid. Noting that the case was appealable to the Ninth Circuit, in which
Bakersfield Energy Partners, LP v. Commissioner, 568 F.3d 767 (9th Cir.
6/17/09), is the controlling precedent, the Tax Court followed the line of
reasoning previously applied by it, Bakersfield Energy Partners, and some
other courts, that the Supreme Court's decision in Colony, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958), was not limited to situations involving a
trade or business and that it controlled the interpretation of § 6501(e)(1)(A).
The court then turned to whether Reg. §§ 301.6501(e)-iT and
301.6229(c)(2)-1T were entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and Mayo Foundation
for Medical Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704, 711 (1/11/11), and
determined that they were not entitled to deference. In this context the court
observed that Mayo "focuses exclusively on the statutory text at Chevron
step one and suggests (by negative implication) a disfavor of using
legislative history at that stage. We are not persuaded, however, that after
Mayo, any judicial construction that examines legislative history is
automatically relegated to a Chevron step two holding by that fact alone." In
proceeding to analyze whether under the authority of Nat'l Cable &
Telecomms. Ass' v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005), the
Treasury Department and the IRS have the power to promulgate regulations
overturning prior court decision, the court appears first to have concluded
that "only if an 'unwise judicial construction' represents a policy choice,
must it yield to 'the wisdom of the agency's policy."' In the end, however,
the court appears also to have grounded its decision on what it perceived to
be ambiguities in the preamble of T.D. 9511, which promulgated the
regulations at issue and which the court infers did not strongly enough
invoke a power under Brand X as the basis for promulgating the regulations.
The final passage of its reasoning as follows:
Even if we read the Supreme Court's recent Mayo opinion as
a license to categorize most judicial constructions that
discuss legislative history as Chevron step two decisions,
respondent has yet to unabashedly accept the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's invitation and issue
regulations that unequivocally repudiate the Colony holding.
Unless and until he does so, his hands must remain tied.
0 Judge Thomton's concurring opinion,
with which Judges Cohen, Halpem, Holmes, and Paris agreed, would have
decided the case solely on the grounds that the result "follows from the
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unambiguous terms of the statute," and there is no compelling reason for the
Tax Court to abandon its precedents.
0 Judges Halpem and Holmes joined in
another concurring opinion discussing the scope and meaning of Chevron and
BrandX.
t. And the Tenth Circuit also likes the way
the IRS thinks. Salman Ranch, Ltd. v. Commissioner, 647 F.3d 929 (10th
Cir. 5/31/11). In a case involving a different tax year for the taxpayer, the
Federal Circuit held, (see e. and f., above) that the extended statute of
limitations did not apply to this partnership for its 1999 year. Subsequently,
in Grapevine Imports, Ltd. v. United States, 636 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir.
3/11/11) (see r., above) the Federal Circuit overruled its pro-partnership
decision in the 1999 Salman Ranch case. In this separate case for this
partnership's 2001 and 2002 years, the Tax Court had held collateral
estoppel required summary judgment be granted for the partnership. The
Tenth Circuit (Judge Seymour) reversed and remanded, holding that
collateral estoppel was inapplicable because of an intervening change in law,
i.e., the final regulations (see n., above). Judge Seymour based his decision
that the final regulations were entitled to Chevron deference based upon the
Supreme Court's holdings in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education and
Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 713 (1/11/11), and refused to follow
contrary authority among the cases discussed above.
u. And the government chalks up another
victory in front of a panel that really understands the proposition for
which Colony stands and the propositions for which it really does not
stand [or, does it?]. Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v.
Commissioner, 650 F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 6/21/11). After a thorough
examination of the history of § 275(c) of the 1939 Code, the pre-Colony
litigation, the Colony decision itself, the enactment of § 6501(e), the relevant
changes from § 275(c), and the recent cases on the issue, and the
promulgation of Reg. § § 301.6501(e)-i T(a)(iii) and 301.6229(c)(- 1T)(a)(iii),
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in an opinion by Judge
Tatel, reversed the Tax Court and, with a healthy spread of Mayo upheld the
regulations, and dismissed the taxpayer's [tautological, in our opinion]
argument, which was accepted by the Tax Court (and a few other courts) that
the regulations by the terms of their effective date were inapplicable to the
transaction in question. The court's opinion carefully explains the source of
the statutory ambiguity and why Colony did not state that the relevant
language was unambiguous, rejecting the less well reasoned opinions of
those courts that found Colony to have held that the statutory provision was
unambiguous. Going a step further, the court concluded that Colony simply
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did not apply to either § 6501(e) or § 6229(c)(2), and that under Chevron it
was an easy call to uphold the substance of the regulations, while under
Mayo there were no procedural problems with the manner in which the
regulations were promulgated. However, the Court of Appeals remanded the
case to the Tax Court to consider Intermountain's alternative argument that
Intermountain avoided triggering the extended statute of limitations by
"adequately disclos[ing] to the IRS the basis amount it applied in connection
with the transaction at issue."
v. Let's play that tune again. UTAM, Ltd v.
Commissioner, 645 F.3d 415 (D.C. Cir. 6/21/11). The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia, in a very brief opinion by Judge Randolph,
reversed the Tax Court decision (see 1., above) on the basis of the court's
holding in Intermountain Insurance Service of Vail v. Commissioner, 650
F.3d 691 (D.C. Cir. 6/21/11). Although the Tax Court did not reach the issue
of whether § 6229(c) suspends the individual partner's § 6501 limitations
period when that period is open on the date the IRS mailed the FPAA, the
Court of Appeals found that a remand on this issue would not serve a useful
purpose. Under D.C. Circuit's opinion in Andantech, L.L.C. v.
Commissioner, 331 F.3d 972 (D.C. Cir. 2003), the assessment period
suspended by § 6229(d) is the partner's open assessment period under
§ 6501. Thus, the statute of limitations had not run.
w. The Fifth Circuit stands by its Burks
holding, and the government is ready to talk to the Supreme Court. R
and J Partners v. Commissioner, 441 Fed. Appx. 271 (5th Cir. 9/19/11). In a
per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit followed Burks v. United States, 633
F.3d 347 (5th Cir. 2011), to hold that the six year statute of limitations of
§ 6501(e) does not apply to basis overstatements and that Reg.
§ 301.6501(e)-i is invalid.
0 The court noted that "[t]he Commissioner
agrees that Burks controls the law in the circuit on that question and that the
Tax Court correctly applied that law, but took this protective appeal in an effort
to obtain a review by the Supreme Court." However, the Supreme Court did not
grant certiorari in this case.
x. And now the Supremes will sing tJ'
"Nothing But Heartaches" .'! But will the song be dedicated to the
taxpayer or the government? The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the
Fourth Circuit in Home Concrete & Supply, LLC v. United States, 634 F.3d
249 (4th Cir. 2/7/11), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 71 (9/27/11). It declined
invitations from the government to consider cases from the Fifth and Seventh
Circuits.
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y. Taxpayer wins in the Supreme Court, 4-
1-4. United States v. Home Concrete and Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836
(4/25/12). In an opinion by Justice Breyer, a former law professor in the
administrative law area, the Supreme Court held that there is no extension of
the three-year statute of limitations under § 6501(e)(1)(A) "when the
taxpayer overstates his basis in the property that he has sold, thereby
understating the gain that he received from its sale." Justice Breyer rested
this conclusion on the precedential value of Colony, Inc. v. Commissioner,
357 U.S. 28 (1958), which construed identical operative language in the
1939 Code counterpart to current § 6501(e)(1)(A), and concluded that the
statute's scope is limited "to situations in which specific receipts or accruals
of income are left out of the computation of gross income," and that the word
"omits" (unlike, say, "reduces" or "understates") means "'[t]o leave out or
unmentioned; not to insert, include, or name."' He rebutted the government
argument that because the Colony opinion stated "it cannot be said that the
language is unambiguous," there is room for a regulation that is a
"permissible construction," stating:
We do not accept this argument. In our view, Colony
has already interpreted the statute, and there is no longer any
different construction that is consistent with Colony and
available for adoption by the agency.
* The test stated in the plurality opinion -
Justice Scalia did not join the Court's opinion on this point - was whether
Congress delegated "gap-filling authority" to the agency. Justice Breyer's
opinion stated that the Colony opinion, including its examination of the
legislative history to the statute, concluded that Congress "had decided the
question definitively, leaving no room for the agency to reach a contrary
result."
* Justice Scalia's concurring opinion would
have overruled the National Cable & Telecommunications Assn. v. Brand X
Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967 (2005), holding that "a 'prior judicial
construction,' unless reflecting an 'unambiguous' statute, does not trump a
different agency construction of that statute."
* Four justices dissented in an opinion by
Justice Kennedy on the ground that the 1954 Code amendments to the statute
created inferences that would have permitted the Treasury to promulgate its
contrary regulations. Justice Breyer dismissed this position in part by stating
that to rely on one of these changes "is like hoping that a new batboy will
change the outcome of the World Series."
. Has the Court cut the hair of Brand X
and Mayo? In invalidating the regulations, the Court held that a regulation can
validly trump a prior judicial interpretation of a statute only if the "statute's
silence or ambiguity as to a particular issue means that Congress has not
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'directly addressed the precise question at issue' (thus likely delegating gap-
filling power to the agency)." The Court noted that in Chevron it stated that
"[i]f a court, employing traditional tools of statutory construction, ascertains
that Congress had an intention on the precise question at issue, that intention is
the law and must be given effect." This logic in logic in Home Concrete is
somewhat tautological because it presumes that it is for agencies, through
regulations - not courts, through judicial decisions - to fill gaps in the statute,
but then states that if a court has already interpreted the statute in the absence of
a regulation, then the court, per force, has ascertained congressional intent, and
there is no gap in the statute remaining to be filled by regulations. Moreover,
the Court's opinion is ambiguous with respect to which court's prior decision
cannot be overturned by regulations - does this principle apply only to
Supreme Court decisions, or dos it extend to lower courts decisions as well?
Are Courts of Appeals decisions different than trial court decisions? What
about Tax Court, or even District Court, decisions? Even more troubling is how
this principle applies to splits between lower courts; for example, if the IRS
prevails in the Tax Court but the decision is reversed on appeal, what are the
limits on the Treasury Department's power to enshrine its Tax Court victory in
regulations.
2. Tolling is personal; it can't be inherited. Murdock
v. United States, 103 Fed. Cl. 389 (2/9/12). The trustee of a deceased
taxpayer's trust filed tax returns for the deceased taxpayer for the years
2001-2006, for which the taxpayer, who had died on May 4, 2006, had not
filed returns. The trustee did not discover that no returns had been filed until
January 2009, and did not file the returns until September 2009. Taxes had
been withheld by the government on pension payments. In an attempt to
avoid the limitations of § 6511 (b)(2), the trustee argued that the tolling of the
period of limitations on refunds under § 6511 applied because the taxpayer's
failure to file returns was "attributable to his advanced age, medical ailments,
and alcoholism." The court (Judge Lettow) rejected the trustee's claim,
holding that § 6511(h) tolls the period of limitations only during the
taxpayer's lifetime; "if the financially disabled taxpayer is no longer alive,
Subsection 6511(h) can no longer apply and the statutory clock must begin to
run." Thus, the three year look-back period had expired in May 2009.
F. Liens and Collections
1. You can't tell the filing period deadline without a
scorecard. Gray v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 13 (3/28/12). The Tax
Court (Judge Gale) followed Raymond v. Commissioner, 119 T.C. 191
(2002), holding that where a taxpayer raises § 6015 relief in a § 6330 CDP
hearing, and the notice of determination included a determination that the
taxpayer was not entitled to § 6015 relief, a Tax Court petition, filed more
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than 30 days, but within 90 days, after the issuance of the notice of
determination, was timely for purposes of conferring jurisdiction on the Tax
Court to determine the appropriate § 6015 relief. However, Barnes v.
Commissioner, 130 T.C. 248 (2008), held that a second request for § 6015(f)
relief from an underpayment that was essentially duplicative of an earlier
request for which a final determination had been issued did not confer
jurisdiction on the Tax Court under § 6015(e)(1)(A). On the basis of the
record developed in this case, the court was unable to determine whether the
claim for § 6015 relief that the taxpayer raised at her CDP hearing is
"sufficiently dissimilar" from the claim for which she received an earlier
final determination, and further proceedings were necessary to determine
whether jurisdiction exists. On a second issue, the court held that the petition
was timely for purposes of conferring jurisdiction under § 6404(h)(1) to
determine whether the IRS's determination not to abate interest, which was
requested by the taxpayer in the CDP hearing, was an abuse of discretion.
The notice and petition conferred jurisdiction under § 6404(h) that was
independent of § 6330. Insofar as the petition sought review under § 6404(h)
of the IRS's failure to abate interest, it was timely because it was filed within
180 days of the final determination not to abate interest.
2. Ca-ching! The IRS collects twice. Weber v.
Commissioner, 138 T.C. No. 18 (5/7/12). In 2007 the taxpayer filed an
income tax return for 2006 reporting an overpayment and elected to have it
applied to his 2007 estimated income tax. However, the IRS had determined
that the taxpayer was liable for a § 6672 penalty and instead applied the
income tax overpayment to that penalty liability. In 2008 the trust fund tax
liability was satisfied by third-party payments, and when thereafter the
taxpayer filed his 2007 income tax return, he claimed a credit for the
overpaid 2006 income tax, thereby reporting a 2007 income tax
overpayment, and elected to have that asserted 2007 overpayment applied to
his 2008 estimated income tax. The IRS adjusted the 2007 credits downward
to eliminate the claimed 2006 income tax overpayment, thereby eliminating
the overpayment for 2007, resulting in a balance due. This pattern was
repeated when the taxpayer filed his 2008 income tax return in 2009, when
he again claimed a credit for earlier overpaid income tax. When the taxpayer
did not pay the balance due, the IRS issued a notice of proposed levy, and the
taxpayer requested a CDP hearing. At the CDP hearing the taxpayer argued
that the § 6672 penalty had been overpaid and that his income tax liability
would be satisfied if that overpayment were applied to his income tax
liability. The IRS rejected his argument and determined to proceed with the
levy. The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that the taxpayer was not
entitled to apply the earlier income tax overpayment to his later income tax
liability, because after application of the income tax overpayment to the
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§ 6672 penalty liability, there was no 2006 overpayment available.
Furthermore, in reviewing the CDP hearing, the Tax Court lacked
jurisdiction to adjudicate the taxpayer's claim of a § 6672 penalty
overpayment. Section 6330 - the statute conferring CDP jurisdiction on the
Tax Court - has no provision conferring and delimiting any overpayment
jurisdiction. Finally, the opinion described the many administrative problems
that would arise from allowing a person against whom a § 6672 penalty had
been assessed and collected to seek a credit (or refund) based on the assertion
that the penalty had been "over-collected."
3. The whole is greater than the sum of the parts.
Lewis v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-138 (5/16/12). In this review of
an IRS CDP determination to proceed with a levy, Judge Paris held that the
IRS had abused its discretion. "While each individual defect on its own may
be insufficient to support a holding that [the IRS] abused [its] discretion, the
cumulative effect of such defects demonstrates that [the IRS] acted both
arbitrarily and capriciously in rendering [its] determination." The IRS's
argument sought "to quilt together a string of exceptions to account for [the]
deviation from what one would consider a thorough review of [the
taxpayer's] case.... Accordingly, the Court holds that the [IRS] abused [its]
discretion in sustaining the proposed levy."
4. CDP hearings raising the issue of liability for tax
at a CDP doesn't require antique common law pleading by the taxpayer.
Fielder v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-284 (10/4/12). The Tax Court
(Judge Laro) rejected the IRS's argument that a taxpayer was precluded from
challenging his liability for taxes in a CDP hearing because he did not raise
the issue in the Form 12153 hearing request. Neither the statute nor Tax
Court case law requires a taxpayer to raise the liability issue in the request
for a CDP hearing. The statutory rule only limits the taxpayer's ability to
contest the underlying tax liability at the CDP hearing if the taxpayer did not
receive a notice of deficiency or otherwise had a prior opportunity to dispute
the tax liability. The statute does not specify the time for raising the issue.
The underlying liability should be considered if a taxpayer raises it at any
time during a CDP hearing.
G. Innocent Spouse
1. The IRS is attempting to be more equitable in
granting innocent spouse relief. Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309 (1/6/12).
This notice provides a proposed revenue procedure that will supersede Rev.
Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, which provides guidance regarding
§ 6015(f) relief from joint and several liability. The factors used in making
§ 6015(f) innocent spouse relief determinations will be revised "to ensure
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that requests for innocent spouse relief are granted under section 6015(f)
when the facts and circumstances warrant and that, when appropriate,
requests are granted in the initial stage of the administrative process." The
revenue procedure expands how the IRS will take into account abuse and
financial control by the nonrequesting spouse in determining whether
equitable relief is warranted, because when a requesting spouse has been
abused by the nonrequesting spouse, the requesting spouse may not have
been able to challenge the treatment of any items on the joint return, question
the payment of the taxes reported as due on the joint return, or challenge the
nonrequesting spouse's assurance regarding the payment of the taxes.
Furthermore, a lack of financial control may have a similar impact on the
requesting spouse's ability to satisfy joint tax liabilities. Thus, the proposed
revenue procedure provides that abuse or lack of financial control may
mitigate other factors that might otherwise weigh against granting § 6015(f)
equitable relief. The proposed revenue procedure also provides for certain
streamlined case determinations; new guidance on the potential impact of
economic hardship; and the weight to be accorded to certain factual
circumstances in determining equitable relief.
0 Until the revenue procedure is finalized,
the IRS will apply the provisions in the proposed revenue procedure instead of
Rev. Proc. 2003-61 in evaluating claims for equitable relief. But if a taxpayer
would receive more favorable treatment under one or more of the factors
provided in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 and so advises the IRS, the IRS will apply those
factors from Rev. Proc. 2003-61, until the new revenue procedure is finalized.
a. The Tax Court tells the IRS that even if it
wants to make a taxpayer favorable change to a Revenue Procedure, it
needs to finalize it, not just publish a proposed Revenue Procedure.
Deihl v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-176 (6/21/12). The Tax Court
(Judge Marvel) declined to apply the provisions of the proposed revenue
procedure set forth in Notice 2012-8, 2012-4 I.R.B. 309, in determining
whether the taxpayer was entitled to equitable relief under § 6015(f) and
instead applied Rev. Proc. 2003-61, 2003-2 C.B. 296, "in view of the fact
that the proposed revenue procedure is not final and because the comment
period under the notice only recently closed." It did however note "where
appropriate how the analysis used in Rev. Proc. 2003-61 ... would change if
the proposed revenue procedure in Notice 2012-8 ...had actually been
finalized." But on the facts the proposed changes did not affect the
conclusion that relief was not warranted.
2. An IRS levy on a joint account doesn't trump a
spouse's right to seek § 6015(g) relief. Minihan v. Commissioner, 138 T.C.
1 (1/11/12). At the time the taxpayer was seeking Tax Court review of the
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IRS's denial of § 6015(g) relief, the IRS levied on a joint bank account
owned by the taxpayer's husband and the taxpayer to satisfy the tax liability.
At that time collection against the taxpayer was suspended pursuant to
§ 6015(e)(1)(B). Judge Gustafson held that because under state law the
taxpayer owned one-half of the funds in the bank account, she was not
precluded from seeking a refund of one-half of the funds in the account if she
prevailed on the § 6015(f) relief issue. While a taxpayer who is relieved from
joint and several liability under § 6015(f) in a Tax Court proceeding is not
entitled to a refund under § 6015(g)(1), unless the taxpayer made an
overpayment, if the taxpayer prevailed, the levy on her one-half of the bank
account funds would constitute an overpayment as defined in § 6402(a).
Although United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713 (1985),
held that the IRS can lawfully levy on a joint bank account to satisfy one
account holder's individual tax liability, that levy is conditional, and it does
not extinguish a third party's rights in levied property. The court then
concluded that the rights of an "innocent spouse" who claims a refund under
§ 6015(g)(1) survive post-levy in the same way that the rights of a § 7426 or
§ 6343(b) wrongful levy claimant survive. Accordingly, the IRS was denied
summary judgment, and whether Mrs. Minihan deserved § 6015(f) relief was
a matter for trial.
H. Miscellaneous
1. The whistleblower made no noise, and kept his
(?) identity secret. Whistleblower 14106-lOW v. Commissioner, 137 T.C.
No. 15 (12/8/11). In a reviewed opinion by Judge Thornton, the Tax Court
granted summary judgment for the IRS in this case in which a whistleblower
appealed the IRS's denial of a reward. The IRS filed the affidavit of a Chief
Counsel Attorney "declaring, on the basis of his review of respondent's
administrative and legal files and on the basis of conversations with relevant
IRS personnel, that the information petitioner provided resulted in
respondent's taking no administrative or judicial action against X or
collecting from X any amounts of tax, interest, or penalty," and the
whistleblower did "not set forth, by affidavits or otherwise, any specific facts
showing that there [was] a genuine issue for trial." The court granted the
whistleblower's request for anonymity and redaction from the record of any
identifying information because the potential harm from disclosing the
whistleblower's identity as a confidential informant outweighed the public
interest in knowing the whistleblower's identity in a case decided on
summary judgment for the IRS denying an award. Because granting the
request for anonymity and redaction adequately protected the
whistleblower's privacy interests as a confidential informant, the motion to
seal the record was denied.
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a. Calculating collected proceeds in
calculating whistleblower awards. T.D. 9580, Rewards and Awards for
Information Relating to Violations of Internal Revenue Laws, 77 F.R. 10370
(2/22/12). The Treasury Department promulgated final regulations relating to
the payment of rewards under § 7623(a) for detecting underpayments or
violations of the internal revenue laws and whistleblower awards under
§ 7623(b) that amend Reg. § 301.7623-1. The amendments clarify the
definitions of proceeds of amounts collected and collected proceeds and
provide that the provisions of Reg. § 301.7623-1(a) concerning refund
prevention claims are applicable to claims under § 7623(a) and (b). "[B]oth
proceeds of amounts collected and collected proceeds include: Tax,
penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional amounts collected by
reason of the information provided; amounts collected prior to receipt of the
information if the information provided results in the denial of a claim for
refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a reduction of an
overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability incurred because of
the information provided."
b. You could be the next one to strike it rich
by ratting out your employer. IRS Summary Award Report, 9/11/12. The
IRS Whistleblower Office recommended a payment of $104 million to
former UBS banker Bradley Birkenfeld based on his 2009 claim under
§ 7623(b). The non-redacted portion of the recommendation read:
Birkenfeld provided information on taxpayer
behavior that the IRS had been unable to detect, provided
exceptional cooperation, identified connections between
parties to transactions (and the methods used by UBS AG),
and the information led to substantial changes in UBS AG
business practices and commitment to future compliance.
The actions against UBS AG and the attendant publicity also
contributed to other compliance programs. Each of these
factors could support an increase in the award percentage
above the statutory minimum. The comprehensive
information provided by the whistleblower was exceptional
in both its breadth and depth. While the IRS was aware of
tax compliance issues related to secret bank accounts in
Switzerland and elsewhere, the information provided by the
whistleblower formed the basis for unprecedented actions
against UBS AG, with collateral impact on other
enforcement activities and a continuing impact on future
compliance by UBS AG.
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c. No relief for an uncompensated
whistleblower when the IRS closes its ears to the whistle. Cohen v.
Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 12 (10/9/12). In a case of first impression, the
Tax Court (Judge Kroupa) held that no relief is available to a whistleblower
under § 7623(b) when the IRS denies a claim without initiating an
administrative or judicial action or collecting proceeds. The taxpayer's
argument that the IRS abused its discretion by not acting on his information
was rejected.
d. More comprehensive Proposed
Regulations on how to get rich ratting out tax cheats. REG-141066-09,
Awards for Information Relating to Detecting Underpayments of Tax or
Violations of the Internal Revenue Laws, 77 F.R. 74798 (12/18/12). The
Treasury Department has published detailed comprehensive proposed
regulations regarding whistleblower awards under section § 7623 to replace
the current final regulations that are only slightly more than one year old.
The proposed regulations provide guidance on eligibility and submitting
information to the IRS and filing claims for award with the Whistleblower
Office that are intended to clarify the process individuals should follow to be
eligible to receive whistleblower awards; the proposed regulations in large
part, track the existing regulations. A claimant must provide the name of the
taxpayer and specific facts and documents to support the claim. The
proposed regulations reaffirm the practice of Treasury and the IRS to
safeguard the identity of whistleblowers whenever possible. The definitions
of proceeds of amounts collected and collected proceeds in the proposed
regulations build on the definitions in the existing regulations, but some
definitions, such as "related actions," are new. The definition of "collected
proceeds" restates the rule from those final regulations that collected
proceeds include: tax, penalties, interest, additions to tax, and additional
amounts collected because of the information provided; amounts collected
prior to receipt of the information provided if the information results in the
denial of a claim for refund that otherwise would have been paid; and a
reduction of an overpayment credit balance used to satisfy a tax liability
incurred because of the information provided. Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-3
describes the administrative proceedings applicable to claims whistleblower
awards. Prop. Reg. § 301.7623-4 provides the framework and criteria that the
Whistleblower Office will use in exercising its discretion to make awards.
The proposed regulations are consistent with, and build on, the award
determination provisions provided in the Internal Revenue Manual. The
proposed regulations will be effective upon finalization.
2. New Tax Court proposed rules (12/28/11). In
December of 2011, the United States Tax Court proposed amendments to its
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Rules of Practice and Procedure. Comments in writing were due by 2/27/12.
The proposals include:
(1) amending Rule 23 to: (a) reduce the number of copies
required for papers filed with the Court, (b) delete the
nonproportional font requirement for papers filed with the Court, and
(c) revise the language regarding the Court's return of documents;
(2) deleting Rule 175, as the number of copies required for
papers filed with the Court in small tax cases would be the same as
in all other cases;
(3) amending Rule 26 to require electronic filing by most
attorneys;
(4) amending Rules 70 and 143 to conform the Court's Rules to
rule 26(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding
the contents of expert witness reports, rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding work product protections, and
revisions to rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
limiting discovery of draft expert witness reports and trial
preparation communications and materials;
(5) amending Rule 121, Summary Judgment, to conform the
Rule with revisions to rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;
(6) amending Rule 155 to clarify that computations may be filed
in conjunction with dispositive orders;
(7) amending Rule 241, Commencement of Partnership Actions,
so that its notice provisions are consistent with those of Reg.
§ 301.6223(g)-l(b)(3);
(8) adopting new Rule 345 to provide privacy protections in
whistleblower cases;
(9) amending various Rules to make conforming changes; and
(10) providing new Form 18 in recognition of 28 U.S.C. sec.
1746, which allows an unsworn declaration to substitute for an
affidavit.
a. The proposed rules were adopted
effective 7/6/12.
3. Just because the case was an S case doesn't
entitle the taxpayer to a mulligan. Or, in other words, if you don't want
an adverse decision in an S case, which would be res judicata, hire John
W. Davis to represent you in the S case. Koprowski v. Commissioner, 138
T.C. 54 (2/6/12). In a reviewed decision by Judge Gustafson, the Tax Court
held (with no dissents) that res judicata attaches to final decisions in a small
tax case and bars relitigation of a liability determined in such a case. In this
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case the taxpayer was not allowed to relitigate a clam for innocent spouse
relief that could have been raised in earlier small case regarding the
deficiency.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Holmes
noted that "the same result will certainly follow when the [Tax] Court finally
addresses the question of whether decisions in S cases collaterally estop losing
parties from relitigating the same issues in later cases."
4. Updating the "independence" of Appeals. Rev.
Proc. 2012-18, 2012-10 I.R.B. 455 (2/15/12). This revenue procedure
provides comprehensive guidance in narrative format regarding ex parte
communications between Appeals and other IRS functions. Rev. Proc. 2000-
43, 200-2 C.B. 404 was amplified, modified and superseded.
5. IRS provides "Fresh Start" penalty relief for the
faltering self-employed and the unemployed. IR-2012-31 (3/7/12). Relief
for the failure-to-pay penalty of 0.5 percent per month (up to a maximum of
25 percent) is provided for otherwise compliant taxpayers who are either
wage earners who have been unemployed for at least 30 days during 2011
and 2012 (up to the 4/17/12 filing deadline) or self-employed people who
experienced a 25 percent or greater reduction in business income due to the
economy. The announcement also doubles the dollar threshold for tax
balance due amount that qualifies for the streamlined installment agreement
program from $25,000 to $50,000 and raises the term for such agreements
from five years to six years; these programs can be set up on the IRS website
without the filing of Form 433-A or Form 433-F financial statements.
a. The IRS announces more flexible offer-
in-compromise terms. IR-2012-53 (5/21/12). The IRS announced an
expansion of its "Fresh Start" initiative that would enable taxpayers to revise
their tax problems in as little as two years (compared to the four or five years
in the past). The changes include: (1) revising the calculation for the
taxpayer's future income; (2) allowing taxpayers to repay their student loans;
(3) allowing taxpayers to pay state and local delinquent taxes; and
(4) expanding the Allowable Living Expense allowance category and
amount.
6. No evidence of this, no evidence of that, no
memory of anything - how in the world did this taxpayer expect to
prove that it actually had filed a refund claim? Maine Medical Center v.
United States, 675 F.3d 110 (1st Cir. 3/30/12). The issue in this case was
whether an administrative refund claim had been timely filed. No one could
locate a certified mail receipt or return receipt. No agent of the taxpayer had
a specific memory of mailing the claim, and no one was aware of the identity
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of the postal service employee who would have dealt with the mailing of the
claim. The IRS asserted that it has no record of ever receiving the claim. The
First Circuit (Judge Stahl) held that Reg. § 301.7502-1(e), promulgated in
2011, forecloses the use of extrinsic evidence - not that there really could
have been any such evidence after all of the things about which there was no
evidence had been ascertained - as a means of proving a timely postmark.
Thus there was no jurisdiction to hear a refund suit. The court acknowledged
that in cases decided before the promulgation of Reg. § 301.7502-1(e), see
Anderson v. United States, 966 F.2d 487 (9th Cir. 1992); Estate of Wood v.
Commissioner, 909 F.2d. 1155 (8th Cir. 1990), other circuits had held that a
taxpayer was entitled to prove via extrinsic evidence that its refund claim had
a timely postmark, but described the holding in those cases as limited to
allowing the extrinsic evidence to give rise to the common law presumption
of delivery in a § 7502 context and were thus not applicable because there
was no evidence that the IRS ever received the refund claim.
7. A zero return is a nothing. Waltner v. United
States, 679 F.3d 1329 (Fed. Cir. 4/19/12). The Federal Circuit (Judge Prost)
held that amended returns showing zeros for all income items and income
taxes withheld were not a valid tax returns, and hence not valid
administrative refund claims. Thus there was no jurisdiction to hear a refund
suit.
8. The Constitution does not require Appeals
Officers for CDP hearings to be appointed by the President. Tucker v.
Commissioner, 676 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 4/20/12), affg 135 T.C. 114
(7/26/10). The taxpayer requested a CDP hearing after the IRS issued a
notice of filing of a tax lien. After the settlement officer had upheld the tax
lien notice, the taxpayer requested a remand for a hearing to be heard by an
officer appointed by the President or the Secretary of the Treasury, in
compliance with the Appointments Clause of U.S. Const., art. II, sec. 2, cl. 2.
The Tax Court (Judge Gustafson) held that an "officer or employee" or an
"appeals officer" under § 6320 or § 6330 is not an "inferior Officer of the
United States" for purposes of the Appointments Clause. They are instead
properly hired, pursuant to § 7804(a), under the authority of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The taxpayer's motion to remand was
denied. In an opinion by Judge Williams, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia affirmed the Tax Court's decision. "[T]o be an 'Officer
of the United States' covered by Article II, a person must 'exercis[e]
significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States."' However,
"Appeals employees' discretion is highly constrained .... [T]he significance
and discretion involved in the decisions seem well below the level necessary
to require an 'Officer."'
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9. Just as a taxpayer is not required to file an
amended return, the IRS is not required to accept and process an
amended return. Roberts v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-144
(5/21/12). The taxpayer filed a return for 2007 reporting zero taxable income
and $6,000 of withheld taxes. The IRS processed the return and applied the
$6,000 overpayment to the taxpayer's unpaid 1983 tax liability.
Subsequently, the taxpayer filed an amended return for 2007 reporting nearly
$59,000 of taxable income, but the IRS did not process the amended return.
Instead the IRS sent a deficiency notice with respect to the same amounts
reported on the amended return, and did not credit the $6,000 withholding
against the 2007 taxes. The taxpayer argued that was improper for the IRS to
apply the overpayment claimed on his original 2007 return to a prior year tax
liability, but the Tax Court (Judge Foley) was unimpressed by the argument.
Petitioner further contends that respondent was
required to treat his amended 2007 return as superseding the
original 2007 return. We disagree. Taxpayers are permitted
to submit amended returns, but the Commissioner is "not
statutorily required to *** [accept an amended return], or to
treat an amended return as superseding an original return."
Fayeghi v. Commissioner, 211 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir.
2000), aff'g T.C. Memo. 1998-297.
10. You can remove those mindless disclaimers from
your emails when these proposed regulations become final (but not
before).8 REG-13867-06, Regulations Governing Practice Before the
8. Chicago lawyer Sheldon I. Banoff suggests consideration of the following
language at the end of emails until the proposed regulations become final:
CIRCULAR 230 DISCLOSURE, NON-DISCLOSURE AND
DISCLOSURE OF NON-DISCLOSURE: In accordance with
Treasury Regulations Circular 230, any tax advice contained in
this communication was not intended or written to be used, and
cannot be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding tax-related penalties
under the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or
recommending to another party any tax-related matter addressed
herein (together, the "Prohibited Purposes"). In September 2012
Treasury proposed elimination of the requirement of the
aforementioned Circular 230 disclosure, to be effective
prospectively only (upon adoption in final form and publication of
the revised Circular 230 in the Federal Register). Until that time,
our emails shall continue to include the aforementioned Circular
230 disclosure. At such time as we are no longer required to
include the aforementioned Circular 230 disclosure, we shall no
longer do so; however, we recognize that those handful of you
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Internal Revenue Service, 77 F.R. 57055 (9/17/12). In the course of a
comprehensive revision of the requirements for tax opinions, these proposed
Circular 230 regulations include the following:
0 The rigid covered opinion rules in current
§ 10.35 (which require that the written opinion contain a description of the
relevant facts, the application of the law to those facts, and the practitioner's
conclusion with respect to the law and the facts) are removed; these rules are
replaced with a single standard for all written tax advice under proposed
§ 10.37. This standard requires that the practitioner must: (i) base the written
advice on reasonable factual and legal assumptions; (ii) reasonably consider all
the relevant facts that the practitioner knows or should know; (iii) use
reasonable efforts to identify and ascertain the facts relevant on each Federal tax
who previously have bothered to read our Circular 230 disclosure
will at that time wonder whether the elimination of our Circular
230 disclosure was due to oversight or, worse yet, that the email
being sent by us to you is in fact "intended or written to be used,"
and can be used, for the Prohibited Purposes. Such inference is
not intended (except in those extremely rare cases where it is
intended, i.e., where you really would be entitled to so use our
emails for the Prohibited Purposes). Therefore, effective as of the
moment that the revised Treasury Regulations Circular 230 is
published in the Federal Register, which should only happen in our
lifetimes, the following disclosure shall become operative without
any further action on our part: "Treasury Regulations Circular 230
was recently amended to eliminate the requirement that we
disclose to you that any tax advice contained in this
communication was not intended or written to be used, and cannot
be used, for the purpose of (i) avoiding tax-related penalties under
the Internal Revenue Code or (ii) promoting, marketing or
recommending to another party any tax-related matter addressed
herein (the "Prohibited Purposes"). Therefore, as of this moment
you should not consider this email to be a Circular 230
disclosure. However, no inference is intended, and none should be
taken, that our failure to make a Circular 230 disclosure to you
from this moment forward shall entitle you to rely on any tax
advice herein for any Prohibited Purpose. Further, in the event any
person who is a member of, employed by or affiliated with this
firm should continue to include a Circular 230 disclaimer on any
email after the amendment of Circular 230 becomes effective, no
negative inference should be taken that the emails of any others
who are members of, employed by or affiliated with our firm
whose emails do not contain the Circular 230 disclosure but which
contain any tax advice can be used for the Prohibited Purposes,
without the express written consent of an authorized representative
of the firm."
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matter; (iv) not rely upon representations, statements, findings, or agreements
(including projections, financial forecasts, or appraisals) if reliance on them
would be unreasonable; and (v) not take into account the possibility that a tax
return will not be audited or that a matter will not be raised on audit. The
determination of whether a practitioner has failed to comply with these
requirements is based on all the facts and circumstances, not on whether each
requirement is addressed in the written advice.
* Proposed § 10.35 provides that a
practitioner must exercise competence when engaged in practice before the IRS
(including providing written opinions), which includes the required knowledge,
skill, thoroughness, and preparation necessary for the matter for which he is
engaged. This complements the provision in § 10.51 that a practitioner can be
sanctioned for incompetent conduct.
* Proposed § 10.36 conforms the
"procedures to ensure compliance" with the removal of the covered opinion
rules in current § 10.35, but expands these "procedures to ensure compliance"
to include all of the provisions of Circular 230.
* Proposed § 10.1 provides that the Office
of Professional Responsibility - as opposed to the IRS Return Preparer Office -
would have exclusive responsibility for matters related to practitioner
discipline.
* Proposed § 10.82 extends the expedited
disciplinary procedures for immediate suspension, but limits it to practitioners
who have engaged in a pattern of willful disreputable conduct by failing to
make an annual Federal tax return during four of five tax years immediately
before the institution of the expedited suspension proceeding, provided that the
practitioner is also noncompliant at the time the notice of suspension is served.
* Proposed § 10.31 forbids practitioners
from negotiating any taxpayer refunds, which specifically adds manipulation of
any electronic refund process.
11. Not just any old express mail service cuts the
mustard when you wait until the last minute to file a Tax Court petition.
Scaggs v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-258 (9/10/12). Tax Court
Special Trial Judge Armen held that a Tax Court petition received more than
90 days after the date of a deficiency notice but which was sent via FedEx
"Express Saver Third business day" within the 90-day period, was not timely
filed. Notice 2004-83, 2004-2 C.B. 1030, which lists the private delivery
serves that qualify for the same "mailbox" treatment as shipment via the U.S.
Postal Service pursuant to § 7502(f), does not list FedEx "Express Saver
Third business day."
2013]
Florida Tax Review
12. If the statute requires Appeals to consult with
Chief Counsel, it's not a prohibited exparte communication. Hinerfeld v.
Commissioner, 139 T.C. No. 10 (9/27/12). The taxpayer's proposed offer in
compromise was rejected and he sought review in the Tax Court. Among the
taxpayer's arguments was that the Appeals Officer had an improper ex parte
consultation with Chief Counsel's Office, violating the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
§ 1001(a)(4), 112 Stat. at 689, and Rev. Proc. 2000-43, 2000-2 C.B. 404,
which provides guidelines in question and answer format that are designed to
distinguish prohibited and permissible ex parte communications between
Appeals and other IRS employees during an administrative appeal. The Tax
Court (Judge Gale) rejected the taxpayer's argument. The Appeals Officer
had consulted Chief Counsel's Office to seek an opinion as to whether the
taxpayer had made a fraudulent conveyance. There was no evidence of
improper communications, and review by Counsel was mandated by
§ 7122(b), which, when the IRS is to compromise any unpaid tax assessed of
$50,000 or more, requires an opinion of the Chief Counsel to be filed with
the IRS.
13. The IRS can't disclose knowingly false taxpayer
information just because it could have disclosed true information. Aloe
Vera of America, Inc. v. United States, 699 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 11/15/12).
The statute of limitations under § 743 1(d) on a claim for wrongful disclosure
of a tax return begins to run when the taxpayer knows or reasonably should
know of the government's allegedly unauthorized disclosures. On the facts of
the case, the statute of limitations did not begin to run when the taxpayer
became aware of a pending general investigation that would involve
disclosures, but only later when they knew or should have known of the
specific disclosures at issue. Under § 6103(k)(4), return information may be
disclosed to a foreign government that has a tax treaty with the United States,
if such information as is pertinent to carrying out the provisions of the treaty
or preventing fraud or fiscal evasion in relation to the taxes which are the
subject of the treaty. But the disclosure of knowingly false information to a
foreign tax authority in a proposal for a simultaneous tax examination is not
protected as "pertinent" information. There was a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether the government knowingly disclosed false information,
and the District Court's grant of summary judgment for the government was
vacated and the issue remanded.
14. Prison tax returns. The 2012 Taxpayer Relief Act,
§ 209, expands the list of persons to whom false prisoner tax returns may be
disclosed by the IRS under Code § 6103(k)(10) to include officers and
employees of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, state agencies charged with
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prison administration, and contractors responsible for operating a Federal or
state prison.
XI. WITHHOLDING AND EXCISE TAXES
A. Employment Taxes
1. Social Security is cheaper for 2011, but the deficits
grow. The Compromise Tax Relief Act of 2010, § 601, reduces the
employee portion of the Old-Age, Survivors, And Disability Insurance Tax
(OASDI) from 6.2 percent to 4.2 percent for calendar year 2011.
0 The 4.2 percent rate also applies to the
railroad retirement tax.
a. Congress giveth a little and taketh some
of it back. IR-2011-124 (12/23/11). This news release highlights the two
month reduction in payroll withholding for social security taxes from 6.2
percent to 4.2 percent and the complimentary reduction in self-employment
taxes for the first two months of 2012 under The Temporary Payroll Tax Cut
Continuation Act of 2011. The news release indicates that employers should
implement the new payroll rate as soon as possible, but in any event no later
than March 31, 2012. The news release also highlights the recapture tax that
is imposed on employees who receive more than $18,350 in wages during
the two-month extension period in the amount of an additional 2 percent
income tax on wages in excess of $18,350 received during the two-month
extension.
b. The recapture tax was repealed. The
Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act of 2012 repealed the two-
percent recapture tax included in the December 2011 legislation that
effectively capped at $18,350 the amount of wages eligible for the payroll
tax cut. As a result, the now-repealed recapture tax does not apply
2. Attorneys are employees of their professional
corporation law firm. Donald Q. Cave a Prof. Law Corp. v. Commissioner,
T.C. Memo 2011-48 (2/28/11), affid, 476 Fed. Appx. 424 (5th Cir. 3/22/12).
The court (Judge Marvel) held that Donald Cave, the principal attorney for
the taxpayer S corporation engaged in law practice, associates of the firm,
and a law clerk were employees for employment tax purposes. Donald Cave
was the corporation's president, made corporate decisions, and received a
percentage of legal fees. The court held that Cave's management services in
the capacity of the corporation's president were not provided as an
independent contractor. Numerous factors supported employment status for
associate attorneys, hired by Cave in his purported activity as an "an attorney
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incubator"; they were found to be sufficiently under the control of the
corporation, the corporation provided facilities, while the associates'
compensation was on a percentage basis, they bore no risk of loss, the
relationship was "continuous, permanent, and exclusive," there was no
evidence that the associate attorneys provided services to anyone else, and
the associate attorneys provided everyday professional tasks in the
corporation's business. The court also denied independent contractor status
under the safe harbor of § 530 of the 1978 Revenue Act finding no
reasonable basis for the corporation to have treated the attorneys as
independent contractors. The corporation was also required to pay failure to
deposit tax penalties under § 6656.
a. Affirmed on control and non-exposure to
losses issues. Donald G. Cave, a Prof. Law Corp. v. Commissioner, 476 Fed.
Appx. 424 (5th Cir. 3/22/12). The Fifth Circuit, in affirming the Tax Court,
emphasized the factors of potential control by the firm of its associate
attorneys and law clerk, as well as their non-exposure to losses. Judge
Haynes concurred to note that, while the law clerk was "free" to do work for
other attorneys outside the firm, "almost no evidence about [the clerk's]
other work [was presented]," and continued, "we need not address here the
tax treatment of a person who truly performs piece work for numerous
business entities."
3. The forms are in the mail doesn't establish
delivery. Martinez v. United States, 101 Fed. Cl. 686 (1/5/12). The taxpayer
employed drivers as independent contractors in his sole-proprietorship
trucking company. The taxpayer claimed relief from employment taxes for
misclassified workers under § 530 of the Revenue Act of 1978, which
requires that the taxpayer consistently treat workers as independent
contractors and file appropriate tax returns. The taxpayer asserted that the
required Forms 1099 were delivered to the IRS asserting that the timely
delivery date can be established under the common-law mailbox rule, which
provides that proof of timely mailing creates a presumption of delivery. The
court noted that under § 7502(a) and (c) the only exceptions to requirements
that returns be delivered are that a return will be deemed delivered on the
date of the postmark, or on the date the mailing is registered [extended by
regulation to certified mail]. The court added that even if the taxpayer could
invoke a common-law mailbox rule, the evidence was not sufficient to prove
a timely and proper mailing.
4. Employment tax liability depends upon which
form you can use. LaFlamme v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-36
(2/6/12). The taxpayer, a self-employed individual, deducted her
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contributions to her qualified defined benefit pension plan on her Schedule
C, rather than on line 26 of her Form 1040 and claimed that her income from
self-employment for purposes of employment tax liability was thereby
reduced by the allowable § 162 deduction. Section 404(a)(8) allows a self-
employed individual to deduct contributions to qualified plans under §§ 162
or 212. Section 1402 defines net income from self-employment subject to the
self-employment tax of § 1401 as gross income "from any trade or business"
less the deductions allowed by Subtitle A "which are attributable to such
trade or business." The court (Judge Vasquez) agreed with the IRS that that
the taxpayer's pension contribution is "not attributable to her trade or
business." The court also indicated that the special rule of § 404(a)(8) does
not apply outside of the context of that section. Thus, the taxpayer's pension
contribution was not allowed as a deduction on her Schedule C in computing
business income. The court declined to impose penalties under § 6662
finding that the taxpayer acted in good faith in the mistaken belief that she
was entitled to deduct the pension contribution on her Schedule C.
5. S corporation "John Edwards gambit" dividends
may be treated as wages. David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 714 F.
Supp. 2d 954 (S.D. Iowa 5/27/10). Using a common tax reduction device,
David Watson formed an S corporation that was a member of Watson's
accounting firm. The S corporation contracted with the accounting firm to
provide services. Watson was paid a salary of $24,000 as an employee of the
S corporation, on which the S corporation paid employment taxes. The
remainder of the S corporation income, approximately $200,000 per year,
was distributed to Watson as a dividend, not subject to employee taxes. The
IRS recharacterized the dividends as wages. The S corporation paid an
assessment and brought a refund action. In a motion for summary judgment
the S corporation asserted that its intent controls whether amounts paid are
wages and that it intended to pay dividends in the amount of cash on hand
after the payment of wages. Citing a long line of authorities in support of its
position, the District Court held that the S corporation's "self-proclaimed
intent" to pay salary does not limit the government's ability to recharacterize
dividends as wages. The court indicated that whether amounts paid to
Watson were remuneration for services is a question of fact.
0 The court's opinion concluded with the
following passage:
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment,
Plaintiff points the Court to the following oft-cited statement
of Judge Learned Hand:
Over and over again courts have said that there
is nothing sinister in so arranging one's affairs as
to keep taxes as low as possible. Everybody does
so, rich or poor; and all do right, for nobody owes
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any public duty to pay more than the law demands:
taxes are enforced exactions, not voluntary
contributions. To demand more in the name of
morals is mere cant.
See Pl.'s Reply Br. at 5 n. 2 (quoting Commissioner
of Internal Revenue v. Newman, 159 F.2d 848, 850-51 (2d
Cir. 1947) (L. Hand, J., dissenting)). While the Court agrees
fully with Judge Learned Hand, it would remind Plaintiff of
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes' succinct, yet equally
eloquent statement in Compania General de Tabacos de
Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue: "Taxes are what
we pay for civilized society." 275 U.S. 87, 100 (1927)
(Holmes, J., dissenting). Indeed, "the greatness of our nation
is in no small part due to the willingness of our citizens to
honestly and fairly participate in our tax collection system."
Manley v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, T.C. Memo
1983-558 (Sept. 12, 1983). Thus, while Plaintiff is free to
structure its financial affairs in such a way as to avoid
paying "more [taxes] than the law demands," Plaintiff is not
free to structure its financial affairs in a way that avoids
paying those taxes demanded by the law. In this case, the
law demands that Plaintiff pay employment taxes on "all
remuneration for employment," and there is clearly a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the funds paid to
Watson, in actuality, qualify as such.
a. Since the judge gave the IRS everything it
asked for, will the IRS go for the whole kit and caboodle the next time?
David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 757 F. Supp. 2d 877 (S.D. Iowa
12/23/10). On the merits, Judge Pratt rejected the taxpayer's claim that the
wages subject to employment tax were limited to the $24,000 salary formally
paid to the sole shareholder/sole employee. In addition to the "salary" in each
of the years in question, the corporation distributed approximately $175,000
of "profits," pursuant to a corporate resolution authorizing "payment to
Watson of 'dividends in the amount of available cash on hand after payment
of compensation and other expenses of the corporation."' Citing Joseph
Radtke, S.C. v. United States, 712 F. Supp. 143 (E.D. Wisc. 1989), Spicer
Accounting, Inc. v. United States, 918 F.2d 90 (9th Cir. 1990), and
Veterinary Surgical Consultants v. Commissioner, 117 T.C. 141 (2001), as
particularly persuasive, the court concluded that "characterization of funds
disbursed by an S corporation to its employees or shareholders turns on an
analysis of whether the 'payments at issue were made . . . as remuneration
for services performed."' After examining the facts, the court concluded that
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the reasonable amount of Watson's compensation for each of the years at
issue was $91,044, increasing the $24,000 salary amount by the full amount
of the $67,044 that the corporation claimed was a § 1368 distribution, thus
upholding in full the government's position.
b. Reasonable compensation can go up as
well as down. David E. Watson, P.C. v. United States, 668 F.3d 1008 (8th
Cir. 2/21/12), cert. denied, 10/1/12. In affirming the District Court, the Court
of Appeals agreed with the IRS that the factors used by courts to assess
reasonable compensation in the context of deductions are applicable to
determine whether payments are in fact remuneration for FICA purposes.
The court indicated that "in light of all the facts and circumstances of the
case, scrutinizing compensation for its reasonableness may guide a court in
characterizing payments for FICA tax purposes." Assessing the facts, the
Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court did not clearly err in
treating additional payments to the taxpayers as remuneration for services.
The court also rejected the taxpayer's argument that under Pediatric Surgical
Assocs., P.C. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2001-81, the intent of the payor
is controlling, noting that Pediatric Surgical did not involve a question of
reasonableness.
6. The story line is just a rerun: NOLs do not
reduce self-employment income. DeCrescenzo v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo. 2012-51 (2/27/12). The taxpayer was assessed deficiencies when he
failed to file a return of income from self-employment as an accountant. The
Tax Court (Judge Marvel) held - yet again - that § 1402(a)(4) prohibits a
taxpayer from offsetting net earnings from self-employment with an NOL
carryforward or carryback.
7. Tax-exempt employer is not subject to excise tax
on qualified plan reversions. Research Corporation v. Commissioner, 138
T.C. 192 (2/29/12). Section 4980(a) imposes a 20 percent tax on the amount
of any reversion to the employer from a qualified plan. However,
§ 4980(c)(1) excludes from the definition of a qualified plan, a plan
"maintained by an employer if such employer has, at all times, been exempt
from tax under subtitle A." Research Corporation received a reversion from
its qualified plan in the amount of $4,411,395, but reported a taxable
reversion under § 4980 of only $14,055 asserting that the reported amount
reflected the portion of its income that was subject to the unrelated business
income tax. In a case of first impression, the Tax Court (Judge Haines)
rejected the IRS assertion that, because the tax-exempt corporation was
subject to tax on unrelated business income, it was not at all times exempt
from tax under subtitle A. The court cited the language of § 501(b), which
provides that a § 501(c)(3) organization that is subject to the unrelated
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business income tax "shall be considered an organization exempt from
income taxes for the purpose of any law which refers to organizations
exempt from income taxes." Thus the court held that Research Corporation
was to be treated as exempt from tax at all times for purposes of
§ 4980(c)(1). The court also concluded that Research Corporation overpaid
its taxes on the portion that it treated as a reversion, but that the court lacked
jurisdiction to order a refund.
8. Full-time resident horse farm workers don't have
enough independence from the horse-mistress. Twin Rivers Farm, Inc. v.
Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-184 (7/2/12). The Tax Court (Judge Ruwe)
denied the subchapter S corporation's petition for redetermination of the
IRS's determination of employment status for two farm workers on the
taxpayer's Tennessee horse farm. In spite of assertions by the taxpayer's sole
shareholder that she did not exercise control over the two workers, the court
noted that to maintain the requisite degree of control to establish employee
status the principal need not directly control the worker; it is sufficient that
the principal has the right to do so. The court indicated that by the nature of
the work relationship, it was likely that the shareholder had the right to
exercise control. The workers were using the taxpayer's equipment, caring
for the corporation's principal assets, and living full time in a trailer on the
taxpayer's property. The court pointed out that if the workers were not
exercising their duties appropriately that the shareholder would certainly
have intervened with direction. The court also pointed to the fact that the
workers were receiving a regular weekly salary for their services and were
long-term employees who resided on the farm. In addition, the taxpayer
maintained workers compensation insurance and covered the workers'
necessary job-related expenditures. The court also held the taxpayer liable
for penalties under § 665 1(a)(1) for failure to file the required Form 943 for
employers of agricultural workers and penalties under § 6656 for failure to
make timely employment tax deposits.
9. Skilled pieceworkers were employees even
though the employer did not "stand over them" to control them. Atlantic
Coast Masonry, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo 2012-233 (8/13/12). In
spite of the fact that construction masons and laborers were paid in cash by
the taxpayer on a piece-work basis, the workers were held to be employees
by Judge Jacobs. The Tax Court noted that the workers were skilled
craftsmen who did not require direct supervision. Nonetheless, instruction
from the taxpayer on the nature of the work and requirements for completion
constituted control over the workers. "An employer need not 'stand over' the
employee to control an employee." The court also indicated that the workers
did not share in profits and losses notwithstanding the piece-work nature of
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the workers' compensation, and that the factor supported employee status.
Section 530 relief was denied because the taxpayer failed to file Forms 1099
with respect to the workers. The taxpayer was also held liable for § 6651
penalties for failure to file required employment tax returns and § 6656
penalties for failure to pay required employment tax deposits. The court held
that the taxpayer failed to demonstrate reasonable cause for the absence of
filings.
10. Tax refunds in a bad economy set up another
deference conflict among the circuits. In re Quality Stores, Inc., 693 F.3d
605 (6th Cir. 9/7/12). In November 2001 Quality Stores closed 63 stores and
9 distribution centers and terminated the employment of all employees in the
course of Chapter I I bankruptcy cases. Quality Stores adopted plans
providing severance pay to terminated employees. The company reported the
severance pay as wages for withholding and employment tax purposes then
filed claims for refund of FICA and FUTA taxes claiming that the severance
pay represented supplemental unemployment compensation benefits (SUBs)
that are not wages for employment tax purposes. Disagreeing with the
contrary holding by the Federal Circuit in CSX Corp. v. United States, 518
F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008), the Sixth Circuit held that the SUBs were exempt
from employment taxes. The court examined the language and legislative
history of § 3402(o)(1), which provides that SUB payments "shall be treated
as if it were a payment of wages" for withholding purposes, to conclude that,
by treating SUB payments as wages for withholding, Congress recognized
that SUB payments were not otherwise subject to withholding because they
did not constitute "wages." Then, under Rowan Cos. v. United States, 452
U.S. 247, 255 (1981), the court concluded that the term "wages" must carry
the same meaning for withholding and employment tax purposes. Thus, if
SUBs are not wages under the withholding provision (because the must be
treated as wages by statutory directive), the SUBs are not wages for
employment tax purposes. The court also rejected the IRS's position in Rev.
Rul. 90-72, 1990-2 C.B. 211, that to be excluded from employment taxes
SUBs must be part of a plan that is designed to supplement the receipt of
state unemployment compensation. The court declined to follow the Federal
Circuit's holding in CSX Corp., which adopted the eight part test of Rev.
Rul. 90-72, stating that, "We decline to imbue the IRS revenue rulings and
private letter rulings with greater significance than the congressional intent
expressed in the applicable statutes and legislative histories." The court also
stated that it could not conclude that the opinion in Mayo Foundation for
Medical Education & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011),
eroded the holding of Rowan Cos. v. United States, which compelled the
court to interpret the meaning of "wages" the same for withholding and
employment tax purposes.
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* Will the disagreement between the
Federal and Sixth Circuits once again invite the Supreme Court to enter the
deference fray?
11. The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York gets the message. Recoveries in age discrimination suit are
wages. Gerstenbluth v. Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC, 110 A.F.T.R.2d
2012-6238 (E.D.N.Y. 9/28/12). The District Court for the Eastern District of
New York (Judge Seybert) granted summary judgment to defendants in a
claim for refund against the employer and the IRS for employment taxes
withheld by the employer on damages paid to the taxpayer in a successful
claim for age discrimination. The court ruled that money paid to settle
employment discrimination claims constitute wages where the money
represents back pay or front pay. Although the settlement agreement with
Credit Suisse did not explicitly describe the payment as wages, the court
concluded that the payment represented wages based on the employer's
characterization of the payment as wages in reporting the settlement as
compensation on Form W-2.
a. As does the Northern District. Back and
front pay in a Title VII wrongful discharge recovery are wages. Noel v.
New York State Office of Mental Health Central New York Psychiatric
Center, 697 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 8/31/12). The plaintiff in a Title VII wrongful
discharge case recovered damages for back and front pay in a jury trial. The
State Office of the Controller withheld employment taxes from its payment
of the judgment. The District Court for the Northern District of New York
ordered the Controller to pay the full amount of the judgment. In an appeal
filed by the Controller, joined by the Tax Division of the Justice Department
as amicus, the Court of Appeals held that the front and back pay constituted
wages subject to withholding. The court noted that both front and back pay
constitute remuneration paid to compensate for what the employee would
have earned had the employee not been a victim of discrimination. Thus, the
court concluded that, "[t]hese amounts are 'wages' because they constitute
'remuneration' for services during an employee-employer relationship."
12. Funding health care by making the HI tax more
progressive. Section 1401, as amended by the 2010 Health Care Act,
increases the employee portion of the HI tax is increased by an additional tax
of 0.9 percent on wages in excess of a threshold amount. The threshold
amount is $250,000 of the combined wages of both spouses on a joint return
($125,000 for a married individual filing a separate return). The threshold is
$200,000 for all other individuals. The employer must withhold the
additional HI tax, but in determining the employer's withholding
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requirement and liability for the tax, only wages that the employee receives
from the employer in excess of $200,000 for a year are taken into account,
and the employer disregards the employee's spouse's wages. I.R.C.
§ 3102(f). The employee is liable for the additional 0.9 percent HI tax to the
extent the tax is not withheld by the employer. Section 1402(b), as amended,
imposes an additional tax of 0.9 percent on self-employment income above
the same thresholds. The threshold amount is reduced (but not below zero)
by the amount of wages taken into account in determining the FICA tax with
respect to the taxpayer. No deduction under § 164(f) is allowed for the
additional SECA tax, and the alternative deduction under § 1402(a)(12) is
determined without regard to the additional SECA tax rate. The additional
tax applies to wages received in taxable years after 12/31/12.
a. Proposed regulations relating to the
Additional Medicare Tax. REG-130074-1 1, Rules Relating to Additional
Medicare Tax, 77 F.R. 72268 (12/05/12). Proposed regulations under
§§ 1401, 3101, and 3102, relating to Additional Hospital Insurance Tax on
income above threshold amounts ("Additional Medicare Tax"), as added by
the Affordable Care Act. Specifically, these proposed regulations provide
guidance for employers and individuals relating to the implementation of
Additional Medicare Tax. This document also contains proposed regulations
relating to the requirement to file a return reporting Additional Medicare
Tax, the employer process for making adjustments of underpayments and
overpayments of Additional Medicare Tax, and the employer and employee
processes for filing a claim for refund for an overpayment of Additional
Medicare Tax.
* The changes to §§ 1401 and 3102 are
effective for tax years beginning after 12/31/12, and taxpayers may rely on the
proposed regulations for purposes of complying with these section until the
effective date of the final regulations, which are expected to be made final
during 2013 and will be applicable to tax years beginning after 12/31/13.
* FAQs to the Additional Medicare tax
were released by the IRS on 11/30/12, 2012-TNT 232-48.
B. Self-employment Taxes
1. LLC guaranteed payments are subject to self-
employment tax; the members are held to their reporting positions.
Howell v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2012-303 (11/1/12). Mr. Howell and
Mr. Bruzee formed a limited liability company to develop medical
technology. Mrs. Howell (the taxpayer), however was named as a 60 percent
member of the LLC instead of Mr. Howell because she had a better credit
rating and the parties intended to use her personal credit card for LLC
expenditures. The LLC members were compensated with payments deducted
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by the LLC as guaranteed payments. Under § 1402(a)(13) a limited partner's
distributive share of partnership income is excluded from wages for self-
employment tax purposes except for guaranteed payments under § 707(c) for
services rendered to the partnership. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel) rejected
the taxpayer's argument that the payments were distributions of partnership
share not subject to employment tax. The court held that the taxpayer was
bound by the characterization of the payments on the partnership returns,
which she signed, noting that taxpayers are free to organize their affairs as
they choose, but that a taxpayer "may not enjoy the benefit of some other
route he might have chosen to follow but did not." The court also observed
that the taxpayer introduced no evidence to prove that the payments to Mrs.
Howell were not in substance guaranteed payments. The court indicated that
although Mrs. Howell's services were minimal in contrast to the
management services of her husband pursuant to a contract signed by Mrs.
Howell on behalf of the partnership, Mrs. Howell provided marketing advice,
signed documents, entered into contracts on behalf of the LLC, and allowed
the LLC to use her credit card and credit rating. The court thus found that
Mrs. Howell was not merely a passive investor in the LLC. The guaranteed
payments were not, therefore, excluded from wages.
2. Good preaching at home does not avoid self-
employment tax for this carpenter. Good v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo
2012-323 (11/20/12). The taxpayer's claimed ministry for Prepare the Way
Ministries, formed based on various books about churches and taxes, did not
exempt the taxpayer's income from various services from self-employment
tax under the minister exception of § 1402(c)(4). Taxpayer's receipts were
also otherwise includible in gross income. The Tax Court (Judge Marvel)
concluded that the taxpayer failed to provide any credible evidence that he
was a minister of a church and held the taxpayer liable for fraud penalties.
3. Local police officers working off-duty security
jobs are independent contractors. Specks v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo.
2012-343 (12/11/12). The taxpayer, a Houston police officer, provided off-
duty security services in uniform for private companies. The private
companies reported the remuneration on Forms 1099. The Tax Court (Judge
Kroupa) determined that the taxpayer was an independent contractor subject
to self-employment tax. The private parties did not train, supply, or equip the
taxpayer in performing the security service, which was performed on an at-
will basis. The court concluded that the absence of evidence of control over
the taxpayer was to be given greater weight over other factors indicating
employee status.
* The court sustained § 6662(a) accuracy-
related penalties and indicated that the taxpayer failed to establish under
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§ 664(c) reasonable reliance on a return preparer who was a competent
professional with significant expertise and provided all of the relevant
information.
C. Excise Taxes
1. The price of a tan goes up even in disregard of
the hazard from which the owner is protected. T.D. 9596, Disregarded
Entities and the Indoor Tanning Services Excise Tax, 77 F.R. 37806
(6/25/12). Temp. and Prop. Reg. § 1.1361-4T(a)(8)(iii) adds the 10 percent
excise tax on indoor tanning services of § 5000B is added to the list of excise
taxes for which disregarded entities (QSub or single owner business entity)
that are treated as separate entities.
2. Roll your own, inhale, and pay the tax. Section
100122 of the Transportation Act would amend Code § 5702(d) to add to the
tobacco excise tax any person who for commercial purposes makes available
to the consumer a machine that rolls cigarettes, cigars, or other tobacco
products. Previously the tax only applied to manufacturers of cigarettes and
cigars who actually rolled the product, but did not apply to consumers who
rolled their own. This change would add to the tobacco excise tax
establishments that provided access to commercial grade rolling equipment
to consumers who purchased the tobacco and paper from the retailer and fed
it into the machine provided by the retailer, obtaining cigarettes at much
lower cost free of the excise tax.
3. The IRS rejects a (former) Court of Claims
limitation on retroactive application of rulings. AOD 2012002 (9/12/12).
The IRS announced its nonacquiescence in International Business Machines
Corp. v. United States, 343 F.2d 914 (Ct. Cl. 1965), which held that the IRS
could not apply a changed position on an excise tax issue prospectively from
the date of revocation to a taxpayer whose erroneous favorable ruling was
revoked, but retroactively as to another taxpayer. The Court of Claims in
IBM held that it was an abuse of discretion to treat two competitors
differently with respect to excise taxes on the same type of equipment.
4. Final regulations for the Medical Device Excise
Tax. T.D. 9604, Taxable Medical Devices, 77 F.R. 72924 (12/7/12). Final
Reg. §§ 48.4191-1 and -2 provide guidance on the excise tax imposed on the
sale of certain medical devices, enacted by the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 in conjunction with the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act. They define "taxable medical device" and provide for
the imposition of the tax at a 2.3 percent rate on manufacturers, producers
and importers making sales of such devices.
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The tax is applicable to sales on and after
1/1/13.
a. Notice 2012-77, 2012-52 I.R.B. 781
(12/5/12). The IRS has provided guidance regarding the § 4191 excise tax
imposed on the sale of certain medical devises by domestic and foreign
manufactures. The notice spells out a methodology for determining a
constructive sales price applicable to manufacturers who sell through
multiple distribution channels. The notice also exempts the sale price of
domestically produced connivance kits for practitioners who install the
medical device. Foreign produced convenience kits are subject to the excise
tax only to the extent of the value of included taxable medical devices.
* FAQs to the excise tax were released by
the IRS on 12/6/12, 2012-TNT 235-22.
XII. TAx LEGISLATION
A. Enacted
1. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act("PPACA" - pronounced "pee-pac-a" or "Obamacare"), P.L.111-148, was
signed by President Obama on 3/23/10, and H.R. 4872, the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 ("2010 Health Care Act" or "2010
Reconciliation Act"), P.L. 111-152, was signed by President Obama on
3/30/10.
a. The 2010 Health Care Act is
constitutional, but the "penalty" is not a "tax." Thomas More Law Center
v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529 (6th Cir. 6/29/11) (2-1). The Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in an opinion by Judge Martin, upheld the constitutionality of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 (2010), amended by the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029. The majority opinion upheld
the Act under the Commerce Clause. Judge Sutton's concurring opinion also
concluded that the Act was constitutional under the Commerce Clause, but
held that the Act was not an exercise of the taxing power - the penalty for
not purchasing health insurance was not a tax. An opinion by Senior District
Judge Graham, concurring in part and dissenting in part, also held that the
Act was not an exercise of the taxing power but would have held the Act
unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power to regulate commerce.
b. But, on the other hand, the Eleventh
Circuit holds that the individual mandate is unconstitutional. Florida v.
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U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir.
8/12/11) (2-1). The Eleventh Circuit held that Congress exceeded its
authority by requiring Americans to buy coverage, but also ruled that the rest
of the wide-ranging law could remain in effect. The case stems from a
challenge by twenty-six states which had argued the individual mandate, set
to go into effect in 2014, was unconstitutional because Congress could not
force Americans to buy health insurance or face the prospect of a penalty.
The majority stated:
This economic mandate represents a wholly novel and
potentially unbounded assertion of congressional authority:
the ability to compel Americans to purchase an expensive
health insurance product they have elected not to buy, and to
make them re-purchase that insurance product every month
for their entire lives.
c. Does anyone really care what D.C.
Circuit thinks when the issue is already up on certiorari? Seven-Sky v.
Holder, 661 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 11/8/11). The Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia (2-1) upheld the constitutionality of the minimum essential
health care coverage requirement of § 1501 of the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Health Care Act, codified at Code § 5000A as an exercise of
Congress's power under the Commerce clause. The suit was not barred by
the Anti-Injunction Act because the suit involved a penalty unconnected to a
tax liability. Judge Kavanaugh dissented as to jurisdiction because he would
have held that the AIA barred the suit.
d. When President Obama said that the
"individual mandate" was not a tax, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas,
and Alito thought he was being serious, but the Chief Justice and
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan knew that, as usual,
he was just fooling with us. National Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (6/28/12). On certiorari to the Eleventh Circuit, the
Chief Justice delivered the opinion for the Court which held: (1) that the suit
to declare the individual mandate unconstitutional was not barred by the
Anti-Injunction Act because Congress indicated that it did not want it to be
so barred (9-0); (2) that the individual mandate was unconstitutional as an
exercise of congressional power under the Commerce Clause (5-4); and
(3) that the individual mandate was valid as a tax - but not a direct tax -
under the Taxing Clause (5-4). With respect to the Direct Tax Clause, the
Chief Justice stated:
A tax on going without health insurance does not
fall within any recognized category of direct tax. It is not a
capitation. Capitations are taxes paid by every person,
"without regard to property, profession, or any other
2013]
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circumstance." Hylton, supra, at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.)
(emphasis altered). The whole point of the shared
responsibility payment is that it is triggered by specific
circumstances - earning a certain amount of income but not
obtaining health insurance. The payment is also plainly not a
tax on the ownership of land or personal property. The
shared responsibility payment is thus not a direct tax that
must be apportioned among the several States.
. There was some more stuff about
Congress lacking the power to force states to expand Medicaid upon pain of
denial of all federal aid to states for Medicaid, which was decided 7-2.
2. The Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation
Act of 2012, P.L. 112-96, was signed by President Obama on 2/22/12. The
new law also repeals the two-percent recapture tax included in the December
2011 legislation that effectively capped at $18,350 the amount of wages
eligible for the payroll tax cut. As a result, the now-repealed recapture tax
does not apply.
3. The Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st
Century Act (the "Transportation Act"), P.L. 112-141, was signed by
President Obama on 7/6/12. Section 100122 of the Transportation Act
amends Code § 5702(d) to add to the tobacco excise tax any person who for
commercial purposes makes available to the consumer a machine that rolls
cigarettes, cigars, or other tobacco products.
4. The American Jobs Act of 2011 was orally signed
by President Obama on 9/8/11. It will reduce the unemployment rate to 4
percent, cause the oceans to recede and cure cancer. Lacking are a written
bill (because the Congressional Budget Office perversely refuses to score
speeches) and the trivial detail of congressional voting (rendered irrelevant
by President Obama's multiple repetitions of the necessity of immediate
passage of the yet-unwritten bill, which Congress perversely failed to do on
9/9/11).
a. His directing that this fiscal cliff bill be
"signed" with an autopen, instead of signing it himself, confirms that
Obama acted arrogantly throughout this entire process. The lion's share
of the Act consists of so-called "Jimmy Johnson" provisions. The
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 ("the 2012 Taxpayer Relief (and
not so grand compromise) Act" or "the Act"), P.L. 112-240, was "signed" by
President Obama's autopen on 1/2/13.
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* According to a White House Press
Secretary statement, it "makes permanent the temporary rates on taxable
income at or below $400,000 for individual filers and $450,000 for married
individuals filing jointly; permanently indexes the Alternative Minimum Tax
exemption amount to the Consumer Price Index; extends emergency
unemployment compensation benefits and Federal funding for extended
benefits for unemployed workers for one year; continues current law
Medicare payment rates for physicians' services furnished through
December 31, 2013; extends farm bill policies and programs through
September 30, 2013; and provides a postponement of the Budget Control
Act's sequester for two months.
